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 1 
 
Introduction 
 
“The horrors lived by child soldiers are overwhelming:abducted, 
subjected to sexual slavery, beaten, deprived, forced to kill and often 
murdered. […] Tens of thousands of under-18s were estimated to 
have been recruited by armed forces in at least 60 countries. While 
thousands were legally recruited, others were forcibly conscripted 
in military round ups to replenish numbers in unpopular armies. 
Still others were enlisted in countries where the lack of a 
functioning birth registration system made it impossible to verify the 
age of recruits and ensure protection of under-18s from active 
military service. […] Some [i.e. of the young recruits] were 
reportedly beaten during training, receiving little medical care for 
their injuries. Girl soldiers are frequently subjected to rape and 
other forms of sexual violence as well as being involved in combat 
and other roles.”1 
 
This quotation from the Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 (hereinafter “Global Report 
2004), published by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, aims to call for 
international attention to protect children against military exploitation. This Report outlines 
the scope of child soldiery, the methods of recruitment, and most importantly stresses the 
detrimental effects and the prevalent phnonmen of child soldiering: not only young soldiers 
have suffered from widespread violence and brutalities of armed conflicts, but the number of 
child soldiers has been seen an increase at an alarming rate. Obviously the cited report is not 
the only voice calling for attention to the miserable situation of child soldiers used in armed 
conflicts.  
 
As early as 1993, Ms. Graça Machel was commissioned by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations to study the impact of armed conflict on children.2 A report, summing up the 
extent of using child soldiers and its consequences was presented to the 51st Session of the 
                                                          
1 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004, Coalition to Stop the Use of 
the Child Soldiers, 2004, pp. 9, 14, 16, 42. 
2 General Assembly, Protection of children affected by armed conflicts, A/RES/48/157, 85th Plenary Meeting, 
20 December 1993, para. 7. 
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General Assembly.3 In this report, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of children, 
many of whom are only ten years old or even younger, were serving either in government 
armies or in opposition groups.4 The use of young soldiers in wars, therefore, was labeled as 
“one of the most alarming trends in armed conflicts”.5 
 
Due to a large number of child soldiers serving in armed forces– primarily in non-state armed 
groups, but also in national armed forces,6 the task to end the child recruitment has become 
an issue of high public attention over the last few years. The condemnation of under-age 
military service is near-universal, coming not only frominternational bodies, but also from 
the States who pledge to implement their obligation to prohibit using of children soldiers in 
the midst of armed conflicts. The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict (“hereinafter “the Office”) set a good example of 
fighting against child soldering.  
 
Since 1997, the Office has devoted itself to the mission of protection children from war.7The 
use of children as soldiers is considered as a part of a broad issue of “war-affected children 
offenses”, and it has become central within the work of the Office. Especially in 2009, the 
Office identifies “recruiting and using children under 18 years” as one of the six grave 
violations against children during armed conflict and urges the states to end the impunity of 
                                                          
3 General Assembly, Provisional Agenda of the Fifty-first Regular Session of the General Assembly, A/51/150, 
51st Session, 19 July 1996. 
4 United Nation General Assembly, Graça Machel, Report concerning the Impact of Armed conflict on Children 
(hereinafter “Machel Report”), U.N. Doc. A/51/306, 26 August 1996, para. 35. 
5 Ibid, para. 34.  
6 Save the Children, Child Soldiers – and Other Children Used by Armed Forces and Groups, 2010, p.1, 
available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/docs/Child_soldiers_policy_brief.pdf (last accessed on May 
2011). 
7 In its mission statement, the Office states, “an extraordinary impetus now exists for the application of 
international standards and norms that demonstrates the remarkable commitment of the international community 
to child protection in armed conflict. It is imperative to maintain that momentum in order to further advance the 
agenda and to better protect our children from war. See website of the Office of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed conflict, 
http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/index.html(last accessed on 9 Sept 2010). 
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perpetrators who recruit or use children in hostilities.8 Various efforts are being made by the 
Office to draw international attention to the horrendous plight of children soldiers serving in 
armed forces or groups and ultimately to stop the use of child soldiers by both governments 
and non-state actors.  
 
On 5 October 2010, the Office issued a unique documentary picturing the miserable life of a 
group of former child soldier, who was abducted and was forced to become fighters of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (hereinafter “LRA”) in northern Uganda. Through the documentary, 
the Office expresses a clear stance that no child should be used to take part in hostilities and 
the governments should assist the former child soldiers in finding a new existence after a life 
of violence, distress and alienation.9 
 
The Office also calls on all of the governments for actions to develop and strengthen the 
existing international norms and standards for the protection of children from soldering. On 
25 May 2010, the Office, along with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Violence against children, the United Nations Children’s Fund (hereinafter “UNICEF”), and 
the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights launched a “zero under eighteen” 
two-year campaign, with the aim to achieve universal ratification of the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
(hereinafter “OPCRC”) 10  by 2012, and to “promote the adoption and effective 
implementation of relevant national legislation”. 11 The Office especially emphasizes the 
                                                          
8 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The Six Grave 
Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation, Working Paper No. 1, October 
2009, pp. 3, 7-8.  
9 Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, Delegates and Mission Staff Invited to World Premiere 
of Documentary “Children of War”, 5 October 2010, available at http://iseek.un.org/webpgdept1913_11.asp 
(last accessed on 8 October 2010). 
10 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict (hereinafter “OPCRC”), Doc. A/54/L. 84, 16 May 2000, entry into force 12 February 2002.  
11 The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Concept 
note “Zero under 18”,  
http://zerounder18.org/Portals/ZeroUnder18/documents/Concept%20Note%20-
%20Zerounder18%20Campaign.pdf(last accessed on 7 October 2010). See more about the Zero under Eighteen 
Campaign, available at http://zerounder18.org/Default.aspx?tabid=829 (last accessed on 7 October 2010).  
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obligation of governments and non-State actors to strengthen “the essence of the OPCRC” to 
raise the minimum age of recruitment to 18 years, even including for voluntary recruitment.  
 
In the implementation of its mission of fighting to end impunity, the Office welcomes the 
achievement made by international tribumals on the trials regarding the crime of child 
recruitment, and further encourages national tribunals to achieve accountability for child 
soldiering violations at the national level.12 
 
It should also be pointed out that effrots to end the use of child soldiers involve a wide 
spectrum of internaiotnal organizations with their own fields of action,which collaborate with 
each other. Besides the Office, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary Forms of Slavery, 
inlcuding its causes and its consequences (hereinafter “Special Rapportuer”) is another 
organization among all the others that provided recommendations on measures that should be 
taken on all variant forms of slavery practices, including child soldiering. Over the years, 
Speical Rapportuer has collected evidence of “a wide range of slavery practices”,13which are 
stated in the report of Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights,  
 
“the word ‘slavery’ covers not only traditional slavery, but also “the 
slave trade, these abuses include the sale of children, child 
prostitution, child pornography, the exploitation of child labor, the 
sexual mutilation of female children, the use of children in armed 
conflicts, debt bondage, the traffic in persons and in the sale of 
human organs, the exploitation of prostitution, and certain practices 
under apartheid and colonial regimes.”14 
 
Use of child soldiers in hostilities therefore has been specfically incorporated into the scope 
of contemporary forms of slavery. The following will describe the main international 
instruments regarding slavery.  
                                                          
12 See the Office’s homepage, available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/actions.html (last 
accessed on 7 October 2010). 
13 Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twenties Century: The Evaluation of a Global Problem, Rowman Altamira, 
2003, p. 15.  
14 Fact Sheet 14: Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, June 1991, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet14en.pdf (last accessed on 1 November 
2010).  
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It should not be underestimated that through the process of fighting against child soldiering, 
an important contribution to the advancement of international legal norms relating to child 
soldiering has been made by modern international criminal law. At the early stage, the 
international instruments only prohibit child soldiering, but not expressly obligations to 
criminalize the practice of child soldiering as an international crimeattracting individual 
responsibility. The approach of only obliging states to prohibit the practice of child 
recruitment seems not to work satisfactorily to stop the use of child soldiers. Apparently it 
failed to bring about lots of progress in the campaign of entailing criminal responsibility to 
perpetrators – an issue attracts important concern in the field of international criminal law. It 
is well-known that the principle of individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law has been a motor for the interpretation and implementation of 
respective standards and norms. And thus, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter “Rome Statute”), as an example, marked a milestone in the road towards 
the criminalization of violations of children by defining child recruitment as a war crime in 
its Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and (e) (vii).  
 
This dissertation, therefore, will focus on two main aspects of the crime of child recruitment: 
the norms and standards relating to child soldiering on the international level, and some 
issues relating to the implementation of these norms and standards at the national level. To 
this end, the dissertation firstly will summarize the international instruments on the 
prohibition of child recruitmient under a classical human rights aspect, and then it will deal 
with the developments of the crime under international criminal law, in terms of 
criminalization level. Following outlining and analyzing the relevant international 
instruments, an overview of case law relating to the prosecution of perpetrators who use child 
soldiers in hostilities will be addressed in Chapter 2. Based on the judicial practice at the 
international tribunals, along with a detailed research on the criminalization of child 
soldiering in the national legislation, the following Chapter 3 is to investigate the question 
whether the crime of child recruitment formed part of the customary international law. Last 
but not least, Chapter 4 is to engage in an analysis of the constituent elements of the crime of 
child recruitment under the Rome Statute. As the first case regarding the crime of child 
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recruitment before the ICC, the jurisprudence which was established in the Lubanga case15 
not only has sent a clear message that no individual is beyond the reach of justice for child 
soldiering, but also has sent an important precedent for both international tribunals and 
national courts in child recruitment trials. 
  
                                                          
15 At the time when the dissertation was finished writing, the trial of Lubanga had not been completed, and 
therefore no judgment had yet been delivered. This dissertation will produce an analysis of the Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges of the Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga trial at the International Criminal Court. 
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PART I – HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF CHILD 
RECRUITMENT 
 
Chapter 1: The International Instruments Concerning the Issue 
of Child Soldiering 
A. Background 
 
Children’s involvement in wars and armed conflicts is not something unknown until recently. 
Throughout the history of homo sapien, child soldiers have been found on frontlines engaged 
in fighting or other staffing chores.In fact, the history of child soldiers can be dated back to 
ancient times, when children were generally considered not only as property under the lawful 
ownership of man, whether a father, slave master, or guardian, but also as property of the 
State.16 Spartan children, for instance, were taken from their mothers at the tender age of 7 to 
be kept in dormitories with other boys and trained as soldiers,17 simply because they were 
believed to be loyal to the state.18 The same situation was found in ancient Rome where 
seven-year-olds were obliged to join the army.19 Minor service in military units was not only 
a phenomenon common within the territory of a state, but underage involvement in hostilities 
also extended to occupied territories far away from the home country. In those times, no 
voice was ever raised challenging the legality of one nation going to war with another.20 The 
conquerors took from the vanquished not only his life, but also all of his belongings, 
                                                          
16 This view has been upheld by some of the States until modern times. Jacob G. Hornberger, Children Are 
Property of the State, paras.1-2, available at http://www.fff.org/comment/ed0400d.asp (last accessed on 15 
September 2010). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Social Studies School Service, Ancient Greece, Social Studies Publisher, 2003, p. 91.  
19 See Xueyou Databases, The Flourishing Age of Ancient Greece and Rome, pp. 17-18, available at http:// 
zhjyx.hfjy.net.cn/Basic/EBookLib/KWDW/TS004056 (latest visit on 8 August 2008). 
20 During that period no systematic law was formed, though some principles concerning the laws of war were 
delineated. For example, Cicero (106-43 B.C.) urged soldiers to conduct with as little cruelty or inhumanity as 
possible to reduce the implicit horrors. See Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in 
International War Crimes Tribunals, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997, p. 19.  
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including women, children, domestic animals and personal properties.21 It was a widespread 
practice for children to be seized as property and then recruited to take part in armed conflicts 
against their own countries.  
 
Slowly, a sense began to emerge that some distinction should be made between combatants 
and non-combatants in war.22 Despite the fact that the term “civilian” remained undefined, a 
feeling had grown that the population of an enemy state should be spared the wrath of war. 
Take ancient China, for instance, a beginning was made in regard to the treatment of the non-
combatant. Sun Tsu, the author of “The Art of War” in the sixth century B.C. forbade the 
slaying of prisoners of war, giving as alternatives: absorption into one’s own army, 
enslavement or ransom.23 Still, there was no clearly formed view that children should be 
protected from military service, either as vulnerable persons or as civilians.  
 
In the Middle Ages, the situation continued more or less the same. Child soldiers were still 
viewed as heroes not victims.24 In 1212 Children crusades, for example, composed entirely of 
young children holding the faith of homeric heroism set out to take the Holy Land from the 
Muslims.25 But only a few of them returned home and most were starved, drowned or frozen 
to death during the journey and others were caught by the Arabs and sold into slavery.26 
                                                          
21 Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War On Land, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 838, p. 
339.  
22 Richard Shelley Hartigan, the Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian, Precedent Publisher, 1982, pp. 7, 
124.  
23 Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War on Land, supra note 21, p. 339. 
24 Dominique Marshall, The Construction of Children As An Object of International Relations: The Declaration 
of Children’s Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League of Nations, 1900-1924, 7 International Journal 
of Children’s Rights (1999):2, pp. 133-134. 
25 It is estimated that 20,000 children were recruited into the German Children’s Crusade lead by a boy and 30, 
000 thousands of children for the France Crusade. See Zhao Daming, The War of Crusades, available at 
http://www.mslfw.com/Soft/ShowSoft.asp?SoftID=44(latest visit on 8 August 2008). See also IlonaTopa, 
Prohibition of Child Soldiering, International Legislations and Prosecution of Perpetrators, International Law 
Journal (2007) 105, p. 106, available at http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf5/Vol3No1Art06.pdf (last accessed 
on 10 November 2010). 
26 Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard, A History of the Crusades: the Later Crusades, 1189-1311, Vol. II, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962, p. 336.  
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Since such “heroic” deeds were much applauded and conferred on the person’s everlasting 
glory, it was an unrealistic legal issue at that time to prohibit the act of child recruitment.  
 
In addition, social values on children had remained much the same: children were still viewed 
as little more than property to be used by the conquering victors. Throughout the military 
circles, the notion went unchallenged that all persons, including unarmed women and 
children, were still the enemy.27 It was not until the Enlightenment Period when the first 
humanitarian principles were expostulated and social values regarding the treatment of 
soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians started to change. Take Jean Jacques Rousseau for 
example, he stated that  
 
“One has the right to kill its defenders as long as they are armed, 
but as soon as they lay down their arms and surrender […] they 
become simply men again, and one no longer has any right to their 
lives[…]”.28 
 
The same view was upheld by Emmerich van Vatel who pleaded the immunity of persons 
who offer no resistance against the war and stated: 
 
“Women, children, feeble old men, and the sick are to be counted 
among the enemy […] But these are enemies who offer no resistance, 
and consequently the belligerent has no right to maltreat or otherwise 
offer violence to them”.29 
 
In 1863 the Lieber Code in its Articles 31-47 laid down specific humanitarian rules in time of 
war, which was anrelatively early attemptto punish crimes against the inhabitants of hostile 
countries.30 However, it failed to lay down explicitly a ban on recruitment of children as 
property of the state or occupied state. Child soldiers were still found fighting in the 
Napoleonic wars. Familiar figures in Nelson’s navy were the “powder monkeys” – officially, 
                                                          
27 Richard Shelly Hartigan, the Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian, supra note 22, p. 155.  
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Penguin, 1968, p. 51.  
29 Emmerich von Vattel, the Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, 2nd (ed.), Lonang Institute, 1758, 
pp. 282-283.  
30 Instructions for the Government of the United States in the Field by Order of the Secretary of War, 24 April 
1863 (hereinafter “The Lieber Code”).See also D. Schindler & J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, 3rd 
(ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, p. 3. 
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Ship’s Boys 3rd Class – many of whom were the sons of serving seamen as young as 12 
years old.31 
 
Another attempt in codifying the laws of land warfare was made one year after the Lieber 
Code. The year 1864 saw the promulgation of the Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,32 which gave birth 
to a considerable codification of humanitarian laws, despite the fact that this short and 
sketchy instrument was considered inadequate during the Nuremberg Trial. 33 The Hague 
Conventions codified international humanitarian law and rules on arms control and 
disarmament, with an aim to reduce the horrors of warfare, concentrating mostly on 
unnecessary suffering in war.34 A slightly redrafted set of the Regulations attached to the 
1907 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter “Hague 
Regulations”) is the most important annex of the 1907 Hague Conventions, where provisions 
concerning the protection of nationals (including children) in the occupied territories against 
the consequences of war were provided.35 Although the use of children as soldiers was not 
specifically prohibited in the texts of the Hague Regulations, its Article 23 (h) prohibited in 
general all forced participation of nationals of a hostile party in operations of war directed 
                                                          
31 Robin Cross, Children and War, available at http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/c-
d/childwar02.html (latest visit on 8 August 2008). IlonaTopa, Prohibition of Child Soldiering, International 
Legislations and Prosecution of Perpetrators, supra note 25, p. 106. 
32 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the 
Filed (hereinafter “GC I”), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the 
Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, entered into force on 31 
October 1950.  
33 Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals, supra 
note 20, p. 39. 
34 See Laws of Wars: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (hereinafter “Hague I”), 29 July 1899; Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter “Hague II”), 29 July 1899; Laws of War: Adaptation to Maritime 
Warfare of Principles of Geneva Convention of 1864 (hereinafter “Hague III”), 29 July 1899; Laws of Wars, 
Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons (hereinafter “Hague IV”), 29 July 1899, 
with Declaration on the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 29 July 1899; Declaration on 
the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, 29 July 1899; 
Declaration on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, 29 July 1899.  
35 The Convention (IV) respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land the its Annex: Regulations concerning 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter “Hague Regulations”), The Hague, 18 October 1907, Section 
III, Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State, Articles 42-56.  
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against their own countries.36 This implies a change of views on children such that children 
ceased to be viewed simply as property subservient to their states.37 
 
During the World War I (hereinafter “WW I”), the innumerous violations of the Hague 
Conventions indicated the insufficiency of the Hague Conventions in view of the protection 
of civilians in occupied territories. In the case of child recruitment, it is roughly estimated 
that in WW I some 250,000 underage boys were recruited in the British Army, of whom 
perhaps 50% were killed or wounded.38 Since the enormity of the offenses committed during 
WW I, concerned voices were raised calling for punishment of the criminals, preferably 
before an international tribunal.39 In 1919, the War Crimes Commission was established and 
thirty-two offenses were specified as violations of the customs of wars. However, regrettably 
child recruitment was not enumerated as one of the violations of the laws of customs of wars 
in the report.40 Although the trial failed, due to various reasons,41it proved to pave a way for 
the development of judicial institution of International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter 
“IHL”).42   
 
Blatant deficit of specific obligations in the international instruments not to recruit children 
continued right up to the Second World War (hereinafter “WWII”) when recruitment of child 
soldiers became more rampant, more widespread and sometimes in forms quite complex. The 
                                                          
36 Ibid., Article 23(h): “A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the national of the hostile party to take part 
in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before 
the commencement of the war”. 
37 A. Clean Mower Jr., The UN Convention of on the Rights of the Child: International Law Support for 
Children, Greenwood, p. 11. 
38 Richard van Emden, Britain’s Boy Soldiers, Channel 4 History, 2004, available at 
http://222.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/a-b/boysoldiers,html (last accessed on 10 November 
2010). 
39 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will, Women and Rape, Ballantine, 1975, p. 31.  
40 UN War Crimes Commission, XIII Law Report of Trials of War Criminals 122, 1919.  
41 The reasons for this are mainly twofold. It is partly because the Netherlands refused to surrender ex-Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, and partly because the disagreement to the creation of a tribunal. See William B. Simons, The 
Jurisdictional Basis of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in the book edited by Ginsberg’s & 
Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, Kluwer, 1990, pp. 39-45. 
42 Ivan Jovanović, Immunity of Heads of State for International Crimes: Deflating Dictator’s Lifebelt?, 3 
Belgrade Law Review (2009):206, p. 207.  
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most notable example of systematically usingchild soldiers during WWII was the Hitler 
Youth,43 which at the last stage of the Wartrained thousands of child soldiers for the German 
Army.44 In order to avoid a repeat of the failure in the aftermath of WW I, the International 
Military Tribunal (hereinafter “IMT”) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(hereinafter “IMTFE”) were established for the punishment of persons who committed 
serious offences during WW II.45 Regrettably, neither Article 6 of the International Military 
Tribunal Charter (hereinafter “IMT Charter”) or the Control Council Law No. 10 (hereinafter 
“CCL10”) specifically listed the use of child soldiers in war as a crime,46 nor did the IMTFE 
Charter enumerate the act of child recruitment as a violation of the laws or customs of war.47 
One possible reason for the failure to criminalize the act of child recruitment as a crime under 
both the Charters of the IMT and of the IMTFE might be the uncertainty of whether 
recruitment of nationals of occupied territories had been coverned by customary international 
law at the time of the WW II.  
 
However, the lack of jurisdiction of the two military tribunals over persons who recruited 
child soldiers to take part in hostilities would not mean that the world community would 
tolerate such atrocities any longer. Immediately after WW II, the consciousness of the 
international community was shocked by the revelation of large numbers of child soldiers 
used in the war and by the consequent suffering of severe physical and psychological 
                                                          
43 The Hitler Youth created in the 1920's. By the outbreak of the WWII, children from 10 to 18 year olds were 
compulsory to join the Hitler Youth. The task of the boys section was to prepare the boys for military service. 
For girls, the organization prepared them for motherhood. See Alan Dearn & Elizabeth Sharp, The Hitler Youth 
1933-45, Osprey, 2006, p. 5.  
44 From late 1944 children of Hitler Youth were directly used in combat. See Alan Dearn & Elizabeth Sharp, 
The Hitler Youth 1933-45, ibid., p. 6. See also Peter Warren Singer, Caution: Children at War, 31 Parameters 
(2001), para. 8, available at  
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=9973C12A0A290D75C49035755D011A91.inst1_1b?doc
Id=5002432475 (last accessed on 10 November 2010). 
45  M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal law, 2nd (ed.), Kluwer Law 
International, 1999, p. 607.  
46 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, London, 8 
August 1945, 8 UNTS 279, Article 6. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of war 
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for 
Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 January 1946.  
47 R. Pritchard & S. Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Complete Transcripts of the 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunals for the Far East, Vol. I, Garland Publishing, 1981, p. 21. 
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distortion they experienced.48 The welfare of the young soldiers consequently gained more 
attention and concerns from the public, and relevant legislation prohibiting the use of child 
soldiers was put on the agenda. A variety of international instruments came into existence 
prohibiting this vicious atrocity. Some, as part of IHL, have proscribed norms to protect 
civilians (including children) in time of war from the involvement in hostilities; some, as part 
of international human rights laws (hereinafter “IHRL”), emphasized the rights of children 
both in peace and in war; others, known as “soft law”, expressed great concern about the 
situation of child soldiers in the armed conflicts. 
 
B. Overview of the International Instruments Concerning the Prevention 
of Child Recruitment under International Humanitarian Law  
 
I. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in the Time of 
War of 1949 (hereinafter “GC IV”)  
 
The first international instrument relating to child recruitment 49 is the GC IV, which was 
adopted in 1949 at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva.50 The GC IV provides standards 
for the treatment of persons who are members of civilian population in an armed conflict. 
Some of its provisions provided for general protection of children from wars. The prohibition 
of under-age military service is provided in Article 51 (1) of the Convention, which 
stipulates:   
 
                                                          
48 Long term effects of the violence in armed conflicts are likely to cause the psychosocial result of loss, fear, 
confusion, aggression. See Laura Arntson & Christine Knudsen, Psychosocial Care for Children in Armed 
Conflict: Supplement Training Manual, Save the Children Norway, 2005, pp. 4-6.  
49 Although the Hague Regulations can be regarded as the first instrument to prohibit to compel the national of 
the hostile party (including children) to take part in the operations of war, it is a general provision not 
specifically concerned of children, or of a specific protected group including children.  
50 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter “GC IV”), adopted on 
12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the 
Protection of Victims of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force on 31 October 1950. 
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“The occupying power may not compel protected persons to serve in 
its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which 
aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.”51 
 
The term of “protected persons” within the meaning of Article 51 GC IV is defined in Article 
14:  
 
“the wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, 
expectant mothers of children under seven.”52 
 
It can clearly be seen from the text that Article 51 (1) not only bans forcible recruitment of 
children under the age of 15 into armed forces of the Occupying Power, but also strictly 
prohibits all forms of pressure or propaganda aimed at securing voluntary enlistment. At the 
Diplomatic Conference, the suggestion of prohibiting propaganda to secure voluntary 
enlistment encountered opposition from some delegates, with regard to the difficulty to 
distinguish propaganda from disguised forms of coercion,53 yet in the end this prohibition 
was successfully carried through. And finally the term “enlistment” was defined as covering 
“all enlistment in the armed forces of the Occupying Power, whatever the theatre of 
operations and whoever the opposing forces might be.”54 
 
However, Article 51 (1) can hardly be regarded as a comprehensive provision for the 
protection of children from recruitment. Firstly, the enrollment of young volunteers by the 
Occupying Power is not prohibited under Article 51(1). The large use of child soldiers during 
WWII was, in the eyes of most delegations, as “voluntary and heroic or an unfortunate 
necessity”.55 And therefore, though the propaganda of voluntary enlistment is prohibited, the 
GC IV’s primary attention was devoted to the prohibition of forcible recruitment rather than 
voluntary enlistment. The absence of legislation banning any voluntary enlistment thus has 
left a gap which gives the contracting States the choices to decide whether to recruit an 
                                                          
51 Ibid., Article 51 (1).  
52 Ibid., Article 14.  
53 Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War of 12 August 1949, (hereinafter “ICRC Commentary on the GC IV”), ICRC Geneva, 1951, p. 292 and 
fn. 6.  
54 Ibid, p. 291. 
55 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 2005, 
p. 55.  
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under-aged volunteer to fight in an armed conflict, even if they know fully well that it is 
inhumane to expose vulnerable minors to the ravages of war.  
 
Furthermore, forcible recruitment of a child by his or her own country does not fall within the 
realm of Article 51(1).  The sole objective of Article 51 (1) is to protect certain persons who 
happen to fall into the hands of an adverse power in times of armed conflict.56 Just as ICRC 
Commentary points out,  
 
“the definition [of protected persons] has been put in a negative 
form; as it is intended to cover anyone who is not a national of the 
party to the conflict or occupying Power in whose hands he is”.57 
 
Since IHL deals with relations between warring parties and hostile individuals, the 
beneficiaries of the GC IV was limited merely to certain protected persons who are in the 
power of an occupying party. Because the recruitment of children of an Occupying Power 
was perceived as “being primarily an internal matter” at the time when the Geneva 
Conventions were drafted,58 the nationals of the Occupying Power, including those under the 
age of 15, however, cannot be protected under the GC IV as those of an occupied territory.  
 
In fact, children are more likely to fall in the hands of their own governments than of those of 
Occupying Powers. 59  Nowadays, a majority of cases indicate that a large percentage of 
children are serving in military units or taking active part in hostilities on behalf of their own 
country. One good example is that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter 
“DRC”) not only the Government forces and, but also a dozen local militia groups have been 
actively engaged in the abduction of children of their own nationals since the onset of the 
                                                          
56 See GC IV, supra note 50, Article 4: “Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”. See also Robert Kolb, The Relationship between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 324, 30 
September 1998, p. 419.  
57 Jean S. Pictet (ed.), ICRC Commentary on the GC IV, supra note 53, p. 45. 
58 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, supra note 55, p. 55. 
59 Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen Worthington, What is Right for Children?: the Competing Paradigms of 
Religion and Human Rights, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 94-95.  
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Second Congolese War in 1998.60 In this respect, the prohibition of recruiting children by 
their own countries is also provided in International Human Rights Conventions, such as the 
CRC, which will be discussed in the following part.  
 
Finally, most of child soldiering occurs in internal armed conflicts, whereas the Article 51 (1) 
does not regulate the conducts occurred in an internal armed conflict. Since the safeguards 
outlined in the GC IV do not apply to non-international armed conflicts, the only protection 
in the event of a civil war is given through the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
(hereinafter “CA3”). CA3 prohibits certain flagrant violations of customs of wars, including 
prohibition on “violence to life and person”, “outrages upon personal dignity”, […] and 
“taking of hostages”61 However, the prohibition of child recruitment is not specially provided 
in CA3.62 Therefore, the application of CA3 seems to be too weak to effectively protect 
children from military service in a non-international armed conflict.63 
 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that up to now 194 States have ratified the GC IV,64 which 
demonstrates a wide acceptance “by virtually the entire international community through 
formal and solemn acts”.65 All the 194 contracting parties are, therefore, under the obligation 
to observe the rules under GC IV, including the obligation to prohibit forcible recruitment of 
children under the age of 15 in an occupied territory.  
 
                                                          
60 Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal 
Law in Post-Colonial Africa, Peter Lang, 2008, p. 131. 
61 See GC IV, supra note 50, Article 3. Or see GC I, supra note 32, Article 3; Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereinafter “GC II”), 
75 U.N.T.S. 31, adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of 
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, entered into force on 31 October 1950, Article 
3; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter “GC III”), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, adopted on 
12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the 
Protection of Victims of War, entered into force on 31 October 1950, Article 3. 
62 ICRC, Commentary of the Convention (III) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, ICRC Geneva, 12 August 1949, p. 41.  
63 The application of the CA3 in the case of forcible recruitment of children will be addressed in Chapter 3.  
64 ICRC, Treaties & Documents by Country, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P 
(last accessed on 8 November 2010). 
65 Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Strife: Their International Protection, Cambridge: Grotius 
Publications, 1987, p. 349.  
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II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “AP I”)  
 
The AP I, as supplement to the Geneva Conventions, have provided protection for the victims 
in international armed conflicts. Part IV of the Protocol contains an extensive set of 
protections for the civilian population, especially Section III of Chapter II where the issue of 
child soldiers is specifically provided. 66 The key provision on this issue is contained in 
Article 77(2) and (3), which reads:  
 
“[…] 
(2) The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in 
order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do 
not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall 
refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of 15 years but who 
have not attained the age of 18 years, the Parties to the conflict shall 
endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest. 
(3) If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, 
children  who have not attained the age of 15 years take a direct part 
in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse Party, they shall 
continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by this 
Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war.” 
 
Compared with Article 51 (1) GC IV, AP I made decisive progress in protection of children 
from recruitment. Firstly, it has signified an important step forward by requiring States to 
refrain from recruiting children who were their own nationals.67 Just as Mr. Surbeck stated, 
when introducing the draft of Article 68 (the basis of Article 77 AP I) to Committee III of the 
Diplomatic Conference,  
 
“[t]he article was intended to operate for the benefit of all children 
who were in the territories of the parties to the conflict, whether the 
                                                          
66 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “API”), 8 June 1977, Adopted on 8 June 1977 by the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, and entry into force on 7 December 1978. 
67 Ibid., article 77 (2) and (3).  
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territory was occupied or not, and whether or not children fall 
within the definition of protected persons in Article 4 of the GC 
IV.”68 
 
Furthermore, Article 77 AP I requires the contracting States to give priority to the oldest 
children, when recruiting persons between the age of 15 and 18 years. The insertion of this 
language indeed is an indication of a strong effort of some representatives at the Diplomatic 
Conference to raise the minimum age for recruitment to 18 years. Therefore, this Article does 
not intent to bear any direct relevance to raise the age beyond 15 years.69 However, adopting 
this language, in fact, played a role in protecting certain children between the age of 15 and 
18 from military service.  
 
Despite the considerable legislative achievements made by the Article 77, advocates of 
prohibition of child recruitment may find article 77 disappointing. One ambiguity contained 
in the text of Paragraph 2 is the word “recruitment”. The term “recruitment” is ambiguous as 
to whether it refers to “both the forcible conscription and voluntary enrolment” or only the 
former. The literal meaning of the term “recruitment” denotes “to get or seek for fresh 
supplies of men for the army”,70 which can be subject to different interpretations and might 
be construed as if the AP I was to prohibit both “the forcible recruitment and voluntary 
enlistment”.71 In fact, children under the age of 15 who voluntarily join armed forces are not 
protected by the Article 77. As is clearly seen from the ICRC Commentary in the 
interpretation of Article 77 (2),  
 
“It would not be realistic to totally prohibit voluntary participation 
of children under fifteen.”72 
 
And thus, similar to the GC IV, Article 77 (1) mainly focuses on forcible recruitment of 
children under the age of 15 in international armed conflicts.  
 
                                                          
68  Official Record (hereinafter “OR”) XV, CDDH/III/SR.45, p. 68. 
69  Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski & B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(hereinafter “Commentary to the API”), 1984, ICRC Geneva, para. 3188.  
70  J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner, Oxford English Dictionary, Volume XIII, Clarendon, 1989, p. 375.  
71  Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski & B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary to the AP I, supra note 69, para. 3179.  
72  Ibid.para.3184. 
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Furthermore, the phrase “take all feasible measures” was a political and diplomatic 
compromise that “allowed states party considerable freedom to evade the general 
prohibition”.73 This phrase requires relatively low level of obligation and commitment and 
does not go far enough to protect children from recruitment. Children who are under armed 
conflicts are protected only if it is feasible for the governments to prohibit them from being 
recruited or used in hostilities.74 
 
III. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-international Armed Conflict (hereinafter “AP II”) 
 
As a complement to the CA3, AP II75 marks a significant progress on the protection of 
children from serving in military units in non-international armed conflicts. Before the 
adoption of AP II, CA3 was the only source of law that applies explicitly to non-international 
armed conflicts. CA3, referred to as a “mini Convention on the treatment of persons in civil 
wars”,76 sets forth the minimum protections and standards of conduct, with which States and 
armed opponents are all obliged to comply. However, protections specified in CA3 only 
cover the core of humanitarian laws, and recruitment of children was not specifically 
mentioned.77 
 
AP II extends the essential rules of the laws of war by applying all fundamental principles 
stipulated in CA3 and additionally, supplements them with detailed provisions on the 
protection of civilian population, including children. Article 4 AP II lists “fundamental 
                                                          
73  Bennett, T. W., Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalizing the 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, 32 Monograph, December 1998, Institute of Security Studies Monograph Series, 
available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no32/contents.html(last accessed on 16 October 2010). 
74  Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl Soldiers?, 29 
University of La Verne Law Review (2008): 219, p. 230.  
75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-international Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “APII”), 8 June 1977, Adopted on 8 June 1977 by the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in 
Armed Conflicts, and entry into force on 7 December 1978. 
76 Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to the Geneva Convention VI, supra note 53, p. 292. Roy Gutman & David 
Rieff, Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, W.W. Norton & Company, 1999, p. 207.  
77 Forcible recruitment of children as soldiers may be part of violations of the CA3, however, enlistment of 
volunteers under the age of 15 might be another story. For more details, see infra Chapter 3.  
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guarantees” to provide protection to civilian populations and guarantee their minimum 
standards of humane treatment under all circumstances.78 Among a number of “fundamental 
guarantees” for persons affected by non-international armed conflicts, the prohibition of 
recruitment of children is provided in Article 4 (3) (c), which reads:  
 
“Article 4: All persons who do not take a direct part or who have 
ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has 
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honor and 
convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction.  
 […] 
1. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they 
require, and in particular: 
[…] 
(c) Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall 
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to 
take part in hostilities.”79  
 
Another remarkable development of Article 4(3) (c) is that it confers a higher protection than 
all the earlier conventions. Under the Article 4 (3) (c) the word “feasible”, which may be 
used as an excuse for the governments to keep on recruiting children into armed forces, does 
not appear in the text.80 
 
Some scholars81 may consider Article 4 (3) (c) as a significantly initial step, because this 
article leaves governments not much discretion in “use children to take indirect part in 
hostilities”, as Article 4 (3) (c) adopts the phrase of “take part in hostilities” quietly different 
from the formulation of “take direct part in hostilities” used in Article 77. However, this view 
can hardly find any grounds to support its stance. Rare resources are useful to prove this 
                                                          
78 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment (hereinafter “Norman Trial Judgment”), 2 August 2007, para. 28. 
79  AP II, supra note 75, Article 4 (3) (c). 
80  Jean Pictet (eds.), Commentary to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “Commentary to the AP 
II”), 1984, ICRC Geneva, para. 4557. 
81 See Bennett, T.W., Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalizing the 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, supra note 73. See also Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the 
International Community Protect Girl Soldiers?, supra note  74, p. 230. 
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different phrase provided in Article 4 (3) (c) covers both direct and indirect participation. 
Looking through the ICRC Commentary on the AP II, one can see the ICRC does not give a 
clear explanation of what is “indirect” participation, but repeats the definition of “direct” 
participation made in the ICRC Commentary on the AP I in Article 77.82 Furthermore, an 
examination of the records of the Diplomatic Conference reveals that the difference between 
the languages in Article 77 and Article 4 (3) (c) should be deemed as “a result of 
inadvertence”, but not a result of “the arguments of principle”.83 As Mr. Humphrey said, the 
coverage of Article 4 (3) (c) was deemed to be “an anomalous shift from the general standard 
of ‘direct’ involvement in hostilities”.84 From this perspective, it cannot reach the conclusion 
that Article 4 (3) (c) imposes a much stricter obligation on contracting states or it provides a 
comprehensive protection for children than Article 77 AP I.  
 
C. Overview of the International Instruments Concerning the Prevention of 
Child Recruitment under International Human Rights 
 
I. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter “CRC”) 
 
Legislative endeavor to protect the rights of the child from the perspective of human rights 
law never had ceased.85This endeavor can be seen from the legislation of the American 
                                                          
82 The Commentary on the Article 4 (3) (c) AP II states that “Not only can a child not be recruited, or enlist 
himself, but furthermore he will not be "allowed to take part in hostilities, i.e., to participate in military 
operations such as gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of 
sabotage.” The definition of “direct” made in Commentary on the Article 77 API refers to “Examples would 
include, in particular, gathering and transmission of military information, transportation of arms and munitions, 
provision of supplies etc. The intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to keep children under fifteen 
outside armed conflict, and consequently they should not be required to perform such services; if it does happen 
that children under fifteen spontaneously or on request perform such acts, precautions should at least be taken; 
for example, in the case of capture by the enemy, they should not be considered as spies, saboteurs or illegal 
combatants and treated as such. In addition, appropriate instruction is again essential.” See Commentary to the 
AP II, supra note 80, para. 4557 and Commentary to the API, supra note 69, para. 3178. 
83 For more details, see Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, supra note55, pp. 67-68. 
84 Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, 13 Australian Journal of Human Rights 
(2007):1, p. 123. 
85 For an extensive overview of international documents relating to the rights of children, see Philip E. Veerman, 
The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1992, pp. 153-369. 
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Convention on Human Rights, 86  the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,87International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter “ICCPR”),88 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereinafter “ICESCR”).89 All of these conventions are applicable to everyone within 
contracting parties’ territories,90 without discrimination on any ground91and some specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See also Geraldine van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff, 1995, pp. 6-
32. 
86 The American Convention on Human Rights, adopted at the American Specialized Conference on Human 
Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969. Article 17 (4): “The States Parties shall take appropriate steps 
to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, 
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution.” 
87 The European Convention on Human Rights was signed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4 November 
1950. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 262, entered into force May 18, 1954, Article 2: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In 
the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical 
convictions.” Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
E.T.S. 117, entered into force 1 November 1988,Article 5: “Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and 
responsibilities of a private law character between them, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage, 
during marriage and in the event of its dissolution. This Article shall not prevent States from taking such 
measures as are necessary in the interests of the children.” 
88 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”), adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966, and entry into 
force on 23 March 1976. See Article 17 (4): “In case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary 
protection of any children solely on the basis of their own best interests.”  
89  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 
3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. Article 10 (3): “Special measures of protection and assistance 
should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage 
or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. 
Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their 
normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid 
employment of child labor should be prohibited and punishable by law.” 
90 Theodor Schilling, Is the United States bound by the ICCPR in relation to occupied territories?, available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/fellowsforum/Schilling%20Forum%20Paper%20100504.pdf (last 
accessed on 26 February 2012).  
91 See the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 1: “1. The States Parties to this Covenant undertake 
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons for race, colour, sex, 
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provisions in respect to children are stipulated. All of these efforts finally gave birth to the 
CRC, as the most important convention on the protection of children’s rights.92 
 
CRC doubtless is a significant development in providing a relatively effective mechanism for 
the protection of children. Firstly, under CRC, a child is not considered as the “object of 
concern” from the perspective of public or private philanthropy, but as the “subject of 
rights”.93 Secondly, it establishes four fundamental principles: nondiscrimination; the best 
interests of the child; participation, survival and development,94 which provide an approach 
for the States to protect children’s rights and interests in their national program.95 From this 
perspective, it would no question that children’s interests should not be subordinated to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social 
condition. 2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being.” See also The European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 1: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” Article 14: “The enjoyment of any 
right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status.” See also ICCPR, Article 2: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” See also International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Article 2 (2): “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
92 See generally UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter “CRC”), G.A. Res. 44/25, 44th U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 49, November 20, 1989 (hereinafter “CRC”), Provisional Agenda Item 108, November 20, 
1989. 
93  Mark Ensalaco & Linda C. Majka, Children’s Human Rights: Progress and Challenges for Children 
Worldwide, Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2005, p. 14.  
94 CRC, supra note 92, Articles 2, 3, 6 and 12. Article 2 requires non-discrimination on any discriminative 
factors, including sex, age, colour, race, religion and disability. Article 3 provides that the child’s interests are to 
be given primary consideration. Article 6 obliges further States and Parties to ensure to the maximum extent 
possible “the survival and development of the child”. Article 12 places an obligation on governments to ensure 
that children’s views are sought and considered in all matters that affect their lives.  
95 UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 26 August 2008, available at http://www.unicef.org/crc (last 
accessed on 5 April 2010).   
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greater war effort, military necessity or state security.96 Finally, another advancement made 
by the CRC is the definition of “child”. Article 1 of the Convention reads that,   
 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every 
human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”97 
 
As appeared from this language, the CRC makes a great contribution to the protection of 
children between the age of 15 and 18 years, while the Conventions of 1949 as well as their 
two Additional Protocols had evaded the sensitive question of who were “children”. Due to 
an absence of a definition on the term of “children”, the relevant age of the children in each 
specific case must “be determined in the light of the [specific] provision” under the Geneva 
Conventions.98 However, as will be addressed subsequently, the inclusion of a definition of 
“children” into CRC does not result in satisfactory progress in the protection of children, 
between the age of 15 and 18 years, from recruitment.  
 
Based on these principles, the CRC contains a number of innovative provisions that have 
never previously been codified.99 However, CRC can hardly be considered as a satisfactory 
convention to deal with the problem of child soldiering, and offers little more protection than 
AP I. The protection of children from participation in armed conflicts, as provided in Article 
38(2) and (3) CRC, similarly mirrors the formulation of Article 77 (2) AP I.  
 
“2. State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen do not take a direct 
part in hostilities.  
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has 
not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In 
recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen 
                                                          
96  T. W. Bennett, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalising 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, supra note 73.  
97 CRC, supra note 92, Art. 1.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Sharon Detrick, A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1999, p. 4.  
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years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States 
Parties shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest.”100 
 
Even though Article 1 defines a child as “a person below the age of 18”, surprisingly, the age 
of 15 appears elsewhere in the Article 38 as the minimum age for recruitment. It must be 
pointed out that despite of the efforts made by some delegations during the Diplomatic 
Conference to raise the minimum age to 18 years, no definitive resolution was reached. The 
proposal of setting 18 years as the minimum age failed to win enough support, due to the 
strong opposition from countries, such as U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, and Bangladesh,101 
which either were affected by non-international armed conflicts at the time or committed to 
recruit children under 18 into their armed forces.102 
 
As being relevant only those under 15 years, Article 38 (3) seems to render an inconsistence 
with the previous provision of Article 1, which defined the children as the persons under the 
age of 18 years. Its failure to protect children under the age of 18 from military service in 
armed conflicts leads to a grey area of protection for children between the age of 15 and 
18. 103  This contradictory also damage the fundamental human rights principle of equal 
treatment,104 according to which, “all children, regardless of differences in circumstance or 
social status, deserve equal protection”.105 
 
Since children between the age of 15 and 18 years are not completely protected from being 
recruited under Article 38 (3), setting a higher minimum age of recruitment to include the 
children between the age of 15 and 18 years would be one of the main issues for the 
subsequent legislation, such as OPCRC.106 
                                                          
100 CRC, supra note 92, Article 38 (2) and (3). 
101 Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 Geo. Wash. Int’L. Rev. 
(2007): 227, p. 239 and Fn 66. 
102 Roy Gutman & David Rieff, Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, supra note 76, p. 78.  
103 Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl Soldiers, supra note 
74, p. 232. 
104 For example Article 24 (1) ICCPR: “[e]very child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, color, 
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, poverty or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on part of his family, society and the State”.  
105  T. W. Bennett, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalising 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, supra note 73.  
106 This will be discussed in infra Part IV, Chapter 1.   
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Furthermore, Article 38 (2) follows the languages of Article 77 (2) AP I, which require 
contracting states to take “all feasible measures” to ensure that children will not take a direct 
part in hostilities.  
 
Although Article 38 is considered to fail to offer children sufficient protection for children 
from participation in armed conflicts, some of its development should not be overlooked. 
Article 38 functioned as “one of the most important bridges linking humanitarian law and 
human rights law whose complementarities are increasingly recognized”.107 In its paragraphs 
(1) and (4), Article 38 provides:   
 
“1. State Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules 
of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed 
conflicts, which are relevant to the child. 
 […] 
4. In accordance with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed 
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure 
protection and care of children who are affected by an armed 
conflict.”108  
 
Article 38, as a “dual-protection”, was a remarkable development in extending its binding 
force to a non-governmental party by directly obliging State Parties to respect the rules of 
international humanitarian law. And meanwhile, by giving priority to children’s interests in 
all circumstance, Article 38 requires contracting states to maintain a prohibition on child 
recruitment during peace.109 In sum, it provides a relatively comprehensive set of guarantees 
that children’s interests are always applicable and always be protected, whether the children 
are under the control of armed forces or in the custody of dissident parties, or whether in 
times of war or in the peacetime.  
 
                                                          
107 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
para. 79. The ICJ states that fundamental rules of international humanitarian laws “constitute intransgressible 
principles of customary international law”. 
108 CRC, supra note 92, Articles 1and 4. 
109  T. W. Bennett, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalising 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, supra note 73.  
 27 
 
So far, the CRC has been ratified by every single UN member state in the world except 
United States and Somalia. It’s extremely high rate of ratification has brought CRC nearly 
universal acceptance. This universal acceptance demonstrate the consensus and willingness of 
a grand array of nations to put the children’s interests in the first consideration, and guarantee 
that they are truly acting in the best interests of children. 
 
II. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (hereinafter “Convention 182”) 
 
The CRC is not the only convention in human rights regime that specifically provides 
protection for children. Another instrument which offers protection for children from 
participation in armed conflicts is the Convention 182.110 In 1990, the General Conference of 
the International Labor Organization (hereinafter “ILO”) adopted the ILO Convention 182, 
which for the first time expressly recognized forcible recruitment of children as one of the 
worst form of child labor, as is clear from Article 3 and Article 7 (1), which read:  
 
 “Article 3: All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such 
as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom 
and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict. 
[…] 
 Article 7 (1): Each Member shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions giving effect to this Convention including the provision 
and application of penal sanctions or, as appropriate, other 
sanctions.”111 
 
ILO Convention 182 enhances the safeguards to protect children from participation in armed 
conflicts in several aspects. Firstly, listed as a form of child labor, child soldiering in conflict 
zones is not limited merely to those who fight in the frontlines or who take a direct part in 
                                                          
110 Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst forms of 
Child Labours (hereinafter “ILO Convention 182”), Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst forms of Child Labours (hereinafter ‘ILO 182’), 2133 U.N.T.S.161, 17 
June 1999, adopted by International Labour Organization. 
111 Ibid., Articles 3 and 7.  
 28 
 
hostilities, but also those who take an indirect participation in a variety of tasks, such as 
cooking, doing laundry, or providing sexual services to adult combatants. In this respect, ILO 
Convention 182 is an initial step in protecting children who take indirect part in hostilities, as 
all other conventions earlier only focus on those who take direct part in hostilities. However, 
regrettably, the provision only seeks to protect those children who are forcibly recruited and 
does not extend protection to those who are voluntarily recruited. 
 
Furthermore, when Articles 1, 2 and 7 (1) are examined side by side,112 ILO 182 appears to 
express its willingness to regard compulsory recruitment of children under 18 years as a 
crime in the domestic laws by urging States to take the most effective sanctions, i.e. criminal 
sanctions to deter this brutal atrocity. This is the first human rights instrument expressly 
providing for criminal sanctions against the use of child soldiers.  
 
Another valuable contribution made by ILO Convention 182 is the adoption of the phrase “all 
necessary measures” in Article 7 (1). As mentioned above, Article 77 (2) AP I requires the 
Contracting States to take “feasible” measures to prohibit the act of child recruitment,113 
which incidentally is the wording used in Article 38 (2) CRC.114Pursuant to Article 31 of 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding the general rules of interpretation115, a 
treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty (literal interpretation), in their context, that is to say, according to a systematic view 
of the whole treaty (systematic interpretation).The word of “feasible” generally referring to 
                                                          
112 Ibid., Article 1: “Each Member which ratifies this Convention shall take immediate and effective measures to 
secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency.” Article 2: “For 
the purposes of this Convention, the term "child" shall apply to all persons under the age of 18”. Article 7(1): 
“Each member shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions, including the provision of penal sanctions, or appropriate other sanctions”.  
113 The wording is used not only in Article 77 of API, but also in Articles 57 and 58 of API. See AP I, supra 
note 66.  
114 The CRC, supra note 92, Article 38(4).  
115 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 
January 1980. Article 31 (1): “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” In 
general, this Article is considered to be a customary international law regarding principles of treaty 
interpretation. See e.g. ICJ, Territorial Dispute Case, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad, Judgment, 3 February 
1994, ICJ Report 1994, para. 41. See also World Trade Organization Appellate Body, United States - Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, p. 17.  
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“capable of being done, possible or practicable”,116 allowed States “considerable freedom to 
evade the general prohibition”.117 Such freedom may include the consideration of a nation’s 
overall policy goals for “the success of military operations”.118 As Paul Tavernier points out, 
the term feasible “imposed on contracting states only an obligation of means and not an 
obligation of result.”119 On the contrary, the term of “necessary” referring to “indispensable, 
vital, essential and requisite”, 120  confers a more stringent standard, as it does not give 
contracting States much leeway to evade their obligations under the Convention. 
 
By March 2009, 169 countries had ratified this Convention.121 The wide acceptance of the 
Convention could be considered as a strong indication that prohibition of forcible recruitment 
of children under the age of 18 has become customary international law.122 
      
III. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter “ACRWC”) 
 
Besides international instruments adopted by international organizations, there has been a 
proliferation of regional documents that specifically address the issue of child recruitment. 
ACRWC123 is one of the regional instruments identifying a child as “a possessor of certain 
rights” and prohibiting the practice of child soldiering.124 No doubt, the wide and systematic 
use of child soldiers in Africa is one of the main reasons that attracts the concerns of 
                                                          
116 The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 1st (ed.), 1933, Vol. IV, p. 182.  
117  T. W. Bennett, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? Criminalising 
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, supra note 73. 
118  F. Jenny Kuper, International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, 
1997, p. 102. 
119 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, supra note 55, p. 60. 
120 The Oxford English Dictionary, supra note 116, Vol. XI, p. 166.  
121  Source: ILOLEX, Convention No. C 182, 5 October 2010, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C182 (last accessed on 4 March 2009). 
122 Bhavani Fonseka, The Protection of Child Soldiers in International Law, 2 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human 
Rights and the Law (2001):2, p. 84. As to whether forcible recruitment is yet a crime under customary 
international law will be addressed in Chapter 3.  
123  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter “ACRWC”), OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29November 1999.  
124 Danwood Chirwa, The Merits and Demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 
10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights (2002):157, p. 157.  
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Organization of African Unity (hereinafter “OAU”) on the issue of child soldiering.125 OAU 
began to enact ACRWC in 1990 and this Charter eventually came into force in 1999.  
 
Article 2 of ACRWC establishes the definition of “children” as “person below 18 years of 
age” and Article 22 (2) prohibits the use of child soldiers in armed conflicts:   
 
“Article 2: For the purposes of this Charter, a child means every 
human being below the age of 18 years.” 
[...] 
Article 22(2):  States Parties to the present Charter shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part 
in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any 
child.”126  
 
With fewer limitations than can be found in all other instruments earlier, ACRWC adopts the 
highest standard on the protection of child from participation in armed conflicts. Firstly, the 
ACRWC adopts a higher age standard: the “straight 18” position. It sends a clear message 
that the participation of children under the age of 18 in armed conflict is are not to be 
tolerated on the African continent. Finally, like the Convention 182, ACRWC requires the 
States Parties to “take all necessary measures” to prohibit the use of child soldiers. These 
“necessary measures” include stricter measures, such as criminal sanctions. 
 
Although the strong language of Article 22 (2) offers considerable protection for children, 
one may still argue that ACRWC fails to include the use of children to take indirect part in 
hostilities into the realm of Article 22(2).127 
 
So far 37 of the 53 member States of the OAU have ratified ACRWC.128 The binding force of 
ACRWC extends only to the contracting states, and the members that have not ratified 
                                                          
125 Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective, Ashgate, 2008,p. 166. 
126 ACRWC, supra note 123, Article 22.  
127 Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl Soldiers?, supra note 
74, pp. 238-239. 
128 See Amnesty International, African Children’s Charter: A Welcome Step to Securing the Rights of Africa’s 
Children, News Service 223/99, 29 November 1999, available at http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/30/161.html (last accessed on 16 January 2009). Some scholars took the view that the 
political nature of this Charter spotted the enforcement of the provisions, since some of the states are politically 
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ACRWC are not subject to the general prohibition. Among the non-contracting States, six of 
them were affected by armed conflicts between the year 1990 to 2005,129 including Sierra 
Leone, which has signed the ACRWC in 1992 yet failed to ratify.130 But the ACRWC is still 
a great achievement in the international legislation on the issue of child soldiering, especially 
as a regional instrument for Africa where using children as soldiers is known as the gravest.  
 
IV. OPCRC 
 
Dissatisfaction with Article 38 of the CRC resulted in the attempt in 1992 to draft an 
Optional Protocol aiming to “strengthen the implementation of rights recognized in the CRC 
and to increase the protection of children from involvement in armed conflict”.131 In 1994, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights established a working group to elaborate a draft of 
Optional Protocol. On 25 May 2000, the OPCRC was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
in the Annex I in the Resolution 263 and later came into force on 12 February 2002.132 
 
1. The “Straight-18”Age Standard under the OPCRC 
 
By providing more details and expanding obligations beyond those under the CRC, OPCRC 
is widely recognized as a major advance, especially by raising the minimum age of 
recruitment to 18 years,133 as Articles 1 and 2 reads:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compelled to ratify the Charter based on their international credentials. See Nima Elmi, Child Soldiers, Where is 
the Law?, Verdict (Oxford University Law Society) Hilary Term (2006), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646645 (last accessed on 8 June 2010), p. 2.  
129 Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl Soldiers?,supra note 
74, p. 238. 
130  Ratification of the ACWRC, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/afchildratifications.html 
(last accessed on 15 September 2010). 
131 OPCRC, supra note 10, the Preamble.   
132 General Assembly, Optional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, A/RES/54/263, 
25 May 2000. See UNICEF, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 10 February 
2006, available at http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30203.html (last accessed on 24 September 2010).  
133 Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan & H. Harry L. Roque Jr. (eds.), Children in Armed Conflict: Roundtable 
Discussion, UP Law Centre, Institute of International Legal Studies, 2006. p. 26. 
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“Article 1: States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure 
that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 
18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.  
 
Article 2: States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their 
armed forces.”134 
 
In spite of stiff opposition at the beginning, the minimum age of recruitment was brought up 
to 18 years and it was declared that no one under the age of 18 shall be directly involved in 
combat. The “straight 18 position” approach has earned the OPCRC warm acclaim and wide 
support from international communities, especially from the NGOs.135 
 
However, OPCRC does not raise the age limits for all forms of recruitment by governments, 
but is merely limited to forcible recruitment. The pressure from several States, such as USA 
along with the UK, to lower the age for voluntary enlistment to 16 finally forced the 
Committee to make a compromise to allow children older than 15 but younger than 18 to be 
recruited voluntarily by governmental armed forces. The freedom is retained to the States 
Parties to set their own minimum age, so long as precautions are taken to ensure that such 
voluntary recruitment is genuine.136 However, no guidance on how the young volunteers 
should be enlisted to ensure their true consent. This is demonstrated in Article 3 (1) and (3), 
which state:   
 
“Article 3 
1. States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary 
recruitment of persons into their national armed forces from that set 
out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, taking account of the principles contained in that article and 
                                                          
134 OPCRC, supra note 10, Articles 1 and 2.  
135 In December 2005, the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent had the topic on 
agenda to support the idea of an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child rising the age of 
recruitment in armed conflict to eighteen years. See ICRC, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child concerning Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts: Position of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross Geneva, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 322, 27 October 1997, para. 11. 
136 Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalengan, Rights of Children in Armed Conflict under the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and Domestic Laws, supra note 133, p. 26.  
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recognizing that under the Convention persons under the age of 18 
years are entitled to special protection.  
[…] 
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national 
armed forces under the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to 
ensure, as a minimum, that:   
 (a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;  
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the 
person's parents or legal guardians;   
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such 
military service;  
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance 
into national military service. 
 […]”137 
 
 
Problematically, the OPCRC directly obliges the dissident parties to the armed conflict to 
refrain from recruitment of children under the age of 18 in both forcible recruitment and 
voluntary enlistment, which is stated in Article 4(1) and (2):   
 
“1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State 
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities 
persons under the age of 18 years. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such 
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures 
necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.”138 
 
A question is arising immediately from the distinct regulations governing armed forces and 
armed groups. Such distinguish are likely to result in “the uncomfortable situation” where a 
government is allowed to recruit a volunteer at 17 year old, while the same action conducted 
by a member of armed group will lead to individual criminal responsibility for child 
soldiering.139 
 
Another question is to be raised as to how far the implementation of Article 4 (1) can go. 
Since rebel groups “are not amenable to the ordinary methods of enforcing human rights 
                                                          
137 OPCRC, supra note 10, Art. 3.  
138 Ibid., Art. 4.  
139 Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, supra note 101, p. 243.  
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law”,140 any attempt to make them respect children’s rights will depend entirely on their 
willingness to cooperate.141 Therefore, the language of Article 4 (1) and Article 4 (2) is 
different. The term “should” was adopted to keep armed groups from recruiting and using 
children in conflicts. As the word “should” is commonly used to express a recommendation 
but not binding a mandate, the prohibition of using children as soldiers in hostilities under the 
provision of Article 4 does not necessarily obligate the armed groups to observe. Different 
from Article 4(1), Article 4 (2) has set a higher obligation on State parties by using the word 
“shall” to convey an obligation142 to the states to adopt “legal measures necessary to prohibit 
and criminalize such practices”. In this respect, the task of prevent and deter the practice of 
child soldiering by armed groups will finally rely on the aid and capacity of the governments, 
in the form of passing domestic laws to  prosecute and punish members of the rebel groups 
who committed the act of child recruitment.143 
 
2. Recruitment of Children into Military Schools 
 
a. Relevant Provisions concerning Recruitment of Children into Military 
Schools  
 
As stated above, in Article 3 (1), the OPCRC requires states to raise the age standard to 18 
years for voluntary recruitment by government forces.144 However, under the OPCRC this 
requirement is not compulsory in the case of admission of children into military schools, as 
can be seen from Paragraph 5: 
 
“The requirement to raise the age in paragraph 1 of the present article 
does not apply to schools operated by or under the control of the armed 
                                                          
140 T. W. Bennett, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate Africa Traditions?, supra note 73, p. 42.   
141 Ibid. 
142 Kenneth A. Adams, A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting, American Bar Association, 2004, p. 23. 
143 Ilona Topa, Prohibition of Child Soldiering, International Legislations and Prosecution of Perpetrators, 
supra note25, p. 110. 
144  OPCRC, supra note 10, Article 3 (1): “States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary 
recruitment of persons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking account of the principles contained in that article and recognizing 
that under the Convention persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to special protection”. 
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forces of the States Parties, in keeping with articles 28 and 29 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.”145 
 
Such exemption to the “straight-18” age standard in relation to military schools comes mainly 
as a consequence of the objections raised by certain states, who argued that besides the 
defense function, military schooling also prepares children with knowledge and skills for use 
in peacetime as well as in war in the future.146 
 
Recognizing the rights of children to education, the OPCRC refrains from prohibiting states 
admitting children between age of 15 and 18 into military schools. Nevertheless, it 
emphasizes in Paragraph 5 that military schools must operate in accordance with Article 28 
and 29 of the CRC and particularly, education given in military school should conform to 
some minimum standards, such as respecting the human dignity and the right to physical 
integrity of the enrolled children. Furthermore, prohibition of forcible enrollment of children 
younger than 18 years still applies to the military school.147 
 
b. Violations against Children in Military School 
 
It should be pointed that although the OPCRC is not opposed to admission of children in 
military school, violence of any kind against children in military school is categorically 
prohibited. It also remains a concern with the OPCRC whether “children in military schools 
are members of the armed forces or could be used or targeted in hostilities”.148 
                                                          
145 Ibid., Article 3 (5). 
146 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and UNICEF, Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict, p. 16, available at www.unicef.org/publicatios/index_19025.html (last accessed 
on 15 March 2012). 
147 Article 2 of the OPCRC prohibits forcible recruitment under the age of 18 for both government and non-state 
groups, and therefore, the forcible recruitment of children under the age of 18 into military school is also 
prohibited.  
148 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, March 
2005, p. 2.  
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Human rights reports and studies dealing with violence against children have collected a 
great deal of evidence of ill-treatment and institutionalized violence against, and abuses of 
children in military schools, some even resulting in death.149 
 
Street children are known to be often subjected to physical violence and obliged to enroll in 
military school.150 The military environment and the nature of the education, i.e., whether 
compatible with the OPCRC, is another concern of the NGOs.  
 
According to the survey of many NGOs, it is a common phenomenon that children enrolled 
in military schools are required to wear military uniform when in school; and there are 
schools that require children to wear uniform on their way to and from school.151 In addition, 
many countries are found to incorporate military training into the school curriculum, where 
children are trained in the use of fire arms and combat fighting.152 
 
Even graduation from military school is found not to automatically grant the children the free 
choice of their future, as they are regularly required to “give commitments to serve in 
military base or units as conscripts”.153 All this leads some researchers to conclude that what 
                                                          
149 See NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Violence against Children: What do NOGs 
know? What do NGOs Say?, February 2006. See also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to 
the UN Study on Violence against Children, with specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to 
Children in Peace Time Government Forces, ibid.,p.2. See also Mail Online, Military college “sorry” that 
“sickening” child sex abuse case was not reported to police, 21 November 2011, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2062037/Citadel-president-John-Rosa-apologises-handling-sex-abuse-
claim-military-college.html#ixzz1rolOQciX (last visit on 18 February 2012). See also Amir Givol, Neta Rotem 
& Sergeiy Sandler, Children Recruitment in Israel, New Profile, 2004, p. 31. 
150 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, supra 
note 148, p. 3. 
151 Amir Givol, Neta Rotem & Sergeiy Sandler, Children Recruitment in Israel, supra note 149, p. 31. See also 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, supra 
note 148, p.3.  
152 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, ibid., p. 
11. 
153 Amir Givol, Neta Rotem & Sergeiy Sandler, Children Recruitment in Israel, supra note 149, p. 31.  
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happened in the military schools made children attending military schools de factomilitary 
recruits.154 
 
Recent studies also find that many countries allow children to attend military cadet school 
after their 8th or 9th grade, as a consequence, children as early as 13 may already be receiving 
training at military schools learning the use of fire arms.155 Some countries, for example, 
Argentina are found to require that children who enroll in military school must be no older 
than 15 years.156 
 
c. Prohibition of Enrollment of Children in Military Schools under 
International Law 
 
Many NGOs, for example, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, take the opinion 
that the best way to protect children from violations in military school is to prohibit “the 
recruitment of any under-18s into the armed forces or to any other military institutions”,157 to 
which, however, the author takes exception, for the following reasons: 
 
Firstly, it must be admitted that there exist many military schools, though run by the armed 
forces of a State, whose aims are not to teach children to fight in combat or prepare them to 
become soldiers in armed, on the contrary, these military schools focus on how to help 
children, especially impressionable teenagers, to learn to be a better citizen,158 as it has been 
                                                          
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. See also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against 
Children, with specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government 
Forces, supra note 148, p. 9.  
156 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, supra 
note 148, p. 11. 
157 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the UN Study on Violence against Children, with 
specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children in Peace Time Government Forces, supra 
note 148, p. 3. 
158 Some examples of such military schools are Military Child Education Coalition, available at 
http://www.militarychild.org/about-us/mission; Education Seek, available at 
http://educationseek.com/military_schools.html; Summer Military Schools, available at 
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shown by research that military schools can play important roles in shaping children’s 
personal characters, by training them in disciplines and instilling in them moral values. In 
addition, allowing children to attend military school is comparable to respecting their rights 
to education, which is widely recognized in the CRC.  
 
Secondly, it is impractical to prohibit admission of children in military schools. According to 
the data collected by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, only15 countries out of 
the 96 countries surveyed state expressly not to admit under-18s into military schools, while 
27 countries provide clear evidence in legislation or in practice that children under-18s in 
military schools are members of the armed forces.159 State parties to the OPCRC for example 
Azerbaijan, made declaration upon ratification that “persons, who are meeting the defined 
requirements of the military service, may voluntarily enter and be admitted in age of 17 the 
active military service of the cadets’ military school”.160 
 
The status quo and the views held by the majority of States dictate that the only effective 
means of prevention and prohibition of abuses in military schools lies in efforts to enhance 
cooperation between the OHCHR and the State Parties, such as implementing or reinforcing 
effective human rights mechanism to monitor and review human rights situations in military 
schools, respond to abuses, follow up progress and measures taken by States, and promote 
human rights assistance and education.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.militaryschools411.com/articles/teen-military-schools-private-youth-academy/summer-military-
schools.html.  
159 The 15 countries are Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cameroon, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia. The 27 countries who 
regard the under-18s in military schools as members of the armed forces are Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Eritrea, Cuba, Georgia, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, North Korea, The Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Singapore, United Kingdom, and Viet Nam. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Submission to the 
UN Study on Violence against Children, with specific Reference to Children in Military Schools and to Children 
in Peace Time Government Forces, supra note 148, p. 3. 
160 Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 8, paragraph 1, of the optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
CRC/C/OPAC/AZE/CO/1, 8 March 2012, para. 13.  
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Although some of its key provisions have been weakened by diplomatic compromise, 
OPCRC is still an important step along the way to protect children from participation in 
armed conflicts. So far, 143 States have ratified the OPCRC161 and it is believed that the 
OPCRC will prove to be a powerful tool for advocacy and persuasion of a full protection of 
children from participation in armed conflicts.  
 
V. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery and its Supplementary 
Convention of 1956 
 
As stated in the introduction, the word “slavery” today has been broadened to cover various 
slavery-like practices, including child soldiering. In this respect, Conventions directly related 
to the issue of slavery should also be mentioned. The Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade 
and Slavery (hereinafter “Slavery Convention of 1926”)162 and the Supplement Convention 
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
(hereinafter “Supplementary Convention of 1956”) 163 are the two main international 
instruments relating to slavery, both of which provided for the suppression of the slave trade 
as well as the abolition of slavery in all its forms. 
 
1. The Slavery Convention of 1926 
 
The Slavery Convention is the first legal instrument, which defines slavery and slave trade in 
Article 1 as follows:  
 
“(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.  
                                                          
161 UNICEF, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 132.  
162 Slavery Convention of 1926, the Convention was amended by the Protocol done at the Headquarters of the 
United Nations, New York, on 7 December 1953; the amended Convention entered into force on 7 July 1955, 
Signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926.  
163 The Supplement Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social Council 
resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956.  
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(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to 
slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to 
selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange 
of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in 
general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.”164 
 
As the first instrument regulating the issue of slavery, the Slavery Convention of 1926 only 
provided a basic definition of slavery, which “stood as a model for states to measure slavery 
within their borders”. 165 The basic definition given by the Slavery Convention of 1926, 
however, provided only an outline, no international bodies or reviewing procedures were 
established to evaluate and track violations in respect to slavery.  
 
      2.   The Supplementary Convention of 1956 
 
An ad hoc Committee of Experts on Slavery was established in 1949, and it was believed that 
the definition of slavery provided in the Slavery Convention 1926 did not go far enough to 
cover the full range of practices related to slavery.166 The Supplementary Convention of 1956 
was therefore drafted where the definition of slavery was refined and broadened. Under the 
Supplementary Convention of 1956, State parties were not only obliged to abolish slavery, 
but also obliged to prohibit various slavery institutions and practices, including debt bondage, 
serfdom, the selling of women by their families for marriage, certain forms of abuse of 
women, and the buying and selling of children for labor or prostitution.167 
 
Abduction and forcible use of children as soldiers is arguably within this definition of 
slavery, as well as girl soldiers exposed to threat or forced to sexual slavery, victims of forced 
marriage, and girls transferred by a person to another for purpose “closely linked with the 
                                                          
164 Slavery Convention of 1926, Art. 1. 
165 Jessica Bell, Contemporary Slavery and International Law, Human Rights & Human Welfare: Topical 
Research Digest: Human Rights and Contemporary Slavery, p. 36.  
166 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms, 
HR/PUB/02/4, June 1999, para. 15, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/slaveryen.pdf 
(last visit on 1 November 2011).  
167 Supplement Convention of 1956, supra note 163, Article 1.  
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three forms of servile states provided under the definition of Supplementary Convention of 
1956”.168 
 
VI. Soft Law on the Issue of Child Soldiering 
 
Recent years have seen the international community’s efforts to issue various new 
declarations, resolutions, action plans, guidance, rules of principles, reports and 
recommendations on the issue of child soldiering. These documents are referred to as “soft 
law”, in that they do not directly bind States but are considered to have persuasive power.169 
Although soft law should not be considered as a formal source of international law, it has a 
legal effect on the creation and application of general law.170 
 
1. UN Security Council Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict 
 
By demonstrating and emphasizing the destructive impact of armed conflict on children, UN 
Security Council issued a serious of resolutions to encourage States to take all necessary 
measures to ameliorate the serious situation of child soldiering.171 
 
In August 1999, the Security Council adopted an unprecedented resolution - Resolution 1261, 
to express its grave concern on the harmful impact of armed conflict on children.172 The 
Security Council issued a series of further resolutions calling for concerted international 
actions and creating a number of monitoring mechanisms to observe and detect the use of 
child soldiers by the States affected by conflicts.173 For example, in Resolution 1314 (2000), 
                                                          
168 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms, 
supra note 164, para. 36, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/slaveryen.pdf (last visit on 
1 November 2011). 
169 Conor Foley, The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went to War, Verso, 2008, p. 42. See also Peter 
Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Ed., Routledge, 1997, p. 54. 
170 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, Taylor & Francis, 2010, p. 65.  
171 F. Jenny Kuper, Military Training and Children in Armed Conflict: Law, Policy and Practice, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher, 2005, p. 85.  
172 Security Council, S/RES/1261, on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts, 25 August 1999.  
173 Security Council, S/RES/1314, on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts, 11 August 2000; 
S/RES/1460, on Children in Armed Conflict, 30 January 2003; S/RES/1539, on Children in Armed Conflict, 22 
April 2004; S/RES/1612, on children in Armed Conflict, 25 July 2005; S/RES/1379, on Children in Armed 
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called for full implementation of the prohibition of child soldiering. 174  Resolution 1379 
(2001) called for actions to halt the use of children in hostilities, and asked the Secretary-
General to draw up a list of parties that recruited or used children at the time.175 In 2002, on 
the request of the Security Council, an annex in the Resolution 1299 provided a list of 
“parties to armed conflict that recruit or use child soldiers”. 176  One year later, Security 
Council issued Resolution 1460 (2003), where parties to armed conflict that were using child 
soldiers were called on to provide information on steps to halt such recruitment of 
children.177 The resolution 1612 (2005) approved a monitoring and reporting mechanism to 
collect information on the use of child soldiers from both non-State and State sides.178 
 
The Resolution 1882 (2009) went further on to call upon the States who violates the 
applicable international law involving child recruitment to stop the use of child soldiers, and 
also encouraged states to take criminal sanctions to prosecute and punish perpetrators who 
use child soldiers in armed conflicts.179 Recently, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1998 (2011), which called again upon the parties to armed conflicts listed in the 
annexes of the report on children and armed conflict to prepare and implement the action plan 
to halt recruitment of children, and urged the government authorities to bring to justice those 
responsible for child soldering.180 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Conflict, 20 November 2001. They called for regional groupings to stop the use of children as child soldiers. 
See also Conor Foley, The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went to War, supra note169, p. 42. 
174 Security Council, S/RES/1314, on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts, Ibid., para. 16.  
175 Security Council, S/RES/1379, on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 173.  
176 Security Council, S/RES/1299, on Children in Armed Conflict, 26 November 2002, Part V, paras. 27-31 and 
Annex, p. 14.  
177  Security Council, S/RES/1460, on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 173, para. 5.  
178  Security Council, S/RES/1612, on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 173, para. 2. 
179  Security Council, S/RES/1882, on Children in Armed Conflict, 4 August 2009, para. 16: “Calls upon 
concerned Member States to take decisive and immediate action against persistent perpetrators of violations and 
abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict, and further calls upon them to bring to justice 
those responsible for such violations that are prohibited under applicable international law, including with 
regard to recruitment and use of children, […] through national justice systems, and where applicable, 
international justice mechanisms and mixed criminal courts and tribunals, with a view to ending impunity for 
those committing crimes against children.” 
180 Security Council, S/RES/1998, on Children in Armed Conflict, 12 July 2011, para.6, 11. 
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In 2010, the Security Council’s efforts directly focused on the persistent violators. On the 
basis of an official list of violators who infringe the obligation not to use child soldiers, on 16 
June 2010 the Security Council held an Open Debate on “Children and Armed Conflict” and 
expressed its readiness to impose targeted measures against persistent violators.181 
 
2. UN General Assembly Resolution on the Rights of the Child 
 
Great efforts aimed at enhancing the protection of children affected in armed conflicts, 
including child soldiers, have been undertaking by the UN General Assembly in the past 
decade. As early as 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution A/51/77calling 
for vigorous efforts to combat the practice of recruiting children as soldiers and 
recommended to establish a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict. 182  On 16 March 2001, the General Assembly issued the Resolution 
A/54/263 that adopts and opens for the signature and ratification of the OPCRC.183 In the 
Resolution A/57/190 (2003), the General Assembly urged States and armed groups to take 
effective measures to demobilize children who have been recruited or used in hostilities, and 
to provide assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration.184 
The Resolution A/59/261 (2005) called upon the States to sign or ratify the OPCRC and 
urged the State parties to fully implement the OPCRC, especially their obligation to adopt 
safeguards to ensure the recruitment of volunteers under the age of 18 years is not forced or 
coerced. 185 In Resolution A/62/141, legal measures necessary to criminalize the acts of 
children recruitment were suggested by the General Assembly to be used as a means to end 
the brutal practice of child soldiering.186 The issue of child soldiering was condemned again 
as one of the serious violations of international law in the Resolution A/64/146, where not 
                                                          
181 United Nation General Assembly, A/64/742—S/2010/181, 21 May 2010. See also Security Council, Open 
Debate on Children and Armed Conflict, Statement by SRSG Radhika Coomaraswamy, 16 June 2010, available 
at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/spanish/16-jun-2010-open-debate-security-council-statement.html(last 
accessed on 9 November 2010).  
182 General Assembly, A/51/77, 20 February 1997, para. 35.  
183 General Assembly, A/54/263, 16 March 2001, para. 1.  
184 General Assembly, A/57/190, 19 February 2003, para. 13. 
185 General Assembly, A/59/261, 24 February 2005, paras.4, 48. 
186 General Assembly, A/42/141, 22 February 2008, para.41 (f). 
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only the parties to the armed conflicts but also civil societies were urged to pay serious 
attention to protect child victims.187 
 
3. Cape Town Principles and Best Practices 
 
In April 1997, UNICEF and Working Groups on the CRC held a symposium in Cape Town, 
South Africa, which is dedicated to develop strategies for preventing child recruitment. The 
attention is particularly focused on two aspects: to raise the minimum age of recruitment to 
18 years old, and to establish the demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration program 
for former child soldiers.  
 
A big success during the symposium is the creation of the definition of 'Child soldier', which 
includes 
 
“Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of 
regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, 
including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone 
accompanying such groups, other than family members. The 
definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced 
marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying 
or has carried arms.”188 
 
This revolutionary definition provides a rather broad scope to include all children engaging in 
all kinds of participation in armed conflicts, no matter fight on the frontline or performing 
supporting tasks. Under this definition, children who take an indirect part in hostilities, such 
as girls used as sexual commodity or recruited for forced marriage, fall within the realm of 
child soldiers. 
 
                                                          
187 General Assembly, A/64/146, 3 March 2010, para. 19. 
188 UNICEF, the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf (last accessed on 16 January 2009). 
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Although the Cape Town definition is considered by some scholars as the most commonly 
agreed definition of child soldiers,189 this definition has not been widely adopted on both 
international level and national level. This definition reflects the intent of the drafters to 
advance the best interests of the child, but not a convenient formulation for States to 
implement. Furthermore, the non-binding force of the Cape Town Principles may also lead to 
the failure to adopt this encompassing definition.  
 
4. Regional Declarations on the Use of Children as Soldiers 
 
On the regional level attention has also been paid to the destructive impact of armed conflict 
on children. In 1999, both the Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers 
(hereinafter “Maputo Declaration”) and the Montevideo Declaration on the Use of Children 
as Soldiers addressed the plight of child soldiers in Africa and Latin America and further 
called on to stop the use of child soldiers. 190 Realizing that most of children soldiering 
occurred among rebel groups, the Maputo Declaration urged the African States not to provide 
sanctuary to any armed forces or armed groups for recruiting or using child soldiers.191 In the 
Montevideo Declaration, all Latin American and Caribbean States are urged to fully respect 
and actively support the adoption of the OPCRC.192 In 2000, two major conferences were 
organized by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers respectively in Asia and the 
Middle East. Declarations against recruitment of children for military use were issued during 
each conference.193 According to the Kathmandu Declaration, a regional network on Stop 
                                                          
189  See also Dana Landau, Child Soldier, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-
Insights/Detail?lng=en&ots627=fce62fe0-528d-4884-9cdf-
283c282cf0b2&id=122984&contextid734=122984&contextid735=123960&tabid=123960 (last accessed on 7 
November 2009). 
190 Human Rights Watch, Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, 22 April 1999, available at 
http://www.chora.virtualave.net/maputo-declaration.htm (last accessed on 8 June 2010). Latin American and 
Caribbean on the Use of Children as Soldiers, Montevideo, Uruguay, 8 July 1999, available at 
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/montevideo.htm (last accessed on 8 June 2010). 
191 Human Rights Watch, Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, ibid, p. 3.  
192 Latin American and Caribbean on the Use of Children as Soldiers, Montevideo Declaration on the Use of 
Child Soldiers, Montevideo, Uruguay, 8 July 1999,  p. 3.  
193 On May 2000, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers launched the Conference to condemn the use 
of child soldiers in Asia. In 2001 the Amman Conference was initiated by the UNICEF and the Coalition to Stop 
the Use of Child Soldiers.  
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Use of Child Soldiers was established, which was considered as one of the biggest 
achievement of the Asia-Pacific Conference.194 The Amman Declaration issued in April 2000 
called on States of the region to “criminalize” the practice of child recruitment and to stop 
“supply[ing] small arms or light weapons to any government or armed group which recruits 
or uses child soldiers”.195 
 
In short, in the past decade, actions from the international community against the use of child 
soldiers have been taken more than ever before. This, on the one hand, shows the growing 
concerns of international community on the issue of child soldiering; on the other hand, it 
also reflects the increasingly continuing use of child soldiers by a variety of armed forces and 
groups all around the world, as the growing international concerns actually arises from the 
urgent demand for ending the use of child soldiers. 
 
D. Overview of the International Instruments Concerning the Crime of 
Child Recruitment under International Criminal Law 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, in the past two decades, significant advance in the 
field of IHL and IHRL have been made to promote and protect children from recruitment or 
use as soldiers in hostilities. However, the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and the 
State’s ignorance of their responsibility under international law to protect the children in their 
territories have undermined the effectiveness of these provisions. As far as the Geneva 
Conventions are concerned, one of the main weaknesses of the Geneva Conventions is the 
lack of “viable enforcement mechanisms”.196 In term of the enforcement of the IHRL, on the 
one hand, the most human rights instruments focus more on the standards of human rights but 
not on the enforcement mechanism, and assume that governments will adequately enforce 
                                                          
194 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Asia-pacific Conference: Don’t Arm Those Who Use Children as 
War Weapons, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/issues/texts/Soldiers007.htm (last accessed on 8 
June 2010).  
195 Child Soldiers and the Law, Amman Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers, April 2000, p. 2, 
available at http://www/tamilnation.org/humanrights/child/instruemnts_resolution.htm (last accessed on 8 June 
2010).  
196 ICRC, A Milestone for International Humanitarian Law, 22 September 2006, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-220906.htm(last 
accessed on 5 October 2011). 
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international human rights into domestic law.197 Furthermore, many national governments 
lack political will to implement international human rights standard and to restrain their own 
human rights violations.198 
 
According to the record on the use of child soldiers, since WW II, particularly in the last two 
decades, the situation of child soldiers has not seen much improvement.199 The widespread 
use of children as soldiers is reported one of the most painful and traumatic legacies of the 
twentieth century.200 There seems to be a fierce expansion of the use of children in armed 
conflicts both in numbers and in the variety of roles children are called upon to serve.201 
 
It was estimated that in 2005 over 300,000 children, most of them ranging in ages from 11 to 
15 years old, were serving as child soldiers in more than fifty countries around the world.202 
Africa is estimated to have amassed the largest number of child soldiers, with up to 120,000, 
nearly the half of the total number, believed to be involved in hostilities.203 As happened 
                                                          
197 Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal (Spring 2002):184.  
198 The primary responsibility for the enforcement of international human rights standards lies with national 
governments. See also Innocent Anaba, Political Will, Bane of Human Rights Enforcement, 16 November 2010, 
available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/political-will-bane-of-human-rights-enforcement/ (last 
accessed on 5 October 2011).  
199 This has already pointed out in the Introduction.  
200 Olara Otunnu, Additional Repost of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, E/CN.4/2000/71, 9 February 2000. Annex I: Mission report on the visits to Sierra Leone and 
Guinea, para.12.  
201 Among more than 36 armed conflicts from 1997 to 1998, children under the age of 15 took part in 28 
combats, and some children were only seven years. It was estimated that there may be a quarter of a million 
children under the age of 18 serving in government armed forces or armed opposition groups. The Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers said that “children, including about 120,000 in African armies, were used as 
front-line fighters, minesweepers, spies, porters and sex slaves”. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 
Child Soldiers Global Report 2001, 22 April 1999. See Rachel Brett & Margaret Mccallin, Children: The 
Invisible Soldiers, 2nd (ed.), Rädda Barnen, 1996, p. 19.  
202 Abigail Leibig, Girl Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: Do Current Legal Frameworks Offer Sufficient 
Protection?, 3 North western University Journal of International Human Rights (2005), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v3/6/ (last accessed on 22 April 2010). See also Peter Singer, 
Child Soldiers: Cause and Symptom of Human insecurity, Human Rights Watch, available at 
http://www.humansecurityreport.info/background/Singer_Child_Soldiers.pdf(last accessed on 12 April 2009).  
203 See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004,supra note  1, p. 31.  
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during the protracted conflicts in Burundi in 1993, children as young as ten years played a 
major part in the war efforts, serving in many different roles in the conflict, such as 
combatants, labors, spies, and sex slaves, for Burundi armed forces as well as for armed 
groups. 204  Only in the year of 2004, hundreds of child soldiers served in the Forces 
Nationales pour la Libération (hereinafter “FNL”).205 The same situation has been found 
going on in Uganda since 1986, where as many as 25,000 children, including 7,500 girl 
soldiers, have reportedly been abducted by the LRA and forced to be soldiers, sex slaves, 
porters, and so on.206 Babies born to children fighting with the LRA in Uganda are now 
almost old enough to fight as second-generation child soldiers. The DRC is reportedly one of 
the countries with the largest number of child soldiers in the world, and it was estimated that 
as many as 30,000 children were associated with armed groups at the height of the war.207 
Children’s involvement in armed conflicts is not a problem that affects only boys. In fact as 
many as a third of those abducted or coerced into military conflict are girls. Some of them are 
as young as eight when they were taught to kill or used as “sexual slaveries”.208 During the 
conflict in Sierra Leone from 1996 to 1999, more than 10,000 children under the age of 18 
were believed to have been enlisted as rebel fighters.209 According to the Global Report 2004, 
                                                          
204 See Eben Kaplan, Child Soldiers around the World, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2005, p. 2, 
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9331 (last accessed on 8 August 2008). 
205 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: African Regional Overview, 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004, supra note 1, p. 1. 
206 See Amnesty International, Uganda: Child ‘Night Commuters’ Fear Abduction, 18 November 2005, p. 4. 
207  ICC, Prosecution v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06,  Statement of Fatou Bensouda, Deputy 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, at the OTP monthly media briefing, 28 August 2006, 
Introduction, para. 5.  
208 See Olara Otunnu, Additional Repost of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, supra note 200, para.11.See also Olara Otunnu, Mission Statement: Sierra Leone, available at 
http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/countryVistis/Sierra-Leone.htm (last accessed on 8 
August 2008). Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Childhood-a casualty of conflict, AFR 51/609/3000, 31 
August 2000. See also Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Africa Report: Sierra Leone, 1999, available 
at http://222.child-soldiers.Org/reports-africa/sierra-leone.html(last accessed on 8 August 2008).  
209  U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet # 1, FY 2000, October 7, 
1999, para. 11.  
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there were an estimated 17,000 children were serving in governments forces, and Between 
2,500 and 5,000 children serving in armed opposition group.210 
 
Asia comes second, with millions of children involved in fighting forces in active conflicts or 
ceasefire situations.211 Widespread forcible recruitment of children, even as young as eleven, 
was reported in Myanmar in 2007 to serve in the National Army. 212 Situations in Latin 
America and the Middle East are also grave. Disturbing reports from Colombia reveal that 
the number of children used by armed groups had increased to around 11,000 by 2004, with 
children as young as 12 being trained and deployed to use explosives and weapons.213 During 
the Iraq war in 2003, it was reported that children were used as combatants by Iraqi 
governments.214 
 
Considering the widespread use of children soldiers in armed conflicts which occurred in the 
last two decades, the following subchapter will address the legislative efforts to establish the 
individual criminal responsibility of the persons who recruit or use child soldiers in 
hostilities.  
 
I. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter “Rome Statute”) 
  
The “toothless nature of the provisions” provided in the above mentioned international 
instruments is often blamed for being one of the major reasons for the increasing spread of 
child soldiers in armed conflicts.215 
                                                          
210 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004: African Regional Overview, 
supra note 1, p. 1. 
211 Of the 33 armed conflicts in which children were involved up to November 1998, 15 were in Asia, 11 in 
Africa and four in Europe. This is a salutary reminder that child soldiering is not only “an African problem”. 
See Save the Children, Children’s Rights: Reality or Rhetoric?, Save the Children, 2000, p. 45.  
212  Human Rights Watch, Child Soldier Use 2009, available at 
http://www.rightwords.org.uk/files/Child_Soldier_Use.pdf (last accessed on 22 September 2010).  
213 Coalition to Stop the Use of child Soldiers, Extract from Child Soldier Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th 
Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict,16 January 2004,  para. 2.  
214 CNN, U.N. Reports Children Used as Combatants in Iraq, 29 January 2006, available at 
http://articles.cnn.com/2006-01-18/world/iraq.rights_1_human-rights-reports-children-iraq-
war?_s=PM:WORLD, (last accessed on 16 January 2008). 
215 Nima Elmi, Child Soldiers, Where is the Law?, supra note  128, p. 1. 
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The individual criminal law, as a new dimension to international law, is in this respect of 
special importance for international criminal justice. The establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (hereinafter “ICC”) is for that matter believed to be a milestone in the 
international community’s effort to stop the use of child soldiers and to enforce legal 
provisions regarding child soldiers by underlining individual criminal responsibility of 
perpetrators. 
 
1. The Establishment of the ICC 
 
Since the end of WWII, it has been a dream of international humanitarian law advocates to 
see a permanent world court established that would have the jurisdiction to try individuals for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.216 
 
As early as 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution affirming the “Nuremberg 
Principles”, and one year late Resolution 177 (II) was adopted in 1947 establishing a 
Commission for the drafting of a code of offences against the peace and security of 
mankind,217 which would include four major international crimes, namely, crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.218 
 
During the discussion on the crime of genocide, the question of the possibility of establishing 
an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes 
was raised and the International Law Commission was invited to study this question.219 
Consequent to the conclusion reached by the International Law Commission that the 
                                                          
216 Howard Ball, War Crimes and Justice, Contemporary World Issues, ABC Clio, 2002, p. 48. 
217 General Assembly, resolution 177 (II): Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 21 November 1947.   
218 The Crime of genocide was later embodied in a separate convention: Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. General 
Assembly, resolution 260 (III): Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, Part A. 
219 General Assembly, resolution 260 (III): Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, Part B.  
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establishment of a court was not only desirable but feasible; a Committee on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction was created to prepare reports regarding the establishment of a court.220 
The committee prepared a draft Statute in 1951 and revised it in 1953; however, the drafting 
was postponed thereafter, due to the pending of “the adoption of a definition of 
aggression”. 221 Until December 1989 when Trinidad and Tobago called for international 
courts to deal with drug trafficking and other international crimes, the General Assembly 
again requested the International Law Commission to address the question of establishing an 
international criminal court”. 222 After nearly five years’ work, the International Law 
Commission submitted the General Assembly the draft statute for an international criminal 
court 223  in 1994 and recommended the General Assembly “convene an international 
conference of plenipotentiaries to study the draft statute”.224 
 
By resolution 49/5225 an ad hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court was set up, which met twice from 3 to 13 April and from 14 to 25 August 1995 
“reviewing the major issues arising out of the draft statute and considering arrangements for 
the convening of an international conference”.226 
 
The General Assembly, in resolution 50/46, decided that a Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (hereinafter “PrepCom”) be set up to 
discuss major substantive issues arising from that draft statute prepared by the Commission 
                                                          
220 ICC, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm (last accessed on 8 February 2009).  
221 Ibid. 
222 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994, Volume II, Part Two: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the Work of its forty-sixth Session, A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (part 2), para. 17. See 
also General Assembly, resolution 44/39, A/44/PV.72, 4 December 1989. 
223 The final version of the Working Group's report was examined by the Commission at the 2374th to 2376th 
meetings, held on 21 and 22 July 1994, and the text of the draft can be found in A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2. and Corr. 
1 and Add.1-3. 
224 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994, Volume II, Part Two: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, supra note 222, para. 17. 
225 General Assembly, A/RES/49/53, 17 February 1995, para. 2. See also Howard Ball, War Crimes and Justice, 
Contemporary World Issues, supra note 216, p. 50.  
226 General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Fiftieth Session, No. 22, A/50/22, 6 September 1995.  
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and to prepare a widely acceptable consolidated draft text.227At the fifty-second session, the 
General Assembly decided to hold a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries in 1998 “with 
a view to finalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international 
criminal court”.228 
 
In April 1998, the PrepCom completed the preparation of the draft Statute of an International 
Criminal Court and the consolidated text was delivered to the Rome Conference. From 15 
June to 17 July 1998, the text of consolidated draft went under discussion participated by 
more than 160 States, and Rome Statute was finally adopted on 17 July 1998.229 
 
On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute entered into force, that is, 60 days subsequent to its 
receiving the 60thratification needed for it to come into effect. 230 Kofi Annan hailed the 
adoption of the Rome Statute and described it as “a giant step forward in the march toward 
universal human rights and the rule of law.”231 
 
2.    The Provision of Crime of Child Recruitment under the Rome Statute 
 
Under the Rome Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes are enumerated in 
Articles 6, 7, 8 of the Rome Statute.232 Certain crimes committed against children fall under 
                                                          
227 General Assembly, A/RES/50/46, 11 December 1995, para. 2. 
228 General Assembly, A/RES/51/207, 16 January 1997, para. 5.  
229 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Rome Conference, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome(last accessed on 5 October 2011). 
230 The provisions of the Rome Statute determine the date upon which the treaty enters into force. See Rome 
Statute, Article 126: “1. This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day 
following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this 
Statute after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Statute 
shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” 
231 Kofi Annan, Statement at the Ceremony Held at Campidoglio Celebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 18 July 1998, available at http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/718sg.htm (last 
accessed on 16 June 2010). 
232 Rome Statute, Articles. 5, 6, 7, 8.Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 
revised 2010 at the Review Conference in Kampala. On 11 June 2010, the Review Conference of Rome Statute 
held in Kampala adopted the amendments to the Rome Statute which include Article 8 bis on the crime of 
 53 
 
the jurisdiction of the Court.233 The inclusion of the crime of child recruitment in the Rome 
Statute was a turning point in the history of international criminal justice, as it enables the 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators who recruit or use children in hostilities. This 
advance had been preceded by an intense debate during the PrepCom on whether the 
recruitment of child soldiers warranted the most fundamental disapprobation, including 
entailing individual criminal responsibility. Although some delegations took the view that “it 
was inappropriate to include in the Statute an issue (child recruitment) that had more of 
human rights than an international humanitarian law character”, 234  the crime of child 
recruitment was finally approved to be provided in the final draft of the Rome Statute. Article 
8 (2) (b) (xxvi) sets forth this crime in relation to international armed conflicts as follows:   
 
“Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into national armed forces or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”235 
 
In Article 8 (2) (e) (vii), a similar provision is laid down to be applied in non-international 
armed conflicts:   
 
“Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”236 
 
To gives a clear picture of what kinds of child recruitment the ICC is supposed to prosecute 
and punish, the Rome Statute adopts the phrase: “conscripting or enlisting” to suggest that 
both forcible recruitment and recruitment of volunteers are both prohibited.237 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
aggression. The ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until after1 January 2017 
when the jurisdiction will be activated by the State Parties. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 
the Crime of Aggression, available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression, (last accessed on 5 October 
2011). 
233 Ilona Topa, Prohibition of Child Soldiering-International Legislation and Prosecution of Perpetrators, supra 
note 25, p. 113. 
234 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Transnational, 2001, p. 205. 
235 Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (hereinafter “Rome Statute”), U.N.Doc.A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi). 
236 Rome Statute, ibid., Article 8 (2) (e)(vii).  
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that the call for criminal liability is not only limited to the 
international level, but also implemented at the national level as well.238 Although there is 
nothing explicitly provided in the Rome Statute imposing any obligation on the states to 
implement the crimes provided in the Statute into their domestic laws, the ICC actually 
leaves the primary responsibility to investigate and punish the alleged criminals to individual 
states under the complementarity jurisdiction. 239 As is stressed by NGOs as a political 
demand, the complementarity system “can only work if states undertake the following: ratify 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
237 For more details, please see infra A. Actus Reus, Chapter 4.  
238 Countries that have signed the Rome Statute should not neglect to implement the provisions into their 
domestic laws. See Justin Coleman, Showing its Teeth: The International Criminal Court Takes on Child 
Conscription in the Congo, But Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, 26 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev (2008): 765, pp. 784-
785. 
239 Article 17 of the Rome Statute: “Issues of Admission. 1.Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and 
article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:(a) The case is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution; (b)The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c)The person concerned has already been tried 
for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, 
paragraph 3;(d)The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.2.In order to determine 
unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process 
recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a)The proceedings 
were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; 
(b)There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c)The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 3. In order to determine inability in a 
particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its 
national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.” See also Article 1 of the Rome Statute: “An International 
Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power 
to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this 
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the 
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.” See also the Preamble of the Rome Statute: 
“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.”  
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or accede to the Rome Statute, fully cooperate with the Court by providing all the necessary 
judicial assistance in its proceedings, and implement all of the crimes under the Rome Statute 
into domestic legislation”.240 In this respect, many organizations, not only Coalition of the 
International Criminal Court, but also the NGOs, such as the ICRC Advisory Service on 
International Humanitarian Law, are working on advocating and assisting the development of 
implementing national legislation.241 
 
However, critics has voiced their disappointment on some key issues provided by Article 8 
(2) (b) (xxvi) and Article 8 (2) (e) (vii). Firstly, dissatisfaction comes with the failure of the 
Rome Statute to protect children who may be used in “indirect but violent ways” to take part 
                                                          
240 Coalition of International Criminal Court, Implementation of the Rome Statute, available at 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=romeimplementation(last accessed on 9 October 2011). The Preamble 
of the Rome Statute emphasizes the significant of the enforcement of the Rome Statute at the national level: 
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ICRC, Official Statement, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Implementation at the National 
Level: Opening Remarks by M. Jacques Forster, Vice-President of the ICRC, Moscow, Russian Federation, 4-5 
February 2004, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5VSHQH?OpenDocument&style=custo_print (last accessed 
on 22 April 2010).  
241 ICRC, Official Statement, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Implementation at the National 
Level: Opening Remarks by M. Jacques Forster, Vice-President of the ICRC, Moscow, Russian Federation, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5VSHQH?OpenDocument&style=custo_print 
(last accessed on 22 April 2010): “[T]he ICRC Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, which was 
set up in 1996 to provide States with more effective assistance, has been giving States technical advice on the 
ratification and implementation of humanitarian law instruments and facilitating the exchange of information on 
measures, legislative and other, already adopted.” See also Coalition of International Criminal Court, 
Implementation of the Rome Statute, available at 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=romeimplementation(last accessed on 9 October 2011): “The CICC is 
one of a few organizations in the world actively monitoring and working on promoting the development of 
implementation legislation globally. As with ratification, the overwhelming focus of CICC’s work is 
educational, providing basic information, documentation and examples of how different nations have addressed 
similar legal issues. To assist our membership, and also those governments working on their legislation, the 
Coalition is committed to providing comprehensive information on the state of legislative drafting and 
implementation campaigns throughout the world.” 
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in hostilities.242 The limited protection provided only to children who “participate actively in 
hostilities” leaves children who take indirect participation beyond the realm of Article 8(2) 
(b) (xxvi) and Article 8 (2) (e) (vii). Finally, like most of the instruments earliest, the Rome 
Statute consistently set the minimum age for recruitment at 15 years. Apparently, such 
formulation came from the need for consensus. Nevertheless, one can not underestimate the 
continuing efforts of the International organizations and NGOs, such as Human Rights 
Watch, UNICEF and ICRC, to raise this minimum age to 18 years. From this perspective, the 
question of raising the minimum age to 18 years seemed to be knocking at the door, 
demanding attention to a future agenda, though one cannot expect a smooth journey on the 
road ahead.243 
 
II. Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (hereinafter “SCSL Statute”) 
 
During the civil war of Sierra Leone thousands of children under the age of 15 were recruited 
as child soldiers by direct or indirect coercive means.244 Considering the cruel reality of the 
massive use of children in hostilities and of the severe situation of the extensive sexual abuse 
of girl soldiers in Sierra Leone, a Special Court in Sierra Leone (hereinafter “SCSL”) was 
established on the request of the Security Council.245 A similar provision mirroring Article 8 
(2) (e) (vii) of the Rome Statute was set forth in the SCSL Statute, which states in Article 4:   
 
“Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.”246 
 
                                                          
242 Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, supra note 101, p. 241. See also 
Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl Soldiers?, supra note 74, 
p. 235. 
243 The difficulties to achieve the “straight 18” standard will be addressed in Chapter 4.  
244 These means may include but not limited to, abduction, threats, killing of family members by the adductors.  
245 UN Security Council, Secretary-General’s Report on the Establishment of the Special Court for the Sierra 
Leone, Doc. S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, para. 12. 
246 SCSL Statute, Article 8 (2) (e) (vii). 
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SCSL Statute specifically provides for criminality of child recruitment committed in the 
context of a non-international armed conflict, under the title of “other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law”. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
As shown above, the use of child soldiers, especially those who are under the age of 15 years, 
is incontrovertibly prohibited under a substantial body of legislations in international law. 
Numerous developments have taken place in this regard since Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Two aspects are of paramount importance. Firstly, the legislative development regarding 
prohibition of child soldiering in the field of international human rights law has greatly 
contributed to the protection of children from being recruitment and has operated in the 
circumstances where humanitarian law fails. International human rights law regards child 
soldiers as victims, as children’s rights and interests are largely violated by their participation 
in the armed conflicts. The prohibition of children to be recruited in armed forces or groups is 
therefore a welfare right. Based on this premise, children’s participation in armed conflicts, 
whether compulsorily or voluntarily, and whether occurs in the war times or peacetime, is 
never in their best interests.  
 
Additionally, the Rome Statute and the SCSL Statute further strengthen the prohibition of 
child soldiering by introducing individual criminal responsibility. It is admitted that the 
violations of the obligations under the norms of international human rights instruments are 
largely considered as a wrongful act resulting in state responsibility, but not a crime attracting 
individual criminal responsibility. By listing the practice of child soldiering as a war crime, 
the Rome Statute transformed this prohibition into a criminalization. Judicial affirmation of 
this crime began in 2003, when the accused Norman was charged with the crime of child 
recruitment before the SCSL. Following the judicial practice of the SCSL, the ICC has in its 
very first case specifically called for Lubanga to be held accountability for his participation in 
planning the recruitment or use of child soldiers in hostilities.247 
 
Nevertheless, as addressed above, current international and regional instruments regulating 
the use of child soldiers have been criticized as age-biased. It seems that impunity gaps are 
                                                          
247 For more details, see infra Chapter 2.  
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appearing in the regard of the failure to prosecute individuals who recruit or use children 
under the age of 18 in the context of the Rome Statute the SCSL Statute. Further demand is 
also growing in respect to raise the age threshold of recruiting volunteers into government 
forces to 18 years. Furthermore, current international and regional instruments regulating the 
use of child soldiers is also regarded as disappointing, as they fail to offer protection for 
children who take indirect part but play supporting role in hostilities, such as cook and sexual 
slaves.248 Although the road ahead is not smooth, the current laws, such as Convention 182 
and ACWRC are successful attempts to reconcile the interests between governments and 
children. It is believed in the near future the international community may be willing to take 
the Cape Town definition of “child soldier”, which reflects all aspects of a child soldier’s 
right and interests.   
                                                          
248 For more details, see infra Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of the Case Law Concerning the Crime of 
Child Recruitment  
 
As addressed in the previous chapter, the establishment of the ICC is of significance to the 
development of international laws of protecting children from recruitment or use as soldiers 
in hostilities, as it set an international platform to enforce international provisions regarding 
child soldiering and also sent a message that the violations of international laws would no 
longer be tolerated without punishment.  
 
So far, 21 former leaders have been accused of the crime of child recruitment before the 
SCSL and the ICC. The examination of the respective judicial decisions is of crucial 
importance not only for the purpose of assuring the evolution of the jurisprudence, but also as 
a means of establishing the most appropriate interpretation to the applicable rules.249In this 
respect, the judicial practice regarding using child soldiers before the ICC and other 
international criminal tribunals will be reviewed in the following chapter. 
 
As to the question of the retroactive effect, this question will be covered by the discussion of 
the customary nature of the crime of child recruitment before 1996 when the SCSL started its 
jurisdiction over the crimes occurred during the Sierra Leone civil war.  
 
The prosecution of perpetrators, who committed the crime of child recruitment, before 
international criminal courts is a relatively recent phenomenon. Little attention was given to 
children when the IMT and IMTFE were established in the aftermath of the WW II. The legal 
framework of these two tribunals only included a very few provisions pertaining to the rights 
and the needs of children, which did not cover the protection of children from participation in 
armed conflicts.250 The crime of child recruitment also neither appears in the Statute of the 
                                                          
249 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University, 2003, p. 37. See also Christopher W. 
Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal Law in Post-
Colonial Africa, supra note 60, p.25. 
250  Cecile Aptel, Children and Accountability for International Crimes: The Contribution of International 
Criminal Courts, available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2010_20.pdf (last accessed on 8 
October 2010), UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, August 2010, p, 3.  
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “ICTY”), nor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR”), and therefore trials before 
these two ad hoc tribunals have not yet referred to any charge concerning the crime of child 
recruitment.251 
 
The crime of child recruitment is explicitly provided both in the SCSL Statutes and the Rome 
Statute. These documents, as shown above in Chapter 1, have brought about a major 
development in respect to the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators who use child 
soldiers in armed conflicts. Although both of the two courts have established their 
jurisdiction on the crime of child recruitment, the SCSL seems to be far more experienced in 
its judicial practice on this crime than the ICC.  
 
So far, the SCSL has been the most active in pursuing child recruiters, having exercised its 
judicial practice in respect of 13 indictments. While until now only three accused have been 
brought to the ICC under the charge of this crime of child recruitment, and no judgment has 
yet been reached. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, both of the courts have devoted 
considerable energy to fighting to end impunity for child soldering violations, and further set 
important precedents through application and clarification of rules in respect of the crime of 
child recruitment. On the basis of the described development, the case-law of the SCSL will 
be addressed in detail first.  
 
A. Judicial Practice of the Crime of Child Recruitment Before the SCSL 
 
Based on the agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the UN, the SCSL was 
established in 2002, with the mission to try those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.252 As 
noted above in Chapter 1, the crime of child recruitment is defined in Article 4 (3) (c) SCSL 
Statute, namely “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to take active part in hostilities”. The Sierra Leone civil war 
                                                          
251 One may argue that at the time of prosecuting the accused, prosecution may play a role to charge the accused 
who recruit child soldiers within the scope of other crimes.  
252 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 245, 
para. 1. See also SCSL Statute, Article 1.  
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between 1991 and 2002 was known for its widespread use of child soldiers in various tasks in 
armed factions, such as the Civil Defense Forces (hereinafter “CDF”), the Revolutionary 
United Front (hereinafter “RUF”), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (hereinafter 
“AFRC”), as well as among the Liberian fighters. The SCSL is the first international criminal 
tribunal to have tried perpetrators for violations of international humanitarian law as related 
to the recruitment of children under the age of 15 as child soldiers or use them in hostilities. 
So far 13 people from all warring factions in Sierra Leone were charged with the crime of 
child recruitment.253 Among the 13 accused, six of them were found guilty of this crime.  
 
I. The Case Concerning the CDF  
 
The first trial concerning the crime of child recruitment is the case against Samuel Hinga 
Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa before the SCSL. On 7 March 2003, Norman, 
along with Fofana and Kondewa, was indicted on eight counts of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, including the crime of child recruitment. 254 At the time relevant to the 
indictment, Norman was the “National Coordinator” of the CDF,255 and the leader of the 
paramilitary force “Kamajors”.256 Fofana was the “National Director of War” of the CDF and 
was regarded as the second in command.257 In addition to this function, Fofana was also in 
charge of commanding some of the battalions of the CDF.258 As a leading member and “High 
                                                          
253 The International Herald Tribune News, Death by Child, 15 November 2008.  
254 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 1. 
255 Ibid, para. 13.  
256 Africa News, Law Bulletin Analyses Legal Ramifications of Child Soldier Recruitment, 8 December 2008. 
See also Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note 84, p. 121. 
257 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 1. 
258 Trial Watch, Moinina Fofana, available at  
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/moinina_fofana_400.html (last accessed on 1 December 
2009). 
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Priest”259 of the CDF, Kondewa was in control of the supervision of all initiations to the 
CDF.260 
 
The joint trial of the three accused commenced on 3 June 2004. On 22 February 2007 
Norman’s trial was put to an end due to his death at a military hospital in Dakar while 
detained.261 Although the Trial Chamber terminated the proceedings against Norman,262 the 
death of Norman did not influence the trial against the other two accused: Fofana and 
Kondewa. The trial continued until October 2006 and a judgment was issued in August 2007. 
According to the judgment, Fofana was convicted on four counts263 but was acquitted from 
the charge of the crime of child recruitment, while Kondewa was found guilty on five 
                                                          
259 When Kamajors go to war they must go to Kondewa to be advised. Kondewa chooses who goes to warfront, 
blesses them as high priest. See SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, 
SCSL-04-14-T, Decision Regarding Prosecution and Kondewa Final Trial Briefs, Trial Chamber, 15 December 
2006, para. 13.  
260 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 1. See also Trial Watch, Allieu Kondewa, available at 
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/allieu_kondewa_400.html (last accessed on 1 December 
2009). 
261 An independent investigation by medical experts to ascertain the cause of the death of Norman has been 
ordered. SCSL,  Press Release, Special Court President Orders Inquiry into Death of Hinga Norman, Office of 
Press and Public Affairs, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 23 February 2007, para. 4. See also SCSL Press Release, 
Special Court Inductee Sam Hinga Norman Dies in Dakar, 22 February 2007.  
262  Although the proceedings against Norman was terminated, Judge Benjamin Nutanga Itoe claimed his 
disagreement with the majority on the decision to delete the name of Norman from the cover sheets of chamber 
rulings, decisions, court process and records. SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu 
Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-T, Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe on the Majority Decision 
to Delete the Name of the First Accused, Samuel Hinga Norman (Now Deceased) from the Cover Sheets of 
Chamber Rulings, Decisions, Court Process and Records, 22 June 2007, paras. 27-31.  
263 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Fofana to be responsible for Court 2 - Violence to life, 
health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 4 - Violence to life, health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
and of Additional Protocol II; Court 5- a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II; as well as Count 7 – Collective Punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, Disposition.  
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counts,264 including the crime of child recruitment. According to the Sentencing Judgment 
issued on 9 October 2007, Fofana was sentenced for six years of imprisonment, and 
Kondewa for eight years.265 
 
The prosecution appealed against the sentencing judgment and called for higher sentences 
based on nine grounds. Kondewa also appealed his conviction based on six grounds. In 
regard to sentencing, the Appeals Chamber held, Justice Gelaga King dissenting, that the 
Trial Chamber erred in law in finding that “just cause” can be a mitigating factor. The 
Appeals Chamber stated that consideration of motive for the purpose of sentence is not to 
regard motive as a defense.266 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber, by a majority, Justice 
Gelaga King disserting, reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision on acquittals of Fofana and 
Kondewa on counts 1 and 3 of the indictment, i.e., for murder and inhumane acts as crimes 
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber, again by majority with Justice Gelaga King and Jon 
Kamanda dissenting, sustained the convictions of Fofana on counts 2 and 4 for murder and 
cruel treatment as war crimes, and increased the sentences substantially. The Appeals 
Chamber not only unanimously overturned Kondewa’s conviction for murder in Talia, but 
also reversed Kondewa’s conviction on Count 8 for “the enlistment of children under the age 
of 15 as combatants”. On 28 May 2008, the Appeals Chamber resentenced Fofana to 15 years 
as opposed to the original six years, and Kondewa to 20 years as opposed to the original eight 
                                                          
264 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Kondewa to be responsible for Court 2 - Violence to 
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 4 - Violence to life, health and physical or 
mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 5 - a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 7 – Collective Punishments, a violation of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; as well as Count 8 – enlisting children under the age 
of 15 years into an armed groups and/or using them to participate actively in hostilities, another serious violation 
of international humanitarian law.  See SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, Disposition. 
265 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa,  SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on 
the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (hereinafter “Norman Sentencing Judgment”),Trial 
Chamber, 9 October 2007, Disposition.  
266 SCSL, 5th Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for the Sierra Leone, June 2007 to May 2008, 
p. 23.  
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years.267 Dissenting opinions were read out by Justice Winter regarding enlistment of child 
soldiers, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 4.268 
 
The trial is a remarkable milestone, for it not only delivered justice to the victims,269 but also 
warned future perpetrators that such atrocity would not be tolerated.270 Some ingenious ideas 
are left by the Norman trial. One of the most important legacies is the Decision on 
Preliminary Motion concerning Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (hereinafter 
“Norman Jurisdiction Decision”) by the Appeals Chamber on 31 May 2004. 271  In this 
decision, the Appeals Chamber found that the prohibition of the recruitment of children under 
the age of 15 years had crystallized as a norm of customary international law by November 
1996 and as such entailed individual criminal responsibility to perpetrators who had recruited 
the child soldiers at least from that date. This finding was of particular significance, as it was 
deemed by many scholars as a landmark milestone resulting in the first ever decision 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the jurisdiction over the crime of child recruitment by an 
international judicial authority.272 However, the finding that the crime of child recruitment 
had been customary international law before 1996 is still controversial to some scholars.273 
 
                                                          
267SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment 
(hereinafter “Norman Appeals Judgment”), Appeals Chamber, 28 May 2008, paras. 115-154.  
268 For more details, see infra Chapter 4.  
269  Tucker Reals, Former Liberian Leader Boycotts Trial, 4 June 2007, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/04/world/main2880672.shtml?tag=currentVideoInfo;videoMetaInfo 
(last accessed on 16 October 2010).  
270 Stephen Kabera Karanja, Child Soldiers in Peace Agreements: The Peace and Justice Dilemma, Global 
Jurist Advances, Volume 8, Issue 3, Article 9, 2008, pp. 2-3.  
271  SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on 
Preliminary Motion Based on lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (hereinafter “Norman Jurisdiction 
Decision”), 31 May 2004. 
272 See SCSL, Norman Appeals Judgment, supra note267, paras. 115-154. See SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, 
supra note78, para. 184. See also SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Karama and Santigie 
Borbor Kanu,  SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment (hereinafter “Brima Trial Judgment”), 20 June 2007. 
See also Renate Winter, Der Spezialgerichtshof von Sierra Leone, Landesgruppe Österreich der Internationalen 
Strafrechtsgesellschaft und Österreichischer Juristenverband (Eds), Internationale Strafgerichtshöfe und 
Menschenrechte, Symposium am 6 Oktober 2006 in Wien, 2007, pp. 34-36.   
273 The issue concerning the status of the crime of child recruitment under customary international law will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, infra.  
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Furthermore, the Norman trial has provided valuable precedents on the clarification of some 
of the key elements of the crime of child recruitment. 
 
However, there is still some ambiguity contained in the judgment, especially the explanation 
of the term “enlistment” by the Trial Chamber, which has raised some questions regarding 
the actus reus of this crime.274 
 
II. The Case Concerning the AFRC  
 
On 25 May 1997, the government of the newly elected president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was 
overthrown by a group of soldiers from Sierra Leone Army (hereinafter “SLA”), who had 
formed the AFRC and Johnny Paul Koroma was elected as the head of AFRC.275Shortly 
thereafter, the AFRC and the RUF joined their forces to become a new army called “the 
People’s Army”. 276  In order to regain the power of President Kabbah, the Economic 
Community of West African States (hereinafter “ECOMOG”) stormed Freetown in February 
1998.277 Due to a series of attacks launched on the AFRC by the forces of ECOMOG, the 
AFRC was driven out of Freetown. 278  During the retreat, the AFRC and RUF troops 
committed widespread looting, attacks on civilians, and heavy damages to infrastructure and 
housing of civilians. 279  After the attack on Freetown in January 1999, the AFRC 
subsequently divided into two groups, one of which was supporting a faction of the RUF, and 
the other formed the “West Side Boys”, many members of which were abducted children.280 
 
                                                          
274 The issue will be addressed in A. actus reus, Chapter 4, infra. 
275 International Centre for Transitional Justice, Special Court for Sierra Leone Issues First Judgment, Long-
Awaited Milestone in Road to Justice, 22 June 2007, available at 
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/press/release/1238.html (last accessed on 16 October 2010).  
276 Paul Richards, War and Peace in Sierra Leone, 25 Fletcher F. World AFF. (2001) 41, p. 45. Babafemi 
Akinrinade, International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & 
Pub. Pol.’Y (2001):391, p. 431.  
277 UNHCR, Sierra Leone: Information on the 1997 Coup D'etat, ECOMOG harassment of civilians, and the 
current situation in Sierra Leone, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, 5 January 
2000,  p.1.  
278 SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note  272, paras. 168, 173, 175.  
279 Ibid., paras. 178-195, 206-207. 
280 Ibid., para. 208. 
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Three accused - Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu - from 
the AFRC faction were arrested in 2003. Brima was in direct command of AFRC/RUF forces 
in the Kono District.281 Kamara was a senior member of the AFRC, and served as Brima’s 
second in command based in Kono District.282 Kanu was a senior commander of AFRC/RUF 
forces in Kono District as well, and “commanded in charge of civilian abductees” during the 
attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999.283 The Prosecution charged them with 14 counts of 
crimes against humanity as well as with war crimes, including the crime of child 
recruitment.284 On 7 March 2005 the trial began and testimony was heard from more than 140 
witnesses.285 
 
Based on the established evidence, the Trial Chamber found that the only form of recruitment 
conducted by the AFRC was abduction, and the Chamber further found that these abductions 
“were linked to these Accused in this case in the districts of Bombali, Freetown and the 
Western Area”. 286  The trial Judgment was delivered on 19 July 2007. Based on the 
consideration of the gravity of the offences and individual circumstances of the convicted 
persons, including aggravating and mitigating factors, the Chamber found Brima guilty on 
ten counts,287 including the crime of child recruitment, with sentences of 50 years; Kamara 
                                                          
281Ibid., para. 342. 
282Ibid, paras. 380, 461-467.  
283 SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272, para. 535. 
284 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Karama and Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-2004-16-
PT, Indictment, 18 February 2005, para. 65.  
285 International Centre for Transitional Justice, Press Releases, Special Court for Sierra Leone Issues First 
Judgment, Long-Awaited Milestone in Road to Justice, supra note 275.  
286 SCSL, BrimaTrial Judgment, supra note  272, paras. 1275-1277. 
287 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Brima to be responsible for Court 1 - Acts of 
Terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2 - 
Collective punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II; Count 3 - Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4 - Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5 - 
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 9 - Outrages upon personal dignity, 
a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 10 - Violence 
to life, health and physical or mantel well-being of persons, as mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 12- Conscripting children under the age of 15 
years into an armed group and/or using them to participate actively in hostilities, another serious violation of 
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guilty on eleven counts,288 including the crime of child recruitment, with sentences of 45 
years; and Kanu guilty on eleven counts,289 including the crime of child recruitment, with 
sentences of 50 years.  
 
Both the Prosecution and the defendants appealed. Among the three accused, only Kanu filed 
Grounds of Appeal on the issue of the crime of child recruitment.290 Kanu claimed that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
international humanitarian law; Count 13 - Enslavement, a Crime against Humanity; as well as Count 14 – 
Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. See SCSL, 
Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272, paras. 2113-2116. 
288 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Kamara to be responsible for Court 1- Acts of 
Terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2- 
Collective punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II; Count 3- Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4- Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5- 
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 6- Rape, a Crime against Humanity; 
Court 9- Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II; Court 10- Violence to life, health and physical or mantel well-being of persons, as 
mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 
12- Conscripting children under the age of 15 years into an armed group and/or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities, another serious violation of international humanitarian law; Count 13- Enslavement, a 
Crime against Humanity; as well as Count 14 – Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. See SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note272,  paras. 2117-2120.  
289 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Kamara to be responsible for Court 1 - Acts of 
Terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2- 
Collective punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II; Count 3- Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4 - Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5 - 
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 6- Rape, a Crime against Humanity; 
Court 9 - Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II; Court 10 - Violence to life, health and physical or mantel well-being of persons, as 
mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 12 
- Conscripting children under the age of 15 years into an armed group and/or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities, another serious violation of international humanitarian law; Count 13 - Enslavement, a Crime 
against Humanity; as well as Count 14 – Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
and of Additional Protocol II. See SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272, paras. 2121-2123.  
290  SCSL, Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Karama and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Judgment 
(hereinafter “Brima Appeals Judgment”), Appeals Chamber, 22 February 2008, paras. 28-33. 
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Appeals Chamber should overturn his conviction for conscripting, enlisting, and using 
children under 15 years in hostilities because he lacked the requisite mens rea. Alternatively, 
Kanu argued that child recruitment was not a war crime by 30 November 1996, the starting 
date of the SCSL's temporal jurisdiction.291 On appeal the conviction imposed by the Trial 
Chamber against Kanu for recruiting child soldiers were upheld. Based on the finding of the 
Norman Jurisdiction Decision that the crime of child recruitment had been part of customary 
international law before 1996, the Appeals Chamber found it “vexatious” that Kanu lacked 
the requisite mens rea of conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities.292 
 
On 22 February 2008, the Appeals Chamber delivered its Judgment on the Brima case. The 
Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeals against conviction brought by Brima, Kamara and 
Kanu. The Appeals Chamber upheld the Prosecution’s grounds of appeal, by stating that the 
Trial Chamber “erroneously failed to consider acts of forced marriage as constituting a crime 
against humanity”, but regarding the substantial sentences imposed by the Trial Chamber, the 
Appeals Chamber declined to “consider arguments that Brima, Kamara and Kanu bore 
responsibility for additional crimes”.293 The Appeals Judgment remained the sentences found 
by the Trial Chamber for all of the three accused.   
 
Regarding the issue of the status of the crime of child recruitment, the Brima case generally 
followed the finding of the Norman Jurisdiction Decision that the crime of child recruitment 
had been part of customary law before 1996. The Brima case has reinforced the legitimacy of 
the jurisdiction over this crime, and sent a clear message that no individual is beyond the 
reach of justice for the violations of recruiting child as soldiers or using them to actively 
participate in hostilities.  
 
III. The Cases Concerning the RUF 
 
                                                          
291 Ibid, para. 293.  
292 Ibid. para. 296. 
293 UNHCR, Sierra Leone: Information on the 1997 Coup D'etat, ECOMOG harassment of civilians, and the 
current situation in Sierra Leone, supra note 277, p. 9.  
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In respect of the RUF trail, the SCSL has dealt with four different cases: Prosecutor v. Issa 
Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Prosecutor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh, 
Prosecutorv. Sam Bockarie, and Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma. 
 
1. Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
 
As senior commanders of the RUF, Issa Hassan Sesay, MorrisKallon, and Augustine Gbao 
were indicted on 7 March 2003 on 17 counts of crimes against humanity, violations of CA3, 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the crime of child 
recruitment. 294  Sesay and Kallon were arrested on 10 March 2003 and had their initial 
appearance on 15 March 2003, where they pleaded not guilty to all charges.295 After Gbao’s 
arrest on March 2003, he had his first initial appearance on 25 April 2003, and also pleaded 
not guilty to all charges.296 
 
On 5 July 2004 commenced the trial of these three former rebel leaders. Considering the 
systematic use of child soldiers by the RUF, the Chamber found that a substantial degree of 
planning of child recruitment from RUF Commanders at the highest levels existed.297 Based 
on the factual finding that Sesay and Kallon were the senior RUF Commanders in February 
1998 when children were abducted in large numbers, and that Sesay and Kallon gave orders 
for children to be trained at RUF camps, the Chamber found that Sesay and Kallon were 
liable for planning the use of persons under the age of 15 years to actively participate in 
                                                          
294 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15, RUF Summary of 
the Charges, available at 
http://www.scsl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSesayKallonadnGbaoRUFSummaryoftheCharges/tabid/185/Default.as
px (last accessed on 11 January 2010).  
295 SCSL, Press Release, Sesay Plead Not Guilty: Three Other Hearing Adjourned, 15 March 2003, available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=dovl%2bKxChyg%3d&tabid=114 (last accessed on 11 January 
2010). SCSL, Press Release, Birma and Kallon Pleaded Not Guilty, 15 March 2003, available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2fFKRltuMyjM%3d&tabid=114 (last accessed on 11 January 2010).  
296SCSL, Press Release, Gbao Plead Not Guilty to Charges in Front of the Special Court, 15 March 2003, 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cylbZaqpFUY%3d&tabid=114 (last accessed on 11 
January 2010). 
297 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao,SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment (hereinafter “Sesay Trial Judgment”), 2 March 2009, para. 1744.  
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hostilities.298 Due to the lack of corroborated evidence to establish a substantial contribution 
of Gbao to the widespread use of children soldiers, the Trial Chamber was not satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused Gbao was individual criminal responsibility under 
Article 6 (1) of the SCSL Statute for the crime of child recruitment.299 Since the Prosecution 
has failed to establish that Gbao was in a superior-subordinate relationship with the 
perpetrators of the alleged crime, he was found not liable as a superior under Article 6 (3) of 
the SCSL Statute for the use of children under the age of 15 to actively participate in 
hostilities.300 
 
On 8 April 2009, the Trial Chamber sentenced Sesay a term of imprisonment of 52 years, 
Kallon to 40 years, and Gbao to 25 years,301 for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed during the 1996-2001 period of the civil war in Sierra Leone. According to the 
judgment, Sesay was convicted on 16 counts,302 including the crime of child recruitment; 
                                                          
298 Ibid.,paras. 2223-2237. 
299 Ibid.,paras. 2235-2236. 
300 Ibid., para. 2237. 
301Ibid., Disposition. 
302 The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Sesay to be responsible for Court 1- Acts of Terrorism, 
a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2- Collective 
Punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 
3- Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4 - Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5 - Violence 
to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Statute by 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise, in relation to events in Tikonko, Sembehun and Gerihun in Bo 
District, in Kenema District, in Kono District, and in Kailahun District; Count 6 - Rape, a Crime against 
Humanity; Count 7 – Sexual Slavery, a Crime against Humanity; Count 8 – Other inhumane acts (forced 
marriage), a Crime against Humanity; Court 9 - Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 10 - Violence to life, health and 
physical or mantel well-being of persons, as mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 11- Other inhumane acts (physical violence), a Crime against 
Humanity; Count 12 - Conscripting children under the age of 15years into armed groups, or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities, another serious violation of international humanitarian law; Count 13 - 
Enslavement, a Crime against Humanity; Count 14 – Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, Count 15 - Intentionally directing attacks against personnel involved 
in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
well as Count 17 - Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a 
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Kallon was convicted on 16 counts,303including the crime of child recruitment; and Gbao was 
convicted on 14 counts, 304  but was acquitted from the charge of the crime of child 
recruitment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.  Pursuant to Article 6 
(3) of the Statute as a superior in relation to events in Bombali and Tonkolili District. See SCSL, Sesay Trial 
Judgment, supra note297, Disposition.  
303  The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Kallon to be responsible for Court 1- Acts of 
Terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2 - 
Collective Punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II; Count 3- Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4 - Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5 - 
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Statute by 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise, in relation to events in Tikonko, Sembehun and Gerihun in Bo 
District, in Kenema District, in Kono District, and in Kailahun District, as well as instigating Murder in relation 
to an event in Wendedu in Kono District; Count 6 - Rape, a Crime against Humanity; Count 7 –Sexual Slavery, 
a Crime against Humanity; Count 8 – Other inhumane acts (forced marriage), a Crime against Humanity; Court 
9 - Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II; Court 10 - Violence to life, health and physical or mantel well-being of persons, as 
mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 
11- Other inhumane acts (physical violence), a Crime against Humanity; Count 12- Conscripting children under 
the age of 15 years into armed groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, another serious 
violation of international humanitarian law; Count 13 - Enslavement, a Crime against Humanity; Count 14 – 
Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, Count 15 - 
Intentionally directing attacks against personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as Count 17 - Violence to life, health and physical 
or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 6 (3) of the Statute as a superior in relation to 
events in Bombali and Tonkolili District. See SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, Disposition.  
304  The Trial Chamber found with respect to the Accused Kallon to be responsible for Court 1- Acts of 
Terrorism, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Count 2- 
Collective Punishments, a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II; Count 3- Extermination, a Crime against Humanity; Count 4 - Murder, a Crime against Humanity; Court 5 - 
Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, a violation of Article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 6 (1) of the Statute by 
participating in a joint criminal enterprise, in relation to events in Tikonko, Sembehun and Gerihun in Bo 
District, in Kenema District, in Kono District, and in Kailahun District; Count 6- Rape, a Crime against 
Humanity; Count 7 – Sexual Slavery, a Crime against Humanity; Count 8 – Other inhumane acts (forced 
marriage), a Crime against Humanity; Court 9- Outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of Article 3 common 
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All the three accused and the Prosecution appealed the Trial Judgment to the Appeals 
Chamber, with 46 Grounds filed by Sesay, 31 by Kallon, 19 by Gbao and 3 by 
Prosecution.305 Sesay appealed his conviction for his role in the use of child soldiers and 
Kallon appealed his conviction for planning the use of child soldiers.306 The Prosecution in 
Ground 2 appealed the acquittal of Gbao for the crime of child recruitment.307 As to the 
Sasay’s and Kallon’s appeals, the Appeals Chamber unanimously upheld their convictions on 
the 16 counts, including the crime of child recruitment. 308  But the Appeals Chamber 
unanimously dismissed the Prosecution’s appeal on the acquittal of Gbao for the crime of 
child recruitment, because the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Gbao 
had significant contribution to the commission of the crime of child recruitment.309 In April 
2009, the Appeals Chamber sentenced Sesay to 52 years of imprisonment, while resentenced 
Kallon for 39 years, and Gbao for 20 years.310 
 
The case against Sesay has been one of the most anticipated trials before the SCSL, and its 
analysis of the crime of child recruitment has indeed contributed to the furtherance of 
international criminal justice and has also enhanced the accountability for the use of child 
soldiers in armed conflicts.  
 
2. Prosecutor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II; Court 10 - Violence to life, health and physical or 
mantel well-being of persons, as mutilation, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II; Count 11 - Other inhumane acts (physical violence), a Crime against Humanity; Count 
13 - Enslavement, a Crime against Humanity; Count 14 – Pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, Count 15 - Intentionally directing attacks against personnel 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. See SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, Disposition.  
305 SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, para. 12.  
306  SCSL, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao,SCSL-04-15-A, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment (hereinafter “Sesay Appeals Judgment”),26 October 2009,paras. 26-27.  
307Ibid,. para. 29.  
308 Ibid.,  paras. 9-11. See also SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, Disposition.  
309 SCSL, Sesay Appeal Judgment, supra note 304,paras. 1169-1180.   
310 Ibid, Disposition. 
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Foday Saybana Sankoh, one of the leaders of the RUF, was indicted on 7 March 2003 on 17 
counts of crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including the crime of child 
recruitment.311 Sankoh was accused of personally having ordered many operations, including 
one called “Operation Pay Yourself” that encouraged troops to loot anything belonging to the 
civilians. 312 Sankoh was arrested after his soldiers gunned down a number of protesters 
outside his home in Freetown in 2000.313 Sankoh died in custody of natural causes on 29 July 
2003, while awaiting trial.314 On 8 December 2003 the Prosecutor formally withdrew the 
indictment against Sankoh.315 
 
3. Prosecutorv. Sam Bockarie 
 
Sam Bockarie, former Battlefield Commander of the RUF,316  was indicted on 7 March 2003 
on 17 counts of crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including the crime of child 
recruitment. 317 Bockarie was infamous for his brutal tactics, and earned the nickname 
“Mosquito” for his ability to attack when his enemies were off-guard.318 Bockarie was killed 
in Liberia, which was officially reported to be a shootout with Liberian forces in May 
                                                          
311SCSL, Prosecutor v. Foday Sankoh, SCSL-03-02-I-001, Indictment, 7 March 2003, para. 50.  
312 Foday Sankoh, available at http://www.spiritus-temporis.com/foday-sankoh/ (last accessed on 3 June 2010). 
313Mark Tran, Charles Taylor and Conflict in West Africa, Global Policy Forum, 4 June 2007, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/165/29621.html (last accessed on 3 June 2010). 
314  Home Office, Sierra Leone Country Report, Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate, Home Office, United Kingdom, April 2004, available at 
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/panja1_02787sie.pdf (last accessed on 3 June 2010). 
315 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Foday Sankoh, SCSL-03-02-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment, 8 December 2003, p. 2.  
316 Alpha Sesay, Tylaor Says RUF Commander Sam Bockarie Did Not Take Orders from Him, available at 
http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2009/08/05/taylor-says-ruf-commander-sam-bockarie-did-not-take-orders-
from-charles-taylor/ (last accessed on 6 January 2010). 
317SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Bockarie, SCSL-03-04-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003, para. 49.  
318 Agaro, Sierra Leone, available at http://www.arago.si.edu/index.asp?cmd=1&con=1&tid=2041528(last 
accessed on 6 January 2010). 
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2003.319 The proceedings against Bockarie by the SCSL were terminated on 8 December 
2003.320 
 
4. Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma 
 
Johnny Paul Koroma, former Head of State and Chairman of the AFRC, was indicted on 7 
March 2003 on 17 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including the crime of 
child recruitment. 321  During the period covered by the indictment, the AFRC and RUF 
alliance were allegedly led armed attacks throughout the territory of Sierra Leone under the 
orders of Koroma.322 The alliance is reported to have forcibly recruited children into armed 
groups.323 Koroma fled Freetown in January 2003, and is still at large.324 
 
IV. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor 
 
Another case before the SCSL is the trial of Charles Ghankay Taylor (hereinafter “Taylor 
case”), the former President of Liberia, who was indicted on 7 March 2003 on 17 charges. 
Taylor has been charged with the crime of child recruitment as a commander responsible for 
crimes committed by “the members of the RUF, the AFRC, the AFRC/RUF Junta, who 
allegedly conscripted, enlisted and/or used boys and girls under the age of fifteen to 
participate in active hostilities”.325 Many of the children allegedly were abducted, and then 
trained in the AFRC and/or the RUF camps in various locations throughout the country, and 
thereafter used as fighters.326 
 
                                                          
319 The Sierra Leone Web, Sierra Leone News May 2003, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Archives/slnews0503.html (last accessed on 6 January 2010). 
320 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sam Bockarie, SCSL-03-04-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment, 8 December 2003.  
321 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma, SCSL-03-03-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003, para. 47. 
322  Trial Watch, Johnny Paul Koroma, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/facts/johnny-paul_koroma_161.html (last accessed on 6 January 2010). 
323 Ibid,. 
324 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma, SCSL-03-03-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003. 
325 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, 
29 May 2007, p. 6. 
326 Ibid,. 
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On 31 May 2004, the Appeals Chamber dismissed a motion by Taylor, which challenged the 
indictment against him on the grounds of sovereign immunity and extraterritoriality.327 On 
the same day, Taylor was apprehended by the Nigerian authorities and flown to Monrovia 
where he was arrested by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (hereinafter “UNMIL”).328 
On 29 March 2006, Taylor was arrested by the Nigerian police,329and then was taken into the 
custody of the SCSL.330 He is charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes over his 
alleged role in the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone where he was accused of backing 
rebels. 331 The Prosecution has contended that Taylor is liable for each of these counts 
pursuant to joint criminal enterprise liability, because he intended each of the charged crimes 
as means to gain political and physical control of Sierra Leone and its diamonds.332  
 
                                                          
327 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 
31 May 2004.  
328 Nicolas Cook, Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance, CRS Report for Congress, 
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, 25 May 2010, p. 52, available at 
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00020134:647db2db06d5d692bfc52e365debb773.pdf 
(last accessed on 3 November 2010). See also SCSL Office of the Prosecutor Press Release, Prosecutor 
Welcomes UN Security Council Resolution Granting the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Chapter 
VII Powers to Arrest Charles Taylor, 14 November 2005, available at  
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bOPxFQrJBdo%3d&tabid=196 (last accessed on 6 January 
2010). SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, available at  
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last accessed on 6 January 
2010). 
329 The New York Times, Liberian Warlord Charles Taylor caught in the Nigeria, 29 March 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/world/africa/29iht-web.0329taylor.html (last accessed on 5 November 
2010).  
330 SCSL Press Release, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, available at  
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last accessed on 5 November 
2010). 
331 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, 
supra note 325. See also BBC News, Charles Taylor Caught in Nigeria, 29 March 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4856120.stm (last accessed on 5 November 2010).  
332  Jennifer Easterday, The Trial of Charles Part I: Prosecuting “Persons who bear the Greatest 
Responsibility”, UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies Centre, June 2010, p. 26. See also SCSL, Prosecutor v. 
Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-327, Prosecution notification of filing of amended case summary, 3 
August 2007, paras. 43.1-43.2. 
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On his first appearance at the SCSL, Taylor pleaded not guilty.333 On 30 June 2006, Taylor 
was transferred to the ICTY under the security concern. 334  At the time of writing this 
dissertation (end of 2011), Taylor is under trial in The Hague before the Trial Chamber of the 
SCSL, which has heard testimony from over 35 Prosecution witnesses. A trial verdict is 
expected in 2011. 
 
Based on the established evidence, the Pre-trial Chamber confirmed that Taylor was one of 
the principal organizers and sponsors of the RUF and was “actively involved in fueling the 
violence in Sierra Leone”.335 However, Taylor denied that children were deployed as fighters 
during the civil war.  
 
“So when you hear of reports that there were some young men seen 
carrying rifles, these reports are true. But what the reports don’t say 
is this: that the men that they see carrying these rifles are young men 
walking with their families, but do not enter combat. Never enter 
combat.”336 
 
                                                          
333 SCSL, Press Release, 29 March 2006, available at  
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hWEjA9QZgI0%3d&tabid=196 (last accessed on 6 January 
2010). 
334 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-1-PT, Decision on Defence Oral Application for 
Orders Pertaining to the Transfer of the Accused to The Hague, 23 June 2006.  SCSL Office of the Prosecutor 
Press Release, Prosecutor David M. Crane Calls Taylor a Continuing Threat to Regional Peace, 20 September 
2004, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=cYUJ9%2fFiqq0%3d&tabid=196 (last 
accessed on 6 January 2010). See also SCSL, Fifth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, June 2007 to May 2008, p. 5. 
335 Jacqueline Geis & Alex Mundt, When to Indict? The Impact of Timing of International Criminal Indictments 
on Peace Processes and Humanitarian Action, Brookings, p. 3, available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/RWST-7RAQ9A-
full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (last accessed on 18 October 2010). See also Gabriel I.H. Williams, The 
Special Court and Charles Taylor’s Possible Indictment, The Perspective, Atlanta Georgia, 11 November 2002, 
p. 3, available at http://www.theperspective.org/slspecialcourt.html (last accessed on 16 October 2010).  
336 Africa News, Legal and Judicial Affairs: Taylor Used Children to Help War, But not to Fight, 16 July 2009.  
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Although the surprise move of the Prosecutor to indict Taylor raised some criticisms,337 the 
trial against Taylor is definitely one of the most high profile cases before the SCSL, and 
serves as one of milestones in the process of prosecuting political leaders for accountability 
for the use of child soldiers in armed conflicts.  
 
B. Situations and Cases before the International Criminal Court 
 
The ICC has been devoting considerable energy to investigating the crime of child 
recruitment through its first set of cases. It’s very first trial, the case of Lubanga (hereinafter 
“Lubanga case”), was launched exclusively on the charge of the crime of child recruitment. 
Besides the Lubanga case, the ICC showed its sustained attention to the crime of child 
recruitment by indicting seven other leaders.338  
 
Currently, four situations339 have been referred to the Court.340 Among them, the situations in 
Uganda and in the DRC are involving charges concerning the crime of child recruitment. In 
the situation of Uganda, four former members of the LRA, who have been charged with the 
crime of child recruitment, are still under arrest. In the situation of the DRC, the Accused 
Bosco Ntaganda (hereinafter “Ntaganda case”) is still at large, while the trial of Germain 
                                                          
337 The SCSL battled a lack of political will in the international community to hand Taylor over to the tribunal. 
The indictment of Taylor by the SCSL was viewed by most of the African delegates and regional heads of state 
“as an affront to their sovereignty and regional pride” and challenged the jurisdiction of the SCSL on Taylor 
case by holding that the SCSL was a court of international character. For example, the Foreign Minister of 
Ghanaian criticized the request of the SCSL to arrest Taylor as “embarrassing”. For more details, see Jacqueline 
Geis & Alex Mundt, When to Indict? The Impact of Timing of International Criminal Indictments on Peace 
Processes and Humanitarian Action, supra note 335, pp. 3-5. Jennifer Easterday, The Trial of Charles Part I: 
Prosecuting “Persons who bear the Greatest Responsibility”, supra note332, p. 49.  
338  The seven other leaders are Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Thomas 
LubangaDyilo, Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, and BoscoNtaganda. 
339 Three States Parties to the Rome Statute – Uganda, the DRC and the Central African Republic (hereinafter 
“CAR”) – have referred situations occurring on their territories to the Court. In addition, the Security Council 
referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, a non-State Party to the Court. See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last accessed on 6 January 2010).  
340 Although the situations were solely from Africa, where some of the most serious violations of human rights 
were happening, it is hoped that other jurisdictions outside Africa known for grave human rights violations will 
also be referred to the Court. 
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Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (hereinafter “Katanga case”) is at the pre-trial stage, 
and the case against Lubanga is under trial at the time when the dissertation is drafted.341 As 
to the situations in the CAR and in Darfur, Sudan, so far there are no child-related cases.  
 
I. The Situation in Uganda: Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen 
 
In January 2004, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni referred the situation of abuse of 
human rights in Uganda to the ICC. The Situation concerned the crimes committed by the 
LRA, who waged an intensive war against the government forces in Northern Uganda.342 On 
6 October 2005, the ICC issued arrest warrants for five senior military leaders of the LRA: 
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya343 and Dominic Ongwen. There 
are 33 charges in total, of which 12 counts concerns crimes against humanity and another 21 
counts regarding war crimes, including the crime of child recruitment.344 Although Kony 
denied all the charges, especially the recruitment of child soldiers,345 the LRA is infamous for 
its notorious atrocities, including abduction of children who were used as fighters, porters or 
sex slaves.346 
                                                          
341 Ibid. 
342 Global Policy Forum, International Criminal Court Investigations Uganda, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28660.html (last visit 18 October 2010). 
343 BBC News, Ugandan Army “Kills Senior Rebel”, 13 August 2006. According to spokesmen for the military, 
the Ugandan army killed Lukwiya on August 12, 2006. According to the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-
02/04-02/05-248, 11 July 2007, to terminate the proceedings against Raska Lukwiya, the warrant of arrest is 
rendered without effect therefore the name of  Raska Lukwiya has been removed from the case. 
344 ICC Press Release, Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya and Dominic 
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05, available at 
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cas
es/icc%200204%200105/uganda?lan=en-GB (last visit 5 January 2010). 
345 Reuters AlertNet, No Deal After U.N. Official meets Uganda Rebel Kony,12 November 2006, available at 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L12604312.htm (last visited on 18 October 2010).  
346  ICC, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, ICC-
02/04-01/05, Pre-trial Chamber, 27 September 2005, para. 5, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF (last accessed on 5 November 2010).See also Henry Mukasa & Barbara 
Among, If Kony says he is ready to sign, that arrangement can be made but only if he is going to assemble at 
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Although the warrants were issued already for more than five years, the four accused remain 
at large in the territories of the State parties to the ICC.347 Since the ICC has no police force 
to arrest any accused, the cooperation of State Parties to arrest and transfer the suspect seems 
to be of great significance for the success of the ICC.348 
 
II. The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
1. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
 
The first charge issued by the ICC was against Lubanga, the founder of the Union of Patriotic 
Congolese (hereinafter “UPC”) and the commander-in-chief of the Patriotic Force of 
Liberation of the Congo (hereinafter “FPLC”), for his role in the recruitment of child 
soldiers.349 During the period of his control over the UPC, a large number of atrocities, such 
as mass killings, destruction of property, rape and torture of civilians, were committed by the 
UPC in the Ituri Region of north-east Congo.350 The Court established in its Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges (hereinafter “Decision on Confirmation”) that children were 
recruited into the ranks of the FPLC on a huge scale.351 It further has been established that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ri-kwangba, Congo Watch, 31 December 2008, available at 
http://congowatch.blogspot.com/2008_12_01_archive.html (last visit 5 January 2010).   
347 The Enough Project, Wanted by the ICC: The LRA’s leaders: Who They Are and What They’ve Done, 
available at 
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%200204%200105/ugada?lan=
en-GB (last accessed on 5 January 2010). 
348 Stephen Kabera Karanja, Child Soldiers in Peace Agreements: The Peace and Justice Dilemma, supra note 
270. “Article 86 calls upon the State Parties to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation of crimes and 
prosecution of culprits within the jurisdiction of the Court. Any failure in cooperation will reduce the Court to a 
mere “paper tiger” and as a result bringing culprits to justice will be severely hampered”. 
349 Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of International Criminal 
Law in Post-Colonial Africa, supra note60, p. 19.  
350 Chris McGreal, Hague’s Credibility in Dock as Trial over Child Soldiers Opens, The Guardian, 26 January 
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/26/hague-trial-child-soldiers-congo (last accessed 
on 18 October 2010).  
351 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public Redacted Version with Annex I, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 251. “Children were made up over fifty 
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Lubanga played an overall role as a coordinator in the FPLC policy to systematically enlist 
and conscript child soldiers and also provided the organizational, infrastructural and logical 
support for its implementation.352 
 
Lubanga was arrested in Kinshasa on 17 March 2006, and was transferred to the ICC by the 
Congolese government.353 On 22 February 2008, due to the failure of the Prosecution to 
supply potentially exculpatory evidence, Lubanga was put to wait for a determination of 
whether he should remain in the custody of the Court or whether he should be released, with 
or without condition.354 The case now is returned to the bench.  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed that substantial evidence is sufficient enough to believe 
that Lubanga was responsible, as co-perpetrator, for the conscription and enlistment of 
children under the age of l5 years into the FPLC from the beginning of September 2002 to 2 
June 2003 in an international armed conflict; and from 2 June 2003 to 13 August 2003 in a 
non-international armed conflict.355 The trial against Lubanga began on 26 January 2009 and 
is expected to be finish in 2011.   
 
The Lubanga case is not only the first trial before the ICC, but also the first case that “an 
individual has been brought before an international court solely on account of the crime of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
percent of their ranks in armies.” See The Redress Trust, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes?: Child Soldiers 
before the International Criminal Court, Report, September 2006, pp. 17-18, available at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/childsoldiers.pdf(last accessed on 5 January 2010). 
352 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ibid, paras.252, 253. 
353 Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations, Africa and International Criminal Court, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12048/africa and the international criminal court. Html(last visited 16 June 
2009). 
354 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Public, Urgent, Order for Submissions on the Detention of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 22 October 2008, p. 3.   
355 ICC,  Lubanga case, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351.See also Jason Morgan-
Foster, ICC Confirms Charges Against DRC Militia Leader, ASIL Insights, 9 March 2007, p. 11, available at  
http://mail.tjsl.edu/exchange/SusanT/Inbox/ASIL%20Insight:%201CC%20Confirms%Ch(last accessed on 6 
January 2010). 
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child recruitment.356 As the first case concerning the crime of child recruitment before the 
ICC, Lubanga trial was described as “an important stage” in the efforts to establish individual 
criminal responsibility for the use of child soldiers in military operation.357 As the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, stated:  
 
“Regardless of the outcome of the proceedings, this case represents 
a huge step in the struggle against these serious crimes against 
children”.358 
 
Additionally, the Lubanga case definitely will be of crucial importance to the work of the 
ICC in the clarification of the substantive provision on the crime of child recruitment.359 This 
case is also representing a valuable precedence on the explanation of the definition of the 
crime of child recruitment, especially regarding the terms of “national armed forces” used in 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi).360 Therefore, this jurisprudential development will not only have an 
impact on the following trial afterwards, but it could also have repercussions beyond the ICC 
in the development of the jurisprudence of the crime of child recruitment.  
                                                          
356  ICC Press Release, Child Soldiers charges in the First International Criminal Court Case, ICC-OTP-
20070129-196-En, The Hague, 28 August 2006, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases, (last 
accessed on 6 January 2010). 
357 However, the political controversy and international dispute over the very first trial were leveled at the trial 
from human rights groups and organizations, such as lack of communication, and the issue of sovereignty was 
one of these major questions concerning the court. See Justin Coleman, Showing its Teeth: The International 
Criminal Court Takes On Child Conscription in the Congo, But Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, 26 Penn St. 
Int’l L. Rev. (2008) 765, p. 768. Among all the dispute, some criticized that charges against Lubanga was only 
limited to the recruitment of child soldiers. The failure of charging other crimes, such as rape and torture, would 
lead to damage the credibility of the ICC. See, for example, Chris McGreal, International: Hague’s Credibility 
in Dock as Trial over Child Soldiers Opens, supra note350, p. 24. On the contrary, others supported the 
prosecution of merely the crime of child recruitment, and claimed that such prosecution increased the awareness 
about this crime. See Human Rights Watch, D.R. Congo: ICC Charges Raise Concern, Joint Letter to the Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 31 July 2006, available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/01/congo13891.htm (last visited 27 June 2009).  
358ICC, Child Soldiers Charges in the First International Criminal Court Case, supra note256. 
359 Stephen Kabera Karanja, Child Soldiers in Peace Agreements: The Peace and Justice Dilemma, supra note 
270, p. 28.  
360 Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvii) is applicable to international armed conflicts. For more details about this Article, see 
above chapter 1. For more details of the terms of “national armed forces”, see infra Chapter 4.  
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2. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
 
 On 2 July 2007, the second warrant of arrest was issued against Germain Katanga, the chief 
commander of the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (hereinafter “FRPI”).361 Katanga 
was surrendered to the ICC by the DRC on 17 October 2007, and was transferred to the 
Detention Centre in The Hague.362 One of the former leaders of the Front des nationalisteset 
intégrationnistes (hereinafter “FNI”), Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, was arrested on 6 February 
2008, and soon was transferred to the Detention Centre of the ICC. 363  Considering the 
identical crimes committed by the FRPI and the FNI, the two cases were joined into one 
trial.364 The two Accused allegedly jointly committed, through their subordinates, “the use of 
child under the age of 15 years to take active part in hostilities in the territory of Ituri District 
before, during and aftermath of the attack on the village of Bogoro on 24 February 2003”.365 
On 27 June 2008 commenced a confirmation of charges hearing. Based on the established 
evidence, the Pre-trial Chamber found that  
 
“There is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that Katanga and Ngudjolo consistently used children for 
multiple purposes, including direct participation in hostilities within 
                                                          
361 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for 
Germain Katanga, 2 July 2007.  
362Ibid. 
363 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/07, Warrant of Arrest for 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007.  
364 The Chamber stated that joining the cases would not prejudice the subjects or would not be contrary to the 
interest of justice, see Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ICC to Open Second Trial Against two 
Congolese Warlords Katanga and Ngudjolo, Alleged Crimes include Rape, Sexual Slavery and Recruitment of 
Child Soldier, 20 November 2009, p. 1, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Katanga-
Ngudjolo_trial__CICC_PR_Nov09_EN.pdf (last accessed on 5 January 2010). See also Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, Katanga - Ngudjolo Chui Case, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinekatanga (last accessed on 5 January 2010). 
365  ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Public Redacted 
Version, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, paras. 243, 253-263.  
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the FNI/FRPI militias prior to, during, and following the attack of 
Bogoro on 24 February 2003”.366 
 
As the charges have been confirmed, Trial Chamber II was constituted for the subsequent 
hearings which started on 24 November 2009.367 This case was highlighted by the large 
number of participating victims. A total of 345 applicants have been granted victim status for 
the Katanga case, compared to 93 for the Lubanga trial.368 A group of child soldiers as child 
witnesses is represented by a separate counsel.369 
 
3. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda 
 
The Fourth warrant of arrest was issued against Bosco Ntaganda, the former associate of 
Lubanga and the Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC.370 It is alleged that Ntaganda had de jure 
and de facto authority over the FPLC training camp and used his authority to actively 
                                                          
366 Ibid., paras. 253-256, 258, 263. It is said that some of the children under the age of fifteen years were also 
used by Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Germain Katanga and other FNI/FRPI commanders as personal escorts and 
bodyguards.  
367 ICC Press Release, Opening of the Trial in the Case of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui on 24 
November, 2009, ICC-CPI-20091120-PR477, 20 November 2009, available at  
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cas
es/icc%200104%200107/press%20releases/pr477 (last accessed on 6 January 2010). 
368 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ICC to Open Second Trial Against two Congolese Warlords 
Katanga and Ngudjolo, Alleged Crimes include Rape, Sexual Slavery and Recruitment of Child Soldier, supra 
note 364, p. 1.  
369Ibid. The Pre-Trial Chamber recognized 345 persons, including 10 child soldiers as victims for the purpose of 
participating in present case. See also ICC Press Release, Press Conference on the Opening Tomorrow of the 
Second Trial Before the International Criminal Court, ICC-CPI-20091123-PR478, 23 November 2009,available 
at 
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cas
es/icc%200104%200107/press%20releases/pr478 (last accessed on 6 January 2010). 
370 ICC, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-CPI-20080429-PR310, available at 
http://iccnow.org/documents/CAD_press_release_Ntaganda_04292008_EN.pdf (last accessed on 5 January 
2010).  Also see, Trial Watch, Bosco Ntaganda, available at http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profile/db/facts/bosco_ntaganda_761.html (last accessed on 5 January 2010).  
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implement the policy of child recruitment.371 He was accused of war crimes with regard to 
“conscripting, enlisting and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in 
hostilities in Ituri, the DRC, between July 2002 and December 2003”.372 At the time of 
writing the dissertation, Ntaganda is remaining at large in the DRC.373 The ICC is calling on 
the relevant authorities in the DRC and in neighboring countries to arrest and transfer him to 
the Court. 374  In this respect, the lack of cooperation from the State parties in arresting 
indicted persons may seriously undermine the authority of the Court.375 
 
C. CONCLUSION  
 
Since the Rome Statute and the SCSL Statute have expressly criminalized the child 
recruitment as a war crime, several former leaders were charged with this crime before both 
of the two courts. This judicial work is significant and precedent-setting, because, through the 
judicial practices, the courts not only express their commitment to end the impunity of 
criminals who recruited children as soldiers, but also further discourage potential warlords 
from this egregious violation of children’s rights. In addition, it may be hoped that these 
judicial practice will educate the public and create a strong awareness for the protection of 
children from being recruited. Since the SCSL has already reached three judgments regarding 
the crime of child recruitment, these trials and convictions have set the stage for trials before 
                                                          
371 ICC Press Release, Warrant Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda Unsealed, ICC-CPI-20080429-PR310, available 
at  
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/warran
t%20of%20arrest%20against%20bosco%20ntaganda%20unsealed (last accessed on 5 January 2010).  
372  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, year, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/International_Warrant_of_Arrest_against_Bosco_Ntaganda.pdf (last 
accessed on 5 January 2010).  
373 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, available at  
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0206 (last 
accessed on 5 January 2010). 
374 AMICC, the Case of Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda at the International Criminal Court, available at 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Ntaganda.pdf (last accessed on 5 January 2010). 
375 Stephen Kabera Karanja, Child Soldiers in Peace Agreements: The Peace and Justice Dilemma, supra note 
270. 
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the ICC. However, as stated above, parts of these judgments concerning the elements of the 
crime of child recruitment contained some ambiguity and still need to be correctly framed 
from a conceptual viewpoint. The ICC therefore has an opportunity to strengthen and 
improve the jurisprudence emerging from the SCSL, especially the terms of “recruitment” 
and the definition of the phrase of “take active part in hostilities”.376 
 
It should be admitted that the judicial practice relating to the crime of child recruitment is still 
at a low number. From this perspective, it is not realistic to expect a consensus on every legal 
issue concerning this crime. For this reason, the rest of the paper is devoted to a discussion of 
several significant and much-debated issues relevant to the crime of child recruitment. 
                                                          
376 For more details, see infra Chapter 4.  
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Part II – THE CRIME OF CHILD RECRUITMNET IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL REGIME 
 
Chapter 3: The Crime of Child Recruitment under Customary 
International Law 
 
The years since 1949 have witnessed some remarkable development in judicial practice 
regarding the use of child soldiers in hostilities, in terms of both contents and enforcement 
mechanism. Of particular important is the Norman Jurisdiction Decision which was issued in 
May 2004. In the decision, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL found that the crime of child 
recruitment, that is, “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities”, had attained the status of 
customary international law by 1996.  
 
The importance of the decision derives from the fact that establishment of the customary 
status of the crime of child recruitment is the surest means of providing universal cover for 
children from involvement in armed conflict. Since a customary international norm has the 
legal effect of binding all states, 377  its application as a legal resource by courts will 
                                                          
377 The consistent objections may absolve a state from the binding of a customary international law only when 
the objection has been “consistently” maintained “from the early stages of the rule”. See Mark E. Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p. 16. See also Ted Stein, The 
Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 Harv. 
Int’L L.J. (1985): 457, p. 457. The International Court of Justice has endorsed the persistent objector rule. See 
ICJ, Fisheries case, United States v. Norway, 18 December 1951, ICJ Report 1951, pp. 116, 131; See also ICJ, 
Asylum case, Colombia v. Peru, Judgment, 20 November 1950, ICJ Report 1950, pp. 266, 277–78. However, a 
state cannot be a persistent objector to jus cogens rules and theorists have generally concluded that the practical 
application of the rule is limited. See also Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 181. See also Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development 
of Customary International Law, 1 Brit. Y.B. Int’L. L. (1986), p. 11. See also Linda A. Malone, International 
Law, Aspen Publishers, 2008, p. 25.  
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consequently deter potential perpetrators from recruitment or use children in armed conflicts 
anywhere in the world.378 
 
This legal opinion is of particular significance, as it has set a valuable precedent concerning 
the prosecution and conviction of persons who committed child recruitment. Trial Chambers 
of both the Brima case and the Sesay case confirmed the finding of the Norman Jurisdiction 
Decision that the crime of child recruitment had been part of customary law before 1996.379 
Nevertheless, this has remained a controversial issue to date, as to whether or not the crime of 
child recruitment had crystallized as a norm of customary international law by November 
1996.  
 
This chapter is thus firstly devoted to an analysis of the verifiability of the finding that child 
recruitment had acquired the customary status as a war crime by 1996.380 The analysis is 
aimed at showing some flaws contained in the reasoning of the Majority Opinion of the 
Norman Jurisdiction Decision, which requires questions be raised of the principle of legality. 
Furthermore, a further analysis will be made to find out about the status of child recruitment 
under customary international law as of today,381  to which the second part of the present 
chapter is intended to give an answer.   
 
A. Legal Significance of the Status of the Crime of Child Recruitment 
Under Customary International Law 
 
The analysis of the status of customary international law regarding child recruitment is based 
on two considerations: a) the binding force of customary international law, and b) the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege.  
 
                                                          
378 Pilar Villanueva Sainz-Pardo, Is Child Recruitment as a War Crime Part of Customary International Law?, 
12 International Journal of Human Rights (2008):555, p. 555.  
379 For more details, see the case concerning the AFRC and II. 1. Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao, Chapter 2.  
380 See infra C. Status of the Crime of Child Recruitment as Customary International Law before 1996, Chapter 
3.  
381  This will be discussed in following part D. Status of the Crime of Child Recruitment as Customary 
International Law as of Today, Chapter 3.  
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I. The Binding Force of Customary International Law 
 
Customary international law confers a norm with an obligatory power, by which all 
states 382 are bound to observe, no matter whether a state happens to be party to an 
international treaty containing the rule in question or not.383 Such obligatory power inherent 
to customary international law is binding on all states of the international community except 
for the consistent objectors, and cannot, according to the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case, be “the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one 
of them [i.e. States] in its own favor.”384 
 
1. The Limitation of Treaty Laws 
 
Compared with the customary international law, treaties are usually limited in application and 
in themselves cannot provide universal cover for all cases without exceptions. As far as 
treaties are concerned, singing and accession are required for a treaty to become binding. 
                                                          
382 The consistent objections may absolve a state from the binding of a customary international law only when 
the objection has been “consistently” maintained “from the early stages of the rule”. See Mark E. Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties, supra note377, p. 16. See also Ted Stein, The Approach of a 
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, supra note 377, p. 457. The 
International Court of Justice has endorsed the persistent objector rule. See ICJ, Fisheries case, supra note 377, 
pp. 116, 131; See also ICJ, Asylum case, supra note 377, pp. 266, 277–78. However, a state cannot be a 
persistent objector to jus cogens rules and theorists have generally concluded that the practical application of the 
rule is limited. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules, supra note 377, p. 181. See also 
Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, supra 
note 377, p. 11. See also Linda A. Malone, International Law, supra note 377, p. 25.  
383ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note107, para. 79. “It is undoubtedly because a 
great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the 
human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in 
the Corfu Channel case [ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22], that the Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a 
broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have 
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of customary 
international law.”  
384 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands, Judgment, 20 
February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, para. 63. 
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From this perspective, an international convention only has the binding force over the 
contracting parties, but not over those which choose to remain uncommitted. Yet it is often 
with the latter that the problem is most serious.  
 
The case of Somalia presents a good example. Somalia is one of the only two countries in the 
world which have so far ignored all the international instruments providing the prohibition of 
child recruitment, having neither ratified the CRC,385 nor the AP I and the AP II,386 nor the 
ACRWC,387 nor the Convention 182,388 nor the OPCRC,389 nor signed up as a state party to 
the Rome Statute.390 Such being the case, the absence of ratifications of international treaties 
with the provision regarding child recruitment would leave a leeway for the Somalia 
government to freely recruit as many children as they like into armed forces and use them to 
take active part in hostilities. In fact, Somalia illustrated more than any other country the 
widespread use of child soldiers. According to the Global Report 2004, it is estimated that 
since 1991, 200, 000 children carried arms or had been recruited in Somalia’s forces and 
groups.391 It is necessary in this respect to examine the status of provisions regarding child 
recruitment as customary rules to ensure that both the government and armed groups are 
“bound by these rules and can be held accountable in case of non-compliance”.392 
                                                          
385 See Up to now 192 States-the holdouts are United States and Somalia. ACEI, Summit for the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child: Mobilizing Communities for Ratification, para. 1. Available at 
http://www.acei.org/summitcrc.htm, (last accessed on 12 April, 2009). 
386ICRC, Treaties & Documents by Country, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P, 
(last accessed on 12 April, 2009). 
387 International Secretariat of Amnesty International, African Children’s Charter: A Welcome Step to Securing 
the Rights of Africa’s Children, News Service 223/99, 29 November 1999, available at  
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/161.html (last accessed on 16 January 2009). 
388 This source is based on the ILOLEX, see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C182 (last accessed on 
4 March 2009). 
389 Database, Normal Commitment to Human Rights: A Global Survey, available at  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-b&chapter=4&lang=en(last 
accessed on 12 April, 2009). 
390The 114th ratification by Moldova in October 2010 represents an important milestone in advancing towards 
universal ratification of the Rome Statute. 
391 Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report 2004: Africa Region Overview, p. 2. 
392  The magazine of International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, available at http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_2/24-25.htm (last accessed on 
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2. The Rome Statute in Particular 
 
As stated above, Rome Statute made decisive progress, as it criminalizes the act of child 
recruitment in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and Article 8 (2) (e) (vii) as an international crime 
attracting individual criminal responsibility to those committing the crimes as well as others 
who may be liable for the crimes, for example by aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in 
the commission of a crime. 393 However, as a treaty law, the Rome Statute has limited 
applicable scope.394 The Court may only exercise jurisdiction over state party, or on the 
territory of a non-state party where that non-state party has entered into an agreement with 
the court providing for it to have such jurisdiction in a particular case, or the Security Council 
has referred the situation of a non-state party to the Prosecutor.395 Generally speaking, the 
Rome Statute is legally binding mainly on the States that have pledged their support to it.396 
And thus, even though the Rome Statue elevated child recruitment to a crime, its jurisdiction 
to prosecute such act, in principle, only extended as far as the States parties and has no 
binding power on non-party states that have withheld their support.397 So it is possible to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 October 2011). Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Cambridge University Press, Vol.3, 2005. 
393 ICC, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, available at  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm 
(last accessed on 16 August 2010). 
394 Ibid. 
395 Rome Statute, supra note 235, Article 12. 
396 According to Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Court may exercise jurisdiction only under three situations: 
“(a) a covered crime is committed by a national of a member state; (b) a crime has been committed on the 
territory of a member state; or (c) a specific case is referred by the Security Council”. The exercise of the 
jurisdiction under the first two conditions needs the support of the state. Even though the Security Council can 
refer a specific case to the ICC, yet it is not always the case. So far, two situations before the ICC were referred 
by the Security Council that is, Sudan and Libya. Furthermore, although the Security Council can make 
decisions binding on Member States if necessary in order to maintain peace and security, it is not practical for 
the Security Council to refer all the violations involving child recruitment, especially those occurred in the non-
parties, to the ICC.  
397 Although Article 15 of the Rome Statute provided three ways to trigger the Court to exercise its jurisdiction 
on investigation of a situation: “i) a State party to the Statute referred the situation to the Court; (ii) the Security 
Council referred a situation to the court under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and (iii) the Prosecutor initiate 
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conclude that as a result of this limitation, unless a non-party state agree to allow the ICC to 
exercise the jurisdiction in a particular case or the Security Council refers a situation of a 
non-state party to the Prosecutor, non-party state’s nationals who recruit or use children in the 
territories of the non-party States would have a very high probability of getting away with 
their atrocities free from any punishment. 
 
A cursory examination of the relevant literature on this matter demonstrates that among the 
current 114 States Parties, the States “specially affected”398 by the use of child soldiers only 
account for a very small number.399 Around half of the countries that are alleged to be in 
serious breach of the obligation not to recruit children under the age of 15 years as soldiers 
are among the non-party States,400 some of whom are unwilling to  consent the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.  
 
The limitation of the Rome Statute restrains the court from exercising its jurisdiction in all-
known cases of child recruitment.401 So it is possible to conclude that as a result of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
investigations propriomotu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court received 
from individuals or organizations (“communications”)”. So far there is the case of Darfur in Sudan, which was 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council and the rest are referred by the States Parties of the ICC.  See also 
Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan & H. Harry L. Roque Jr. (eds.). The Criminal Nature of Recruitment of Child 
Soldiers under International Humanitarian Law, supra note 133, p. 9. 
398ICJ, Case concerning North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 384, p.29.  
399 Lists of parties that recruit or use children in situations of armed conflict, see GASC, A/63/785-s/2009/158, 
26 March 2009, Annex I and II. The highlighted states with situations of concern on child recruitment on the 
agenda of the Security Council, such as, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, are not yet a 
state party to the ICC. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: Children should not Be Used in Adult 
Wars, 12 February Anniversary of the UN “Child Soldiers” Treaty, 11 February 2003.  
400 According to the Annual Report issued by the General Assembly on 21 May 2010, 13 countries were 
reported in violation of their obligation not to recruit or use child soldiers in armed conflicts. They are 
Myanmar, Somalia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, the DRC, Uganda, Sudan, Columbia, Afghanistan, the CRA, Chad, 
Iraq and Nepal. Among the 13 countries up to seven of them are non-party States of the Rome Statute. They are 
Myanmar, Somali, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Iraq and Nepal. See General Assembly, A/64/742-
S/2010/181, 21 May 2010, Annex I and Annex II.  
401 Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Law?, 93 AM.J.INT’L L. (1999):452, p. 453. See also Kyle 
R. Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose 
Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F.L.REV. (2005):167, pp. 
170-171. 
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limitation, unless a non-party state agree to allow the ICC to exercise the jurisdiction in a 
particular case or the Security Council refers a situation of a non-state party to the Prosecutor, 
non-party state’s nationals who recruit or use children in the territories of the non-party States 
would have a very high probability of getting away with their atrocities free from any 
punishment.  
 
As to a State party, even though the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over a national of a State 
Party, or over a crime occurred on the territory of a State Party, or a situation referred by the 
Security Council, the Court’s jurisdiction is further limited to crimes taking place after 1 July 
2002. If a State joins the Court after 1 July 2002, the Court only has jurisdiction after the 
Rome Statute entered into force for that State.402 
 
3. The Need of Customary International Law 
 
Considering treaty laws have so far failed to provide universal protection to all children from 
recruitment into armed conflict, the next open avenue to be explored is customary 
international law. 
 
Due to its strong obligatory power, customary international law also erects a judicial 
authority, by which all states are bound to observe, whether or not a state happens to be party 
to an international treaty containing the rule in question. 
 
II. The Inter-relationship Between Customary International Law and 
the Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
 
 The issue of customary status of the crime of child recruitment is closely related to the 
principle of legality, or nullum crimen sine lege, which stands today as a fundamental 
criminal principle. The principle is intended to protect individuals from being prosecuted or 
punished for their act which were not violations of penal law or international law at the time 
                                                          
402 Rome Statute, Article 126. 
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when the act was committed.403As Bassiouni points out, the principle of legality plays a 
significant role in fighting “against unbridled abuse of power”.404 
 
When an international tribunal is established, whether a crime exists under a customary 
international law is one of the major issues that a Statute drafter must take into consideration. 
The tribunal jurisdiction should be limited to the extent of the existing law, and should be 
prevented from becoming a source of, to use bariums, “unbridled abuse of power”. 
 
Under this principle, it is a fundamental jurisdictional obligation upon tribunals to ascertain 
whether an alleged crime is part of customary international law, at the time the crime was 
committed. And the status of a crime as part of customary international law will probably be 
the final guarantee that the principle is not violated and the proceedings are legal. To better 
understand the importance of the customary international law in the safeguarding the rights of 
the defendant against unlawful prosecution, the following part will give a close examination 
of how customary international law plays a role in the observance of principle of legality in 
the establishment of jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals.  
 
1. The IMT and the IMTFE 
 
Almost 70 years ago, the question of legality in criminal proceedings became the cause of a 
heated debate. It happened in the Nuremburg Trial, where the defendants challenged the 
legality of the International Military Tribunal Charter (hereinafter “IMT Charter”) and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (hereinafter “IMTFE Charter”)405, 
                                                          
403 Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals, The 
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 97, p.174. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, Vol. 3, 
Transnational Publisher, 1987, p.122: “The principle of legality first and foremost means that an act must be 
criminalized under the applicable law when the act is committed. And then there can be no punishment of crime 
without a pre-existing law”.  
404  M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Transnational Publishers, 1996, p. 282: the principle of legality is “not only a fairness right but also a 
fundamental right against unbridled abuse of power.” 
405 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal-Annex to the London Agreement (Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis), 8 August 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 280; also see the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis Appendix II, 
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with the question whether both of the two Charters were truly restating laws that had 
preceded the commission of the act, or the Charters prescribed new laws.406 
 
According to the defendant, the definition of crime against humanity was unknown at the 
time when the alleged acts were conducted, which would have meant that the IMT Charter 
was a retroactive law in violation of the principle of ex post facto laws.407 
 
But the Tribunals rejected the challenge raised by the decedent by asserting that crimes 
against humanity did not engage a newly established rule, and this crime came under the 
preexisting “common law crimes”, which were punishable under the criminal codes of “all 
civilized States”, to which Germany certainly could not claim exception.408 It was admittedly 
a convoluted argument. Although afterwards the tribunals managed to establish the legal 
grounds for their jurisdiction against persons who committed serious atrocities in WWII, 
numerous debate and critics were put forward on the explanation of the legality of their 
jurisdiction.409 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
United Nations General Assembly - International Law Commission, New York, 1949 (A/CN.4/5, 3 March 
1949). Tokyo Charter: Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 19 January 
1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20. 
406 Almost all the defendants raised the same question on the legality of the charter. Although the tribunals took 
great pains to justify their jurisdiction by trying to prove the existence of crimes before WWII, especially crimes 
against peace, the legality of the charter still remains questionable. Even the legality of the establishment of the 
two war crimes tribunals was called into question. See George Ginsburgs &Vladimir Nikolaevich Kudriavtsev, 
The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, pp.54, 149. 
407Goerge Finch and Professor Hans Kelsen held the view that the conviction of the defendants of crimes against 
humanity and peace was undoubtedly ex post facto. SeeGeorge Ginsburgs &Vladimir Nikolaevich Kudriavtsev, 
The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, ibid.,p.54. Also see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity 
in International Criminal Law, supra note 45, pp.165-166.  
408  M. de Menthon, Opening Argument at Nuremberg, see Kenneth S. Gallant, Principle of Legality in 
International and Comparative Criminal Law, Cambridge University press, 2008, p.23-24, and Fn 118,126. 
Although no claim was explicitly made in the opening argument that the crimes against humanity was also a war 
crime, some scholars inferred from the statement that M. de Menthon implied that the crime against humanity 
“were also on their facts war crimes”.  
409 This dissertation will not go into details of the debate and critics. For more details, see George Ginsburgs & 
Vladimir Nikolaevich Kudriavtsev, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, supra note 406.  
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In fact, the trials conducted by the IMT and the IMTFE proved a test case.410 Ever since then, 
the principle of legality has stood eminent in the consideration of the jurisdiction of any 
international tribunal afterwards. The question of non-retroactivity raised in the IMT and 
IMTFE has remained one of the most issues that occupy the attention of the drafters 
constantly, as evident from the following observation shows:  
 
“The principle of non-retroactivity of criminal rules is now solidly 
embedded in international law. It follows that courts may only apply 
substantive criminal rules that existed at the time of commission of 
the alleged crime.”411 
 
Since 1945, the principle of legality with an enhanced image has imposed a stricter standard 
in legal proceedings on both the national and international levels. Already, it can be seen 
from the establishment of the international criminal tribunals after the WWII.  
 
2. ICTY 
 
At the time of its establishment, the questions asked not only involved whether its jurisdiction 
over an offence that had already become a crime under national law or international law, but 
also whether a crime had already attained customary status under international law when the 
alleged acts were committed.412 This requirement arises mainly from the concern that the 
principle of legality should be fully complied with. As can be clearly seen from the 
Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council regarding the establishment of the ICTY: 
 
“The application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires 
that the international tribunal should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary 
                                                          
410 The drafters of the ICTY were determined to distance themselves from the perceived problems of the post-
war tribunals. See Richard Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice, International and Comparative Criminal 
Justice, Ashgate, 2005, p.279.  
411 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note 249, p. 149.   
412 “Because the Tribunal’s functions are punitive against individuals, it is bound by the principles of legality”. 
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 
404, p. 270.  
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law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to 
specific conventions does not arise”.413 
 
The same concern was expressed in the Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case (hereinafter “Tadic Jurisdiction Decision”). In this 
decision, the Appeals Chamber found that, 
 
“The only reason behind the stated purpose of the drafters that the 
international Tribunal should apply customary international law was 
to avoid violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the 
event that a party to the conflict did not adhere to a specific 
treaty”.414 
 
However, it should be pointed out that the ICTY does not absolutely exclude the application 
of treaty laws. In fact, the jurisdiction of the ICTY is composed by two parts of crimes: a) 
treaty-based crimes, as long as the treaty is binding on the party to the conflicts; and b) 
crimes under customary international law.415 This can be seen from the Appeal Decision on 
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case, 
 
 “[i]t should be emphasized again that the only reason behind the 
stated purpose of the drafters that the International Tribunal should 
apply customary international law was to avoid violating the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the event that a party to the 
conflict did not adhere to a specific treaty. (Report of the Secretary-
General, at para. 34.) It follows that the International Tribunal is 
authorized to apply, in addition to customary international law, any 
treaty which: (i) was unquestionably binding on the parties at the 
time of the alleged offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or 
                                                          
413 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
para.34, which stated that “rules of international humanitarian law which is beyond any doubt part of customary 
law”. 
414 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction (hereinafter “Tadic Jurisdiction Decision”), 2 October 1995, Appeals Chamber, para. 143. 
Daniela Kravetz, The protection of Civilian In War, The ICTY’s Galic Case, 17 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2004): 524, p.527.  
415 ICTY, Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, ibid.,para. 143. 
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derogating from peremptory norms of international law, as are most 
customary rules of international humanitarian law.”416 
 
3. ICTR 
 
Similar with the practice of the ICTY, the ICTR Statute not only requires the Tribunal to 
apply customary international law, but also allows the prosecution of violations provided in 
treaty that Rwanda ratified, especially the AP II.417 As obvious from the Secretary General’s 
Report of the Establishment of the ICTR: 
 
“Article 4 of the Statute, accordingly, includes violations of 
Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet been 
universally recognized as part of customary international law 
[…].”418 
 
 However, according to Gallant,  
 
“The ICTR Statute included treaty-based crimes which might or 
might not have been customary, but applied to Rwanda through its 
ratification of the instruments involved and the adoption of the 
substance of the instruments into national law of Rwanda”.419 
 
In other words, Rwanda was treaty-bound to implement its obligations under AP II. 420 
Therefore the leaders of Rwanda should be “reasonable awareness” of their obligation 
provided under the AP II. This practice, similar to that of the ICTY, does not deny the 
importance of the customary international law in the observance of the principle of legality.  
 
                                                          
416 ICTY, Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, ibid.,para. 143. Daniela Kravetz, The protection of Civilian in War, The 
ICTY’s Galic Case, supra note 414, p. 527.  
417Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2005,p. 11. 
418Security Council,Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 
(1994), UN Doc. S/1995/134, 13 February 1995, para.12. Also see ICTR Statute, Article 4, where its Statute 
requires the ICTR to apply APII.  
419 Kenneth S. Gallant, Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, supra note 408. 
420ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trail Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 617. 
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4. SCSL 
 
The concern of non-retroactivity was also a point of emphasis in the establishment of the 
SCSL, a “mixed” tribunal of domestic and international components. The Secretary-
General’s Report on the Establishment of the SCSL claimed its opinion regarding the subject-
matter jurisdiction:   
 
“In recognition of the principle of legality, in particular nullum 
crimen sine lege, and the prohibition on retroactive criminal 
legislation, the international crimes enumerated, are crimes 
considered to have had the character of customary international law 
at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.”421 
 
However, the legality of the jurisdiction of the SCSL over the crime of child recruitment had 
repeatedly been challenged by the defenses, whether the child recruitment had been 
crystallized as a crime by 1996, when the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL states. By 1996, 
Sierra Leone had been a contracting party to the GC IV, the AP I, the AP II, the CRC. 
However, none of the above mentioned treaties criminalize the recruitment of children as a 
crime in their provisions. In this respect, the inclusion of the child recruitment into the SCSL 
Statute largely violates the principle of legality, unless it can be proved that child recruitment 
had been a customary international law by 1996. This leads to the birth of the Norman 
Jurisdiction Decision, which will be elaborately analyzed in the following part of this 
Chapter.  
 
In sum, if the principle of legality is for the protection the defendant’s rights against unlawful 
prosecution,422 the legal ground for prosecution falls, to a large extent, on the proof of the 
existence of customary international law. Furthermore, due to the universal obligatory force 
                                                          
421 Secretary-General’s Report on the Establishment of the Special Court for the Sierra Leone, Doc. S/2000/915, 
4 October 2000, para. 12. See also SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, where the Appeals 
Chamber focused on the international customary nature of the child recruitment instead of simply stating that 
the tribunal is bound by its statute. 
422 Héctor Olásolo, A Note on the Evolution of the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law, Criminal 
Law Forum, Volume 18, Numbers 3-4, December 2007. Kenneth S. Gallant, Principle of Legality in 
International and Comparative Criminal Law, supra note 408, Chapter 6. 
 99 
 
of the customary international law, the customary international law can establish an 
extraordinary jurisdiction over all persons and all states, especially when there was no written 
rule covering the crime at the time it was committed, or when treaties or international 
conventions are found to have had no power regarding a non-party state.  
 
All the reasons cited above should give us ample justification to devote the following section 
to the issue of whether the crime of child recruitment has the characteristics of customary 
international law. To begin with, the next part will give a brief overview of the prerequisites 
of a customary international law and the ways they are usually expressed.  
 
B. Assessment of Customary International Law  
 
Customary international law, in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter “ICJ Statute”), refers to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”. This formulation, though vague and descriptive, has been universally 
accepted. In 2000, the 69th Conference of the International Law Association held in London 
considered the Report of the International Committee on the Formation of Customary 
International Law (hereinafter “ILA Conference London Report 2000”)423 where definition of 
customary international law was again codified as follows: 
 
“[A] rule of customary international law is one which is created and 
sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other 
subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international 
legal relations, in circumstances which given rise to a legitimate 
expectation of similar conduct in the future.”424 
 
As can be seen from the above cited definitions, the establishment of a customary rule 
requires two main elements: state practice and opinio juris. 
                                                          
423 International Law Association, Conference Resolution London 2000, Resolution No. 16/2000, Formation of 
General Customary International Law. 
424 ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement 
of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference, London, 2000, Principle 4 and commentary (a) thereto, pp. 725–726 (hereinafter “ILA London 
Conference Report 2000”), p. 8.  
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I. State Practice 
 
As for what practice contributes to the creation of the customary international law, the 
International Law Commission considers both physical and verbal acts of a State as State 
practice.  
 
Physical acts frequently cited as examples of State practice include battlefield behavior, 
reports on military operations and arresting people or seizing property.425 Verbal acts include 
“diplomatic Statements (including protests), policy statements, press releases, official 
manuals (e.g. on military law), instructions to armed forces, comments by governments on 
draft treaties, legislation, decisions of national courts and executive authorities, pleadings 
before international tribunals, statements in international organizations, and the resolution 
these bodies adopt”.426 
 
For a verbal act to count as State practice, it must be a public act; consequently, acts, such as 
internal memoranda, confidential opinions of Government legal advisers, and secret 
“bugging” of diplomatic premises would hardly fall under the term ‘State 
practice’. 427 Similarly, acts of individuals, corporations, non-governmental entities have 
apparently little to do with State practice, unless “carried out on behalf of the State or adopted 
by the state”.428 
 
The second consideration, whether a practice creates a rule of customary international law, 
must take account of the density of such a practice.429 The density requirement is a measure 
involving three separate but closed related issues, namely, virtual uniformity, 
                                                          
425 Ibid.,p. 14. See also Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties, supra note 377, p. 13. 
426 ILA London Conference Report, ibid.,p. 14. See also Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and 
Treaties, ibid. 
427 ILA Report, ibid., p. 15. 
428 Ibid. pp. 16-18. 
429 Ibid., p. 20.  
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representativeness and continuity.430 This is to say that a customary rule must involve certain 
behavior virtually universal among all states and not some isolated incidence of practice of 
small number of states. Only when all three criteria are met, can a certain state practice be 
said to be a contributing factor to the formation of a customary international law.431 
 
1. Virtually Uniform 
 
Firstly, for State practice to create a customary international norm, it must meet the standard 
of “virtually uniform”, both internally and collectively. The term “internal uniformity” was 
defined by the ILA as “each State whose behaviour is being considered should have acted in 
the same way on virtually all of the occasions on which it engaged in the practice in 
question”. 
 
As to what constitutes an “internal uniformity”, the ICJ jurisprudence has given some 
explanations. In the Nicaragua case, the Court went over the question of what has been 
termed “internal uniformity”, emphasizing that inconsistency or uncertainty in a State’s 
practice is not fatal, as long as “it does not try to excuse its non-conforming conduct by 
asserting that it is legally justified”.432 In the judgment, the Court stated:  
 
“The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as 
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary 
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in 
general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
                                                          
430  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: a response to US Comments, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 89, Number 866, June 2007, pp. 3-5. 
431 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 384, para.74: “Although the passage of only a short 
period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law 
on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that 
within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests 
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or 
legal obligation is involved.”  
432 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 424, p. 22.  
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as 
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If 
a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justification contained 
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact 
justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm 
rather than to weaken the rule.”433 
 
A virtually uniform State practice must also be “collective uniformity”, that is, “different 
States must not have engaged in substantially different conduct, some doing one thing and 
some another”.434 And therefore a “constant and uniform usage” or a general consistency 
across States in their practice is required to meet the standard of “collective uniformity”. In 
the Asylum case, the ICJ emphasized the need of “constant and uniform usage” with respect 
to the exercise of diplomatic asylum:  
 
“The party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the 
other Party, […] that it is in accordance with a constant and uniform 
usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage is the 
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty 
incumbent on the territorial State. 
[…] 
The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much 
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the 
exercise of diplomatic asylum and in official views expressed on various 
occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of 
conventions on asylum, ratified by some states and rejected by others, and 
the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of political 
expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this 
any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the 
alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offence.”435 
 
                                                          
433 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United 
States of America(Merits), Judgment, 27 June 1986, para. 186.  
434 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 424, p. 21.  
435 ICJ, Asylum case, Judgment, supra note 377, p. 277.  
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However, it should be not be read as if a few uncertainties or contradictions in a State 
practice necessarily constitute a bar to the formation of a rule of customary international law. 
The issue came up in the Nicaragua case, when the court examined the customary nature of 
the non-intervention principle: 
 
 “The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as 
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous 
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary 
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in 
general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as 
breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new 
rule.”436 
 
In other words, contrary practice is not deemed sufficient to undermine the formation of a 
rule of customary international law, unless it is the official practice of the states affected, or it 
is condemned by other States.437 
 
2. Extensive and Representative 
 
For the determination of the existence of a customary international law, it is not necessary to 
prove the consent of each individual State, but the State practice must be both extensive and 
representative. There is nevertheless no mathematical formula or a precise percentage for 
calculating how widespread a practice must be, it will be mainly based on the “degree of 
repetitiveness of the practice”.438As can be seen in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the 
Court emphasized that State practice does not need to be universal among all the states. 
                                                          
436 ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 433, para. 
186.  
437  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 857 International Review of the Red Cross 
(2005):175, p. 180. 
438 ILA London Conference Report 2000, supra note 424, p. 25. 
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Instead, the Court stipulated that State practice must be “extensive and representative”,439 as 
is given in the following description:  
 
“With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary 
before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a 
general rule of international law, it might be that, even without the 
passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and 
representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of States whose interests were specially 
affected.”440 
 
Similarly, the ILA in its London Conference Report 2000 pointed out that the question 
concerned of the evaluation of “extensive and representative” criterion is not how many 
States in the same practice, but which States, especially the States whose interests are 
specially affected.441 
 
A following question is who are “specially affected” States. Given to the scope and the nature 
of the interests, the answer may vary according to circumstances.442 As Henckaerts pointed 
out, in the case of the legality use of blinding laser weapons, those “identified as having been 
in the process of developing such weapons” are considered as “specially affected States”.443 
Concerning the rules of international humanitarian law, “specially affected States” generally 
include those “participated in an armed conflict” and those whose “practice examined for a 
certain rule was relevant to that armed conflict”.444 
                                                          
439  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 180. See also ICJ, North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 384, pp. 13-14. ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases explicitly 
stated that “within the period in question, short thought it might be, State practice, including hat of State whose 
interest are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked.” 
440 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ibid.,para. 73. 
441 ILA London Conference Report 2000, supra note 424, p. 26 (e). 
442Ibid. 
443  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 181. 
444Ibid., p. 181. 
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If all specially affected States are represented, it does not necessarily require major powers 
must participate in a practice in order for it to become a customary international rule.445 It 
may not be left out of sight that a practice that is not displayed by those States “whose 
interests are specially affected” will in most cases not contribute to the formation of a norm 
of customary international law.446 
 
Although the fact that the participation of specially affected States is important to the 
formation of a customary international rule, it will not necessarily be only the “specially 
affected” to be represented as a very widespread participation. In the most cases, the practice 
of other States should also be considered for the establishment of a customary international 
law, whether or not they are “specially affected”.447 
 
3. Continuity and Repetition 
  
The third requirement concerning the evaluation of state practice is related to the period of 
time in the formation a rule of customary international law. It is generally agreed that “some 
time will normally elapse” before a practice to become sufficiently dense. 448  There is, 
however, no specific time requirement for the establishment of a customary rule. In the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Court emphasized that the continuity of the practice should 
be not interpreted literally as a requirement on temporal duration.449 On the contrary, all that 
                                                          
445 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 424, p. 26. 
446 General Report to the XVIIIth Congress of the ISMLLW on the Practice and Customary Law in Military 
Operations, including Peace Support Operations, in: W. Heintschel v. Heinegg/C. Hellestveit/S. Horvat (eds.), 
Practice and Customary Lawe in Military Operations, International Society for Military Law and the Law of 
War, /May 2009, Brussels 2011, 61-264. See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international 
humanitarian law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 
supra note 437, p. 180. 
447  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary international humanitarian law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 181.  
448Ibid., p. 181 .  
449 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf case, supra note 384, para. 74. “Although the passage of only a short period 
of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the 
basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the 
period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
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is required is “accumulating a practice of sufficient density”, in terms of uniformity, 
extensive and representativeness.450 
 
II. Opinio juris 
 
In general, opinio juris refers to a “belief in the legal permissibility or obligatoriness of the 
practice”,451 or denotes a consensus that there is a rule of customary law.452 In the assessment 
of opinio juris, the essential problem, as pointed out by Brownlie, is surely the proof of an 
opinio juris. 453 In practice, International courts are often willing to take the approach of 
assuming the existence of an opinio juris from “the evidence of a general practice, a 
consensus in the literature, or the previous determinations of the Court or other international 
tribunals.”454 And when there is a constant and uniform State practice, there is no absolute 
need to prove the presence of an opinio juris is.455 This is mainly because verbal acts are 
often regarded as “indications of both practice and a corresponding opinio juris”.456 
 
However, particular importance should be reserved for the evaluation of opinio juris in 
assessing the probative value of a state practice, when the state practice is not sufficiently 
dense.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and 
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved.”  
450 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 424, p. 20 (d).  
451 Ibid., p. 33 (b). 
452 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 384, p. 73: “it is of course axiomatic that the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States”. See 
also M. Shaw, International Law, 5th (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 80. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 
Study on customary international humanitarian law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the 
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 178. 
453 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 8 
454 Ibid. 
455 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 242, p. 33 (16).  
456 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005, p. 46. See also Jean-
Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding 
and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 182.  
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An examination of the jurisprudence of the ICJ indicates that the ICJ does not specifically 
prove the presence of opinio juris except when there is a belief that the practice is ambiguous 
to count towards the formation of customary law.457When analyzing a situation involving 
ambiguous omissions in the Lotus case, the Court disagreed with the argument of France that 
the absence of prosecutions for collisions on the high seas acted as evidence proving the 
existence of an obligation not to institute such prosecution. On the contrary, the Court found 
that there were other possible reasons when States omitted to prosecute in such a case. For 
this reason, the Court could not reach the conclusion that there were “a conscious[ness] of 
having a duty to abstain” among States.458 
 
The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases examined another kind of ambiguous 
conduct that may be taken to count towards the establishment of customary international law 
by mistake. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Denmark and the Netherlands referred 
to a number of bilateral treaties in support of the existence of a general legal obligation to 
delimit overlapping continental shelf on the basis of equidistance. However, the Court 
disagreed with this argument with an examination of the presence of an opinio juris in order 
to determine whether the ambiguous practice actually contribute to the formation of 
customary international law. 459 In the process, the Court ran up against various possible 
reasons why a State may apply the equidistance principle in solving the overlapping 
continental shelf issue, and concluded that the conduct of states in applying the equidistance 
principle was based on a range of different reasons, which “can only be problematical and 
must remain entirely speculative”.460 The final conclusion reached was that “no inference 
could justifiably be drawn that they believed themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of 
customary international law”.461 
 
                                                          
457 ILA London Conference Report, supra note 424, p. 34. 
458 Permanent Court of International Justice, Lotus case, France v. Turkey, Judgment, Serial A, No. 10, p. 28. 
459  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the 
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, supra note 437, p. 182.  
460 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 384, paras. 76–77; See also ILA London Conference 
Report, supra note 424, p. 37, Principle 17(iv) and commentary. 
461 Ibid. 
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As stated above, if a particular practice is sufficiently dense, the Court often finds the 
existence of a rule of customary law without going to the length of trying to prove the 
existence of opinio juris. But in cases where the conduct is ambiguous, evidence of the opinio 
juris is critical, in that the practice must be shown to be repeated in a way which 
demonstrates that “a legal obligation is involved”.462 
 
C. Status of the Crime of Child Recruitment as Customary 
International Law before 1996 
  
The discussion above shows that as required by the non-retroactivity principle, it is necessary 
to ascertain the exact time when child recruitment has been crystallized as a crime under 
international law, and, if one goes further, it is also necessary to ask when such crime 
acquired the status of a customary international law in international law.  
 
The question was answered by the Appeals Chamber in its jurisdiction decision the Norman 
case on 31 March 2004. The Chamber decided that child recruitment, namely “conscripting, 
enlisting children under the age of 15 in armed forces or groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities”, was a crime under customary international law before 1996. This was 
the first time that a particular time frame was referred to for the formation of a customary rule 
with regard to child recruitment. However, the decision remains controversial to date, in spite 
of the years that have passed since the decision was taken.  
 
This section is therefore devoted to an examination as to whether child recruitment was 
indeed a crime under customary international law prior to 1996 or it was merely regarded as 
a wrongdoing.463 
 
From the very beginning, Justice Robertson raised a strong voice against the Majority 
opinion. In his dissenting opinion he asserted that child recruitment lacked the nature of 
                                                          
462 ICJ, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 384, pp. 13-14. See also Nicaragua Case, supra note 
433, para. 77. 
463 1996 was when the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL started.  
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crime before 1996, and further stressed that this offense only be a crime in 1998 when the 
Rome Statute was adopted.464 
 
The same opinion can be found in the Brima case465, where the defense challenged the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL, insisting that conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 
was not a war crime at the time of the act alleged, and further claimed that the accused was 
lacking “the criminal knowledge of committing the crime of child recruitment”.466 
 
In the following is a discussion based on the Majority opinion in the Norman Jurisdiction 
Decision and the dissenting opinion of Justice Robertson, in order to determine a time frame 
for the formation of child recruitment as a crime under customary international law.  
 
I. Finding by the Majority in the Norman Jurisdiction Decision 
 
At the beginning of the Norman trial, the defense challenged the jurisdiction of the SCSL 
over the crime of child recruitment on the basis of the principle of legality, that is, there was 
no evidence that child recruitment as defined in Article 4(c) of the Statute was recognized as 
a crime entailing individual criminal responsibility under customary international law at the 
time the alleged acts were committed back in November 1996.  
 
Pursuant to Article 72 (E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the preliminary motion 
was referred to the Appeals Chamber,467 for an opinion on the question of whether and when 
                                                          
464 SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note271. 
465 See the discussion in Chapter 2 for more detail. 
466 The Appeals Chamber rejected the submission, based on the confirmation of the jurisdiction decision ruled in 
the Norman case that conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed force or groups or 
using them to participate actively in hostilities was a crime entailing individual criminal responsibility at the 
time of the acts alleged in the Indictment. The Appeals Chamber further claimed that it is frivolous and 
vexatious for Kanu to contend that the absence of criminal knowledge on his part vitiated the requisite mens rea 
in respect of the crimes relating to child soldiers. SCSL, Brima Appeals Judgment, supra note 280, paras. 732. 
467 See Statute of the SCSL, article 72 (E), “When making an order under Sub-Rule (A) above, a Judge or 
Chamber shall wherever appropriate state in the order whether the transcript of those proceedings relating to the 
evidence of the witness to whom the measures relate shall be made available for use in other proceedings before 
the Special Court”. 
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the norm of child recruitment had acquired the status of a crime under customary 
international law.468 
 
The defense held that even though certain international treaties, such as the AP II and CRC, 
might have imposed an obligation on States to refrain from recruiting child soldiers, these 
instruments however did not go as far as criminalizing the act prior to 1996.469 Clearly if this 
argument were proven true, the trial would have violated the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege.  
 
On the Prosecution side, it was argued that the crime of child recruitment was already part of 
customary international law at the time the offences were committed, and that evidence could 
be derived from the relevant provisions of treaty laws, especially the Rome Statute. 470 
Furthermore, “the sheer number of states” that illegalized the practice of child recruitment 
under their national law gave further evidence of the existence of the crime under customary 
international law.471 
 
On 31 May 2004, the Appeals Chamber by a 3:1 majority delivered a 27-page decision which 
stated that recruitment of children, namely “conscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of 15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities”, had become a crime under 
customary international law by November 1996.  
 
 
1. The Reasoning of the Majority Decision  
 
For its finding, the Appeals Chamber first examined relevant international instruments, 
particularly the GC IV, the AP I, AP II, the ACRWC and the CRC. The wide ratification of 
                                                          
468 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note  271, para. 3.  
469 Ibid.,para. 1.  
470  SCSL, Prosecutor vs. Sam Hinga Norman, Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction: Child 
Recruitment, 26 June 2003, para. 3-9; See also SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, para. 5. 
471 SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, para. 5, cited as “[t]he prosecution submits further that 
the sheer number of states that made the practice of child recruitment illegal under their domestic law 
demonstrated that the practice is widely viewed as unacceptable and a violation of international obligations.”  
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these conventions gave the Appeals Chamber reasons to believe that the prohibition of child 
recruitment had become a customary international law before November 1996.472 
 
The mere prohibition, however, cannot be interpreted as criminalization. Criminalization 
carries criminal responsibility for the perpetrators of the offence, while the prohibition of a 
conduct can at the most be taken as a condemnation of a wrongdoing or a declaration of a 
moral stance.  
 
Therefore, the next question, requiring clarification by the Appeals Chamber, was whether 
such prohibition also entailed individual criminal responsibility of the person recruiting 
children before 1996. In other words, the central question was whether such a prohibited act 
was “criminalized and punishable under international or national law” 473, or remained a 
simple prohibition on States attracting no individual criminal liability.  
 
In support of its conclusion that child recruitment had already entailed individual criminal 
responsibility under customary international law before 1996, the Appeals Chamber adopted 
a two-pronged argument: a) the act of child recruitment was a violation of fundamental 
humanitarian values leading to individual criminal liability before 1996, and b) such a crime 
had became a customary international law.474 The two aspects can be seen as follows:  
 
“As has been shown in the previous sections, child recruitment was a 
violation of conventional and customary international humanitarian 
law by 1996. But can it also be stated that the prohibited act was 
criminalised and punishable under international or national law to 
an extent which would show customary practice?”475 
 
                                                          
472 Ibid.,paras. 10-23. 
473 Ibid.,para 25.  
474 The emphasis given to the customary nature of the crime of child recruitment arises mainly from the 
definition of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which was defined in the Secretary-General’s Report on 
the establishment of the SCSL as, “in recognition of the principle of legality, in particular nullum crimen sine 
lege, and the prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation, the international crimes enumerated, are crimes 
considered to have had the character of customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of the 
crime.”.  
475 See Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, para. 25.  
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It should be noted that these two aspects are not completely independent of each other. 
Rather they are both required to support the compliance of the principle of nullum crimen 
cine lege in the discussed case.  
 
To prove its point, the Appeals Chamber cited the provisions of Article 38 of the CRC476 and 
Article 4 of the OPCRC477, as both of which require to take “all feasible measures” to prevent 
recruiting and using child soldiers in hostilities. The phrase “feasible measures”, according to 
the Appeals Chamber, includes criminal sanction as measure of enforcement.478  This further 
implies that the states parties have an obligation to criminalize the act of recruitment or use of 
child soldiers.  
 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute was claimed to be applicable as evidence of the existence of 
the crime of child recruitment under customary international law before 1996. With regard to 
this point, the Appeals Chamber went as far as recounting the proposal of the Germany 
Delegation to include child recruitment as a crime into the Rome Statute as well as the 
objection of US Delegation that the prohibition on child recruitment was a human rights 
provision rather than a criminal law one.479 The Appeals Chamber argued that the Rome 
Statute “focused on the codification and effective implementation of the existing customary 
norm rather than on the formation of a new one” and concluded that the agreement of the 
majority to incorporate child recruitment into the Rome Statute was sufficient enough to 
prove that child recruitment had already become a crime under customary international law 
before 1996.480 
 
In addition, the Majority examined national legislations in regard to the crime of child 
recruitment. State practice of 108 states, whose national legislations included criminal 
sanction as a measure of enforcement, was regarded sufficient to support the finding that  
 
                                                          
476 Article 38(2) of the CRC: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.” 
477 Article 4 of the OPCRC: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, 
including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices”.  
478 See Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, paras. 35, 41. 
479 Ibid.,para. 33. 
480 Ibid.,para. 33. 
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“[t]he recruitment of child soldiers481 was criminalized before it was 
explicitly set out as a criminal prohibition in treaty laws by 
November 1996, the starting point of the frame relevant to the 
indictment.”482 
 
2. Flaws Contained in the Majority Decision 
 
There can be little doubt that the prohibition of child recruitment had become part of 
customary international law before 1996, and this conclusion, being uncontroversial, 
encountered no objection from either the prosecution or the defense counsel.  
 
There are however some notable ambiguities in the Majority’s finding as to whether there 
indeed existed a crime under customary law prior to 1996. As mentioned above, the 
Majority’s reasoning is based on two aspects: a) the existence of the criminalization of the 
child recruitment in national or international law before 1996, and b) such practice had 
become a custom before 1996. In this respect, an examination of these two aspects will give 
us some bearing on the soundness of the reasoning of the Majority’s finding.  
 
a. Flaws in the Analysis of the Child Recruitment as a Crime before 1996 
 
As stated above, the core issue is whether the international conventions are sufficient proof of 
criminalization of child recruitment as a customary law before 1996. In the following a 
detailed examination is undertaken in an effort to reveal the flaws in the reasoning of the 
Norman Jurisdiction Decision.  
 
                                                          
481 Although the Appeals Chamber in the Norman case ruled that the offence of recruitment of child soldiers had 
crystallized under customary international law prior to the events alleged in the Indictment, the Trial Chamber 
in the Norman case stated that the “‘use of child soldiers’, in ordinary language, could not be said to be a form 
of recruitment. Having considered the dismissal by the Appeals Chamber of the whole Motion relating to 
Article 4(c) in its totality, and having considered the available authorities, the Chamber found that ‘using child 
soldiers to participate actively in hostilities’ was also proscribed under customary international law prior to the 
events charged in the Indictment.”, see SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 197. 
482 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note271, para. 53.  
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a) The Interpretation of Obligations to Criminalize Child Recruitment under 
International Conventions 
 
One of the arguments of the Appeals Chamber is that the treaties prohibiting the act of child 
recruitment, such as the CRC and the OPCRC, set up an obligation for State parties to 
criminalize this act.  
 
Admittedly these treaties indeed imposed an obligation on the states to protect children from 
recruitment into armed forces or groups. Yet it is also true that none went as far as placing an 
obligation to criminalize the act in terms of the individual criminal responsibility. Thus, 
although “all feasible measures” was required by both the CRC and the OPCRC, the 
expression “feasible”, being open to interpretation, left the states to interpret to their own 
liking what was feasible. There was thus little hope for real criminal sanctions on individuals 
who recruit and use child soldiers.483 As Humphrey notes:  
 
“No international body was created to supervise Additional Protocol 
II and determine which conflicts met its criteria. Similarly, the CRC 
did not found criminal sanctions, but an inadequate system of 
periodic reporting to a special committee with no faculty to force 
compliance, to punish non-compliance or to even hear complaints. 
[…] the obligation to report has been consistently breached by many 
states with no consequence. […] The CRC’s simple requirement that 
states use ‘feasible measures’ to protect children is also weak.”484 
 
The above passage suggests, contrary to what the Majority was claiming, these conventions, 
though generally accepted, demonstrated not a proof but rather a lack of commitment by the 
states parties to penalize child recruitment in their national laws.485 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that all the international conventions concerning child 
recruitment earlier than the Rome Statute only impose the obligation on the states not to use 
children in hostilities, but had not unequivocally contained any obligation on individuals not 
                                                          
483 SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note 271, para.28. 
484 Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note 84, p.123.  
485 Ibid. 
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to do so. In this respect, the interpretation by the Appeals Chamber confuses the issue of the 
“obligations upon states parties to make the particular conduct criminal in their national 
laws” with that of “the creation of an international crime”.486 
 
b) The Rome Statute in Particular 
  
The claim that the Rome Statute codified an existing customary norm regarding child 
recruitment was also hard to be substantiated. The Appeals Chamber was known to have 
supplied three reasons with respect to the conclusion that Rome Statute codified an existing 
customary norm regarding child recruitment. Firstly, “the first draft of the Rome Statute was 
produced as early as 1994 referring generally to war crimes”; secondly, “in the first session 
of the Preparatory Committee it was proposed that the ICC should have the power to 
prosecute serious violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II”; and lastly, the 
inclusion of child recruitment into the Rome Statute “was justified by the near universal 
acceptance” and the act of child recruitment “warranted the most fundamental 
disapprobation”.487 
 
The fact that war crimes were drafted into the Rome Statute in 1994 does not however imply 
that the act of child recruitment was necessarily included as one of those criminalized at the 
time. The fact is that the proposal for the inclusion of child recruitment as a crime was raised 
for the first time in 1997, as revealed by a trace of the PrepCom.488 According to Humphrey, 
“the issue of criminalization [of child recruitment] was mostly a reaction to the Machel 
Report, received in 1996 and discussed in 1997.”489 This is to say that the relevant timeframe 
for formulization of child recruitment as a crime should center around the period between the 
receipt of the Machel Report in 1996 and the adoption of the Rome Statute. 
 
                                                          
486 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, supra note 55, pp. 131-132. 
487 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, para. 33. 
488 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Decisions Taken by the 
Preparatory Committee its Session Held from 11 to 21 February 1997, A/AC.249/1997/L.5, March 1997. See 
also Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=979916 (last visit on 15 March 2012), 
p.20. 
489 Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note 84, pp. 120-121. 
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Nor was the second reason provided in support of the claim any more convincing. The 
Appeals Chamber referred to the power of the ICC to prosecute serious violations of 
Common Article 3 and the AP II, in an attempt to demonstrate that the Rome Statute did not 
create a new legislation on the crime of child recruitment. But no adequate ground was given 
by the Appeals Chamber for the claim that child recruitment constituted a serious violation or 
a grave breach of the AP II. Due to the lack of further analysis, child recruitment appears to 
have been included in the Rome Statute as a crime simply because child recruitment was 
prohibited under the AP II. As it stands, a mere mention of the power of the ICC to prosecute 
serious violations of Common Article 3 and AP II does not constitute sufficient proof that 
child recruitment had been incorporated as a crime before 1996. Besides, Common Article 3 
and AP II only cover situations in non-international armed conflicts but not those involving 
international armed conflicts.490 
 
The third reason was more of an attempt at patchwork to stop any loophole left by the first 
two reasons supplied. However, the vague and ambiguous statement does not sufficiently 
warrant the conclusion that child recruitment was a crime before 1996. The near universal 
acceptance of the norm of child recruitment only related to the prohibition but not the 
criminalization of the act of child recruitment, considering, “individual breaches of human 
rights norms are not per se criminal unless specifically criminalized”.491 
 
Actually even by October 2000, or two years after the adoption of the Rome Statute, the 
question remained unresolved whether child recruitment was a crime under customary 
international law. This can be seen from the Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, where the issue of the customary nature of 
the crime of child recruitment resurfaced. The report raised the doubt again: “it is far less 
clear whether it is customarily recognized as a war crime entailing the individual criminal 
responsibility of the accused”,492  when referring to the formulation of the Rome Statute with 
regard to child recruitment. 
 
                                                          
490 Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, supra note 488, p. 20. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 245, 
para. 17.  
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The Appeals Chamber is therefore argued to have neither addressed the issue of when child 
recruitment became a crime, nor supplied evidence enough for a conclusion that such a crime 
had crystallized as customary international law before the Rome Statute.  
 
b. Lack of Sufficient National Legislation in the Analysis of Customary 
International Law 
 
Since state practice and opinio juris are the two major elements required for proving the 
existence of a customary international law, in the following these two aspects will be 
examined in verification of the Majority’s finding. 
 
a) State Practice of the Crime of Child Recruitment 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, no international instruments have been found criminalizing the act 
of child recruitment up to 1996. Now it must be examined if there was any evidence at the 
national level of imposing criminal responsibility on perpetrators before 1996.  
 
According to the Majority, “by 2001, and in most cases prior to the Rome Statute, 108 states 
explicitly prohibited child recruitment. […] The list of states in the 2001 Child Soldiers 
Global Report clearly shows that states with quite different legal systems - civil law, common 
law, Islamic Law - share the same view on the topic.”493 
 
However as argued early, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires a well-established 
crime, which cannot be easily substituted with something like a vaguely expressed moral 
stance or a mere declaration of abhorrence or prohibition. Yet the legislations referred to in 
the Majority’s finding were unfortunately prohibition of child recruitment only.  
 
If the distinction between prohibition and criminalization is made, then one fact that stood out 
was that among these 108 States, only five had actually criminalized the offence in their 
                                                          
493 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note271, para. 44. 
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criminal laws prior to 1996.494 The question then is how the five countries be construed as 
evidence of an “extensive and virtually uniform” state practice of criminalizing child 
recruitment offenses.  
 
The Majority also attempted to draw support by stating that:” sanctions can be found […] in 
administrative legislation, or in the laws by civil servants.”495 Here the Majority seems to 
claim the same value of an administrative or civil measure to criminal sanctions. It is 
questionable if these administrative laws indeed play the same extent of function as the 
criminal provisions 496 i.e. punishing the perpetrator or deterring the potential criminals. 
Rather, it must be concluded that the state practice as presented by the majority did not 
qualify for the “virtually uniform” standard for the formation of a customary international 
law, but for “a particular serious wrongdoing”.497 
 
b) Opinio Juris of the Crime of Child Recruitment 
 
As stated above, in situations where practice is ambiguous, the examination of the evidence 
of the opinio juris become particularly crucial in determining whether or not a practice counts 
towards the formation of a custom. In the current case, there is neither dense practice on the 
criminalization of child recruitment before 1996, nor the possibility of the formation of an 
opinio juris. 
 
                                                          
494 SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note271, paras. 42-43. 
See also Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note84, p.124: Among the five 
countries, “two of the states had military controls on the prohibition of child recruitment, and the other three had 
administrative controls that effectively prevented children from being enlisted.” 
495 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, para. 47.   
496  There is a difference between administrative measures and criminal sanctions, as the former aim at 
recovering benefits unduly received, whereas the latter seek to punish and deter rather than to confiscate 
proceeds. However, administrative sanctions, seems not being so much different in nature from criminal 
sanctions, requires stricter rules than administrative measures. In practice it is not always easy to decide whether 
a sanction is a truly penal sanction or rather than an administrative sanction. From this perspective, analysis 
should always be based on a case-to-case basis. 
497 Happold Matthew, Children in International Law, supra note55, p. 132. 
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As already pointed out, no international conventions before the Rome Statute attached 
individual criminal responsibility to the issue of child recruitment.498 The fact that, of the 108 
states mentioned by Majority, only five countries expressly criminalized child recruitment in 
their criminal law seems to be a scant ground to establish a general consensus by the 
international community on the criminalization of child recruitment. 499 Among those 
countries that placed child recruitment on a criminal basis, a brief in legal obligation to 
criminalize the conduct of child recruitment is not the only reason for using the criminal 
sanctions.  
The lack of judicial practice concerning the crime of child recruitment, both in the World 
War II Tribunals, and in the post-war international criminal tribunals, is another indication of 
its non-customary status.500 
 
After all being shown, if the proposition that State practice and opinio juris in this case 
sufficiently entailed individual criminal responsibility were to be allowed, it should 
constitute, according to Mettraux,501 a case of “a rule generates a custom” rather than “a 
custom generates a rule”. In the words of the ICJ, the existence of a customary norm should 
be established  
 
 “[b]y induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and 
convincing State practice, and not by deduction based on 
preconceived ideas as to what the law should be”.502 
 
                                                          
498 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, supra note  271, para. 38. 
499 Ibid.,para. 44. 
500 Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan & H. Harry L. Roque Jr. (eds.), Children in Armed Conflict: Roundtable 
Discussion, supra note 133, p. 9. 
501 “Many a Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals has been too ready to brand norms as customary, without giving 
any reason or citing any authority for that conclusion. What judges find to be customary may be what they are 
willing or able to find in the practice of states and their opinio juris so that customary law has to a large extent 
been a matter of opinion, rather than one of existing state practice, to a point where it sometimes seems that 
“rule laid down by judges have generated custom, rather than custom generated the rules.” See Guénaël 
Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, supra note 417, p.15, fn.8-9. 
502 ICJ, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, 
para.111.  
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3. Conclusion 
 
In sum, based on the above discussion, it must be contended that the Majority decision was 
inherently flawed. 503  Evidence from the available international instruments and national 
domestic legislations before only 1996 showed that the view shared among the international 
community by 1996 was that recruitment of child soldiers was an abhorrent wrongdoing. 
However there was no indication of a consensus that it amounted to a crime. A most 
regrettable fact this is. Surely “we might wish the law were otherwise,” as stated in the IMT 
Trial, “but we must administer it as we find it”.504 
 
II.      Dissenting Opinion Delivered by Justice Robertson 
 
1. Major Arguments in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson  
 
Justice Robertson in his Dissenting Opinion in the Norman Jurisdiction Decision questioned 
the accuracy of the Majority finding, arguing that the Decision based on the finding was 
inconsistent with the principle of legality in criminal law.  
 
The main argument of Justice Robertson was that up to 1996 no provision of child enlistment 
(i.e. recruitment of volunteers) as a crime could be found in the treaty laws. This conclusion 
was reached on the basis of separating forcible child recruitment from child enlistment. It was 
his belief that the two should belong to two different categories of recruitment, in spite of 
they lead to the same consequence that children are enrolled in the armed forces or groups.   
 
As far as forcible recruitment was concerned, there was no question to Justice Robertson that 
“the use of physical force or threats in order to recruit children” had already acquired the 
status of a crime under customary international law by November 1996. However, if the 
question was mainly concerned with the means of how a child became involved in armed 
conflict rather than the end, child enlistment plays a crucial role on the discussed issue. It was 
                                                          
503 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, supra note417, p.15. See also Thomas 
Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note84, p.125.  
504 United States v. Von Leeb and Others, US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Judgment of 28 October 
1948, in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, XI (“High Command case”), p. 563.  
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highly unlikely that the child enlistment had been developed as a crime before November 
1996.  
 
To support his argument, Justice Robertson carefully went through the preparatory work 
leading up to the adoption of the SCSL Statute. A close scrutiny revealed a major difference 
between the proposal of the Secretary-General on child recruitment and that of the President 
of the Security Council. 
 
In the proposal of the Secretary-General, child enlistment was not included into the crime of 
child recruitment. This is made abundantly clear in the Secretary-General’s Report on the 
Establishment of the SCSL: 
 
“Owing to the doubtful customary nature of the ICC’s statutory 
crime which criminalizes the conscription or enlistment of children 
under the age of fifteen, whether forced or ‘voluntary’, the crime 
which is included in Article 4(c) of the Statute of the Special Court is 
not the equivalent of the ICC provision. [...] The elements of the 
crime under the proposed Statute of the Special Court are: 
Adduction and forced recruitment in the most general sense, and 
transformation of the child into, and its use as, among other 
degrading uses, a ‘child combatant’. ” 505 
 
Clearly, here “voluntary” enlistment was pronounced as having a ‘doubtful’ customary status 
and thus excluded from the proposed crime. But in the letter of the President of the Security 
Council, one finds that the crime of child recruitment expanded to include child enlistment.506 
The difference in their treatment of child enlistment was the question Justice Robertson 
raised, which challenged the certainty that the Majority felt about the criminal status of child 
enlistment:  
 
 “[i]t might strike some as odd that the state of international law in 
1996 in respect to criminalization of child enlistment was doubtful to 
                                                          
505 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note 271, para. 4.  
506 Ibid.,para. 5. See also Security Council, Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Secretary 
Council addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2000/1234, 22 December 2000, Annex, p. 5.  
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the UN Secretary-General in October 2000 but was very clear to the 
President of the Security Council only two months later.”507 
 
There was little doubt to Justice Robertson that the status of child enlistment as a crime 
remained ambiguous.  
 
Furthermore, an examination of the PrepCom showed that even though the draft statute for 
the ICC was submitted by International Law Commission in 1994, the proposal to include 
child enlistment as a crime was not raised until December 1997,508 which did not get its final 
approval until as late as July 1998.  
 
It was thus groundless to conclude that there existed a widely accepted obligation on states to 
criminalize child enlistment as early as 1996.If the status of child enlistment remained 
dubious to the UN Secretary-General in 2000, was there really legal ground for the child 
enlistment became a crime by 1996? Or what knowledge could one attribute to the defendant 
on the ground?  
 
Finally, the relevant state practice up to 1996 regarding child enlistment was examined, 
which showed few provisions by the national authorities to criminalize voluntary enlistment 
before 1996.509 
 
All this led Justice Robertson to conclude that prosecution and punishment of child 
enlistment before 1996 was fallible, for lack of sufficient legal ground. In fact, July 1998, 
when the ICC was established,  
 
“was the beginning of crystallization point of child enlistment? […] 
The state practice immediately after July 1998 demonstrates that the 
                                                          
507 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note 271, para. 6. 
508 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Decisions Taken by the 
Preparatory Committee its Session Held from 11 to 21 February 1997,supra note 488. See also Matthew 
Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 
488, p.20. 
509 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note 271, para. 20. As Judge 
Rorbertson emphasized in the Disending Opinion, “the Geneva Convention IV, the 1977 Protocols, the 
Conveniton on the Rights of the Child and African Charter are, even when taken together, insufficient”. 
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Rome Treaty was accepted by states as a turning point in the 
criminalization of child recruitment.”510 
 
2. Critics of the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson 
 
However, this is not to say that the distinction between child enlistment and forcible 
recruitment did not attract its own controversy. Critic on this matter was raised by some 
scholars.  
 
a. Forcible Recruitment of Children as a Violation of the CA 3 
 
Justice Robertson made a distinction in his dissenting opinion between forcible recruitment 
and child enlistment, to the effect that forcible recruitment had already acquired the status of 
a crime by November 1996, however, no evidence was found that “the law in 1996 
criminalized individuals who enlisted child volunteers”.511 As to the reason why forcible 
recruitment had been a crime by 1996, Justice Robertson simply stating that forcible 
recruitment amounted to the violation of CA3:   
 
“[t]his [abduction and forcible recruitment] was in my view a war 
crime by November 1996; indeed, it would have amounted to a most 
serious breach of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.”512 
 
To Happold, the argument by Justice Robertson was well supported that child enlistment was 
not a crime before 1996. What Happold objected to was that it was questionable that forcible 
recruitment of children could be regarded as an offence under the CA3 by interpretation:  
 
                                                          
510 Ibid.,para. 40. 
511 SCSL, Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, supra note271, paras. 4-5. 
Since it is well recognized that CA3 is part of customary international law and its violation imposes individual 
criminal responsibility, the person who committed the atrocities listed in CA3 should take individual criminal 
responsibility for their perpetrations. ICTY Jurisprudence confirmed the opinion that CA3 is part of customary 
international law. 
512 Ibid.,para. 4. 
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“The problem is, however, that Common Article 3 does not 
specifically prohibit such conduct, nor is there any evidence 
additional to that adduced in the majority opinion to suggest that 
states had criminalized it prior to 1996”.513 
 
Since CA3 does not specifically prohibit forcible recruitment, such an interpretation of the 
CA3 may be in breach of the principle of specificity. It must be noted that it is insufficient for 
criminalization to be inferred from the seriousness of the offence but must be established 
independently.514 
 
b. The Necessity of Distinguishing Child Enlistment and Forcible Recruitment 
 
From a totally different perspective, Smith, objected to the distinction drawn by Justice 
Robertson between non-forcible recruitment and forcible recruitment. 515 To her, the 
distinction between forcible and voluntary nature of child recruitment is simply a 
distraction.516 The purpose of this crime is to “impose liability for merely enrolling a child 
under the age of 15 into an armed force or group”.517To Smith, the law should focus on 
protecting children from recruitment into armed conflicts and not dwell on a distinction of 
forms of recruitment.518 She maintains “the conscription or enlistment of a child under the 
age of 15 is a crime, whether the child is coerced or volunteers”.519 
 
However it must be remembered that the point at issue is the principle of legality, or whether 
there is legal precedence involving the persecution of a person for a certain act. The nature of 
the question thus places a stringent requirement on the principle of legality. This is 
abundantly demonstrated in the quote given above regarding the General-Secretary. In point 
                                                          
513 Happold Matthew, Child Soldiers in International Law, supra note 55, p. 132. 
514 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, IT-98-29-1/A, Judgment, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu 
Daqun, Appeals Chamber, 12 November 2009, para. 5.  
515 Alison Smith, Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 International Criminal Justice 
1141, p. 1147.  
516 Ibid.,p. 1148.  
517 Ibid.,pp. 1148, 1152. 
518 Ibid., p.1147: “Whether the enlistment is voluntary or forced appears to be one of the major considerations 
on which the dissenting opinion is based.” 
519 Ibid., p.1152. 
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of the legality, it was felt necessary that voluntary enlistment be given a separate category of 
its own.  
 
The opinion presented, on the other hand, was intended to show that although child 
enlistment “was abhorrent to all reasonable persons in 1996, but abhorrence alone does not 
make that conduct a crime in international law.”520 
 
D. Status of the Crime of Child Recruitment as Customary 
International Law as of Today 
 
On the analysis of the Norman jurisdiction Decision, the above discussion reveals that before 
1996 child recruitment under the age of 15 years were generally deemed as a wrongdoing, at 
most, a prohibition under customary international law, but not a crime entailing individual 
criminal responsibility. As the development of the substantive laws regarding child 
recruitment, especially the criminalization of such act under the Rome Statute, there is little 
doubt that child recruitment is a war crime today. What remains to be found out now is 
whether this crime, as of today, has become a crime under customary international law. 
 
As stated above, due to the intrinsic legal effect of a customary international law to bind all 
states, a customary status of the crime of child recruitment will have an effect of binding non-
party states to prosecute and punish their nationals who committing this heinous international 
crime. From this perspective, the newly born international jurisprudence on child recruitment, 
the implementation of provision of child recruitment under the Rome Statute, and the 
legislation of child recruitment as a crime in domestic laws will be examined as evidence in 
the evaluation the customary nature of the crime of child recruitment.  
 
As pointed out earlier, formation of customary international law requires consistent and 
extensive state practice and opinio juris. 521  The two aspects will be examined in the 
                                                          
520 Norman Jurisdiction Decision, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, para. 9. 
521 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary Rules of International Humanitarian Law: Purpose, coverage, 
mythology, supra note 437, p.178. As the International Court of Justice stated  in the Continental Shelf case: “It 
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following, in an effort to demonstrate that child recruitment has indeed become a crime under 
customary international law today.   
 
First of all, it is known that the Rome Statute has received recognition from 114 states by 
2010.522 So more than half of the international community, “an overwhelming majority of 
States”, have given their consent to apply the Rome Statute in their domestic practice and 
have agreed to criminalize the use of child soldiers in an explicit and precise manner.523 This 
is arguably a significant factor in the proof of formation of state practice.  
 
Secondly, a number of legislative practices on criminalization of child recruitment had been 
carried out in domestic laws, especially since the Rome Statute came into effect. Since 2003 
trials of persons charged with the crime of child recruitment have become a reality as can be 
seen in the court of both the SCSL and the ICC.  
 
However, the question still remains whether such practices have reached to the extent of 
sufficient, or they are just practices of certain States, and should not be taken as general 
acceptance by the whole international community.  
 
I. The State Practice of State Parties to the Rome Statute 
 
The state practice of the state parties to the Rome Statue will firstly be discussed. The 
adoption of the Rome Statute prompted a large number of states to implement the Rome 
Statute’s provisions into their own laws. Since then, there has been an increasing trend to 
legislate the norms of the child recruitment as a crime at the national level.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio juris of States”, ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf case, Judgment, supra note 384, p.73. 
522 The 114th ratification by Moldova in October 2010 represents an important milestone in advancing towards 
universal ratification of the Rome Statute. See ICC, the States Parties to the Rome Statute. See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties  (last accessed on 30 December 2010). 
523 The 1996 Rome Statute was regarded as a reflection of the legal views of an overwhelming majority states in 
Furundzija case. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Auto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 December 
1998, para. 227. Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, 
supra note 408, p.229. 
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For the Monism States, such as Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Russian, South Africa, 
and Austria, the act of ratifying the Rome Statute means an immediate incorporation of the 
provisions of the Roman Statute into their national laws. Therefore, judges in the national 
courts can apply the Rome Statute directly, just as if it were part of the national law.  
 
As for the Monism States, the incorporation is often either redundant or very little is required, 
Austria and Germany still incorporate the provisions regarding the crime of child recruitment 
into their national system. Australia adopted the International Criminal Court 
(Consequential Amendments) Act in 2002 to criminalize the offence of “using, conscripting 
and enlisting children in the course of an international armed conflict.” 524The German 
legislator, in the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) of 26 June 2002, adopted the definition 
provided in the Rome Statute word by word, such that the crime is defined as 
“[W]erimZusammenhangmiteineminternationalenodernichtinternationalenbewaffnetenKonfli
kt [...] Kinder unter 15 Jahren für Streitkräfte zwangsverpflichtet oder in Streitkräfte oder 
bewaffnete Gruppen eingliedert oder sie zur aktiven Teilnahme an Feindseligkeiten 
verwendet, […].” 525According to § 8 (1) (5), child recruitment attracts a punishment of 
imprisonment of at least three years. 
 
As far as the Dualism States are concerned, many have passed legislations through the treaty-
making process to criminalize the recruitment of children, either occurs in their territories or 
committed by their nationals.  
 
A revised criminal code of Burundi adopted in 22 April 2009 defined the crime of child 
recruitment exactly in the wording of the Rome Statute, that is, “conscripting or enlisting of 
children under the age of 15 years in national armed forces or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities” applicable in the context of international armed conflict, and 
                                                          
524 Section 268.68(1) of the International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act, An Act to amend 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 and certain other Acts in consequence of the enactment of the International 
Criminal Court Act 2002, and for other purposes, No. 42, 2002.268.68 War crime-using, conscripting or 
enlisting children:(1) A person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:(a) the perpetrator uses one or more 
persons to participate actively in hostilities; and (b) the person or persons are under the age of 15 years; and (c) 
the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.” 
525 See § 8 (1) (5) VStGB. 
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“conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities”, applicable in the context of a non-international armed conflict.526 
 
In Kazakhstan, “recruitment, training, financing or other material support for mercenaries” 
was prohibited under Article 162 of the Criminal Code, and the violation would cause 
imprisonment from 7 to 15 years.527 
 
In Lithuania, a new Article 105 was introduced into the Criminal Code in May 2003, 
according to which, “the recruitment of under-18s into armed groups and their use in 
hostilities” is punishable by imprisonment of up to 12 years.528 
 
Mongolia legislated in its domestic law against “the use of minors as foreign mercenaries in 
armed conflicts”, which would be punishable by a 10–15 years’ imprisonment”.529 
 
                                                          
526Article 198 (2) (z)) and Article 198 (5) (g) of Revised Penal Code 22 April 2009, No. 1/05.Article 198 
(2).“Les autres violations graves des lois et coutumes applicables aux conflits armés internationaux dans le 
cadre établi du droit international, à savoir, l’un quelconque des actes ci-après: (z) aa. Le fait de procéder à la 
conscription ou à l’enrôlement d’enfants de moins de 15 ans dans les forces armées nationales ou de les faire 
participer activement à des hostilités.” […] “5° “Les autres violations graves des lois et coutumes applicables 
aux conflits armés ne présentant pas un caractère international, dans le cadre établi du droit international, à 
savoir l’un quelconque des actes ci-après: (g) Le fait de procéder à la conscription ou à l’enrôlement d’enfants 
de moins de 15 ans dans les forces armées ou dans des groupes armés ou de les faire participer activement à des 
hostilités.” 
527 The Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Law No. 167, 16 July 1997. Article 162: Employment of 
Mercenaries: “1. Enlistment, training, financing, or other material support of a mercenary, as well as the use of 
him in a military conflict or military actions, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period from four to eight 
years. 2. The same acts committed by a person with the use of his official position or with regard to an underage 
person, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period from seven to fifteen years with forfeiture of property, 
or without it. 3. Participation of a mercenary in a military conflict or military actions shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a period from three to seven years. 4. The act stipulated by the third part of this Article which 
entailed the death of people or other grave consequences, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period from 
ten to twenty years with forfeiture of property, or life-time imprisonment with forfeiture of property”.  
528 Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted on 26 September 2000, by the Law No.III-1968. 
529 The Criminal Code of Mongolia, 10 January 2002, MN016. Article 303(1) of the Criminal Code of Mongolia, 
“use of foreign mercenaries in armed conflicts or warfare, training, financing or support of them in other forms 
shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than 5 to 8 years.” 
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In Sierra Leone, there have been reported several trials of persons who recruited children. 
The SCSL was created by the government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with UN in January 
2002, for purpose of conducting trials of those “bearing the greatest responsibility” for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law, including the 
crime of child recruitment.530 To date, 13 leaders from all sides of the armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone, i.e. AFRC, CDF, and RUF have been indicted for the crime of child recruitment.531 
 
II. The State Practice of non-party States to the Rome Statute 
 
The campaign for domestic legislation was no longer limited to the State parties to the Rome 
Statute, but extended to States who had not yet ratified the Rome Statute. As far as non-party 
States to the Rome Statute are concerned, there is no lack of evidence showing that domestic 
legislations in these countries are catching up with the growing trend to criminalize child 
recruitment.  
 
The Azerbaijan government legislated in Article 116 (5) of its Criminal Code that “any 
person who attracts minors in armed forces shall be punished by imprisonment for the term 
from seven up to fifteen years or life imprisonment”.532 
 
In April 2000, the president of the Cote D’Ivoire signed a decree granting amnesty for 
crimes committed during the armed conflict. However, the crime of child recruitment was 
specifically excluded from the amnesty, as it was regarded as “crimes constituting serious 
violations of human rights”.533 
                                                          
530 Statute of the SCSL, Article 1. 
531 The International Herald Tribune, Death by Child, 15 November 2008. They were three former AFRC 
leaders, two former CDF leaders, and three former RUF leaders. Two others had been indicted by the Court: the 
leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, who had died in custody in 2003, and the leader of the CDF, Norman, who 
died in February 2007. In March 2006, the Nigerian authorities apprehended Charles Taylor, former president of 
Liberia, who was transferred to the authority of the Court where he was charged with war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the use of child soldiers 
during his alleged involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict supporting the RUF.                                                                                                                             
532 Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic, 1 September 2000. Article 116: Infringement of norms of the 
international humanitarian right during confrontations, 116.0.5: “attraction of minors in armed forces.”  
533 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, signed between President Laurent Gbagbo and New Forces rebel leader 
Guillaume Soro, 4 March 2007, VI. Provisions aimed at consolidating the national reconciliation, Peace, The 
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Article 87 of the Republic of Indonesia Law on Child Protection provided for imprisonment 
of no less than five years for “recruiting and equipping children for military purpose, or 
misusing children” by “involving them in political activities, or in an armed conflict, social 
disturbance […] or in a violent event”.534 
 
Compared with the other national legislations, the Singaporean legislation framework for the 
protection of children engages a much wider scope. The Children and Young Persons Act 
provides that “any act which endangers or is likely to endanger the safety of the child or 
young person” is a criminal offence.535 There is no doubt that recruitment of children into 
armed conflict is among the acts circumscribed as likely to endanger the safety of the child. 
 
Child Soldier Accountability Act of United States passed into law after being signed by the 
president on 3 October 2008, 536  which makes it a federal crime to “recruit children 
knowingly or to use those as soldiers under the age of 15”. The Act also empowers the US 
courts to “prosecute any individual on US soil for the offense, even if the children were 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Security and free Movement of People and Goods, 6.3: ‘[...] a new law of amnesty covering the crimes and 
offences related to national security, in connection, with the military, political and social troubles that broke out 
in the country[...], except for economic offences, war crimes and crimes against humanity.’ 
534 Chapter XII, Article 87 of Law No. 23/2002 on National Child Protection Act, Republic of Indonesia. 
According to Article 1 (1), children are defined as someone under 18 years old. 
535 Children and Young Persons Act of Singapore, 21 March 1993. Article 5 (b) willfully or unreasonably does, 
or causes the child or young person to do, any act which endangers or is likely to endanger the safety of the 
child or young person or which causes or is likely to cause the child or young person: (i) any unnecessary 
physical pain, suffering or injury; (ii) any emotional injury; or (iii) any injury to his health or development; or 
(c) willfully or unreasonably neglects, abandons or exposes the child or young person with full intention of 
abandoning the child or young person or in circumstances that are likely to endanger the safety of the child or 
young person or to cause the child or young person: (i) any unnecessary physical pain, suffering or injury; (ii) 
any emotional injury; or (iii) any injury to his health or development.  
536 S.2135 [110th]: Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008. Sec. 2442: Recruitment or use of child soldiers: 
“(a) Offense- Whoever knowingly--(1) recruits, enlists, or conscripts a person to serve while such person is 
under 15 years of age in an armed force or group; or (2) uses a person under 15 years of age to participate 
actively in hostilities; knowing such person is under 15 years of age, shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(b).” 
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recruited or served as soldiers outside the US”.537 The law imposes penalties of up to 20 
years or life imprisonment, if the recruitment or use of children in hostilities results in the 
children’s death.  
Research have also shown that at least two other states, Tanzania and Papua New Guinea, 
are in the legislation process to criminalize the acts of child recruitment under their national 
laws.538 
 
Among the rest of the non-party States, which have neither made any attempt in their national 
legislations to criminalize child recruitment nor dissented from this rule, up to 25 have no 
record or shown any indication of using child soldiers in armed conflict.539 
 
III. The State Practice of “Specially Affected” States 
 
Furthermore, customs require a broader test on those “specially affected” States. In the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Case, the ICJ stressed the importance of the practice of “specifically 
affected” states, by stating that “a very widespread and representative participation in the 
convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States, whose interests were 
“specially affected”.540 
 
In this respect, the practice of those “specially affected” States is the final test of State 
practice concerning the crime of child recruitment as to whether it is “virtually uniform” to be 
recognized as customary international law. For that matter, the state practice of these 
countries is separately examined.  
                                                          
537 Africa News, Uganda: UPDF Has No Reason to Recruit Children, 21 October 2008. 
538 A “children’s law” to address the child recruitment has been proposed since 2005. Coalition to Stop the Use 
of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, 2005, p.332. See also BBC Monitoring Africa, Tanzanian 
Government to Amend Laws to Block Recruitment of Child Soldiers, 4 October 2008: “we consider these so 
that extraterritorial jurisdiction could be introduced for such crimes”. A submission of new child protection 
legislation was being drafted by the Minster. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers 
Global Report 2008, p.270. 
539 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Solder Global Report 2008, ibid.,Data Summary, pp.389-
407.  
540 ICJ, North Sea Continental cases, Judgment, supra note 384, para. 73.  
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The mostly affected states with regard to the use of child soldier are unquestionably those 
which have been or still are burdened under protracted armed conflicts and using child 
soldiers in hostilities. According to the Annual Report issued by the General Assembly on 21 
May 2010, there are 13 countries reported in violation of their obligation not to recruit or use 
child soldiers in armed conflict. These countries are Myanmar,541 Somalia, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, the DRC, Uganda, 542  Sudan, Columbia, Afghanistan, the CRA, Chad, Iraq and 
Nepal.543 However of these 13 countries, nearly half are known to have already provided for 
the crime of child recruitment in their penal codes. 
 
For example, Myanmar in its 1993 Child Law sets penalties for offences of “employing or 
permitting a child to perform work which is hazardous to the life of the child or which may 
cause disease to the child or which is harmful to the child’s moral character”.544 The word 
“work” provided in the text should unarguably cover tasks performed by child soldiers, such 
as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints, even sexual slavery. The violation of this 
provision may lead to an imprisonment of up to six months.  
 
The Columbia government in Article 14 of its Law no. 418, prohibits “the recruitment of 
children by armed forces or armed groups, with a penalty of up to five years’ 
imprisonment.”545 
 
                                                          
541 GA, A/Res/61/232 (2006). In this regard expressing deep concern at large-scale human rights violations in 
Myanmar, as cited in the report of the Special Rapporteur of 21 September 2006, including violence against 
unarmed civilians by the Myanmar military, unlawful killings, torture, rape, forced labour, the militarization of 
refugee camps, and the recruitment of child soldiers.  
542 See Africa News, Uganda: UPDF Has No Reason to Recruit Children, 21 October 2008:“According to 
Human Rights News published on the Human Rights Watch Website, Uganda is listed among the countries that 
have reportedly used child soldiers between 2004 and 2007.” 
543 General Assembly, A/64/742—S/2010/181, 21 May 2010, Annex I and II.  
544 The Child Law, The State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 9/)§; The 11thWaing Day of Loo 
Waso, 1355 M.E., 14th July 1993, Chapter XVII: Offences and Penalties, Article 65. ‘Whoever commits any of 
the following acts shall, on conviction be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months 
or with fine which may extend to kyats 1000 or with both: (a) employing a permitting a child to perform work 
which is hazardous to the life of the child or which may cause disease to the child or which is harmful to the 
child’s moral character’. 
545 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, supra note538, p.101. 
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A draft of a bill for the protection and promotion of children’s rights has been initiated by the 
government of Nepal. Among other provisions, the crime of recruitment of child soldiers 
appears high on the draft list.546 
 
Penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment are provided in Philippines for “the recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflicts” in Section 12 (D) of the Republic Act 9231.547 
 
On 9 April 2009, the Child Act for Southern Sudan was inaugurated by the president of the 
government of South Sudan, which criminalizes the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
under the age of 18 by armed forces or groups.548 
 
The government of Sri Lanka set 18 as the minimum age for recruitment, and in 2006 the 
Penal Code of Sri Lanka was amended, to include a criminal offence of “engaging/recruiting 
children for use in armed conflict” with a punishment up to 20 years of imprisonment.549 
 
                                                          
546 General Assembly, A/64/742—S/2010/181, 21 May 2010, p.11. 
547Republic Act No. 9231: An Act Providing For The Elimination Of The Worst Forms Of Child Labor And 
Affording Stronger Protection For The Working Child, Amending For This Purpose Republic Act No. 7610, As 
Amended, Otherwise Known as the "Special Protection Of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And 
Discrimination Act", Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child Labor. - No child shall be engaged 
in the worst forms of child labor. The phrase "worst forms of child labor" shall refer to any of the following:"(1) 
All forms of slavery, as defined under the "Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", or practices similar to 
slavery such as sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, 
including recruitment of children for use in armed conflict. " 
548 The Southern Sudan Gazette No.1 Volume I, Acts Supplement No. 1, 10th Feburary2009, Act 10 Child Act 
2008. Article 31.The Child and Armed Conflict: “(1) The minimum age for conscription or voluntary 
recruitment into armed forces or groups shall be eighteen years; (2) The Government shall ensure that no child 
shall be used or recruited to engage in any military or paramilitary activities, whether armed or un-armed, 
including, but not limited to work as sentries, informants, agents or spies, cooks, in transport, as laborers, for 
sexual purposes, or any other forms of work that do not serve the interests of the child.[…]” Article 32. 
Penalties for Recruitment of a Child into an Armed Force: “Any person involved in the recruitment of a child 
into an armed force or use of a child in any activity set forth above, commits an offence and shall upon 
conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or with a fine or with both” 
549 Article 7 (358A) (1) (d) of the Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Penal Code 
(Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 2006, ‘Any person who engages or recruits a child for use in armed conflict shall 
be guilty of an offence.’ 
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According to the Child Protection Code adopted on 29 January 2009, the government of the 
DRC criminalizes and prescribes penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the 
recruitment and use of children by armed forces, the police and armed groups.550 
 
In Uganda, trials have been conducted for prosecution of persons who used child soldiers in 
armed conflicts. Particularly in January 2004, President Museveni of Uganda referred the 
situation of Uganda to the ICC. The referral was an attempt by the Uganda government to 
stop the inhumane violations of the Rome Statute, including the practice of using children as 
soldiers in armed conflict, and to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, including the crime of 
child recruitment, and crimes against humanity with a severe sentence.551 
 
In the CAR, Afghanistan, and Chad, neither the constitutions nor the criminal codes 
specifically criminalize recruitment or use of children in armed conflict. All the three 
countries are, however, parties to the Rome Statute. As such they should take steps to reform 
their criminal codes to bring them in line with the provisions of the Rome Statute, which 
specifically and unequivocally hold individuals criminally liable for the recruitment of child 
soldiers. 
 
In general, there seems to be good practices among the “specially affected” States of 
implementing the Rome Statutes into their national laws, and there is a representative 
participation among “specially affected” States in the legislation campaign to criminalize the 
act of child recruitment. 
 
In sum, the 114 ratifications of the Rome Statute, the active participation of non-state parties 
in criminalizing the act of child recruitment, the criminal sanctions legislated by the 
“especially affected” States in their domestic laws, as well as judicial practice concerned with 
                                                          
550 The DRC, Child Protection Code, Law 09/001. General Assembly, A/64/742—S/2010/181, 21 May 2010, 
Article 53(c): “Les pires formees de travail des enfants sont interdites. Sont considérées comme pires formes de 
travail des enfants. […] (c) le recruitement forcé ou obligatoire des enfants en vue de leur utilisation dans les 
conflits armés.” 
551 Susan Tieferbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 Fordham Int´L. J. (2008):415,  
p. 511. 
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the crime of child recruitment, 552 all point to one conclusion that a legal conviction has 
formed that the use of child soldiers in armed conflict should incur individual criminal 
liability. 
 
IV. The Widespread and Systematic Use of Child Soldiers as Ground for an 
Argument of Inconsistent State Practice and Weak Opinio Juris 
 
The widespread and systematic use of child soldiers around the world today553 may still 
constitute grounds for counter-argument to the effect that there is still no of customary law 
with regard to the crime of child recruitment today. However, these violations cannot 
seriously challenge the existence of the crime of child recruitment under customary 
international law.  
 
It is true that the violations, at first sight, appear to undermine the evidence gathered above. 
However, it should be borne in mind that this contrary practice “does not prevent the 
formation of a rule of customary international law, as long as this contrary practice is 
condemned by other States or denied by the government itself”, according to the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ.554 
 
In fact, so far no governments or armed groups involved in using child soldiers have publicly 
declared that they have the rights to do so, or have absolved themselves from the obligation 
of not to recruit or use child soldiers. On the contrary, all of them have found it necessary to 
                                                          
552 A number of scholars take the view that a solid approach to determine states practice is to examine state 
practice of as many states as possible. See Ruth A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, p. 181.  
553 Though there is a decrease in the number of conflicts from 27 in 2004 to 17 by the end of 2007, the number 
of governments that deployed children in combat or other frontline duties in their armed forces has not 
significantly decreased since 2004. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global 
Report 2008, supra note 538, Introduction, pp.15-16. 
554 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & LoiuseDoswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: 
Rules, supra note 392, p. xxxvii.  
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urgently deny or at least make a gesture of denying that child recruitment had occurred.555 
The fact that no country has made a stand openly to oppose the criminalization or punishment 
of persons who recruit child soldiers, indeed, provides strong evidence of opinio juris.556 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the question whether the use of child soldiers has attained the status of 
customary international law has been examined. The primary interest in this question is 
regarding its status before the year 1996. Although the Norman Jurisdiction Decision found 
the recruitment of children under the age of 15 before 1996 was a crime under customary 
international law, this decision has been challenged by many scholars as lacking legal 
certainty on its verification.557 
 
Justice Robertson’s dissenting opinion, as one of these different voices, argues that this 
offence only became a crime at the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, since 
child enlistment can hardly be said to be crystallized as a crime in the very early stage when 
the Rome Statute was drafted.  
 
Despite of some debate over Justice Robertson’s dissenting opinion, his scathing criticism 
still manages to show the limits and errors inherent in the majority’s decision. Particularly, 
this dissenting opinion is a strong reminder that the fundamental principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege should be served at all times of the criminal process.    
 
After almost 15 years’ development since 1996, the criminalization of child recruitment, i.e. 
conscripting or enlisting of children under the age of 15 years or use them to participate 
actively in hostilities, has developed into a rule in customary international law today. 
Sufficient state practice of the State Parties, the non-party States to the Rome Statute, and 
                                                          
555 Sometimes the countries denied the child recruitment by asserting that these children were not military 
recruits. Stephen Kabera Karanja, Child Soldiers in Peace Agreements: The Peace and Justice Dilemma, Global 
Jurist Advances, supra note 270, p.2. 
556 Security Council, S/RES/1379, supra note 173, para. 8 (d). 
557 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, supra note 417, p.15. See also Thomas 
Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, supra note 84, p.125.  
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particularly the “specially effected” States, bears a strong indication of the existence of a 
customary international law on the criminalization of the child recruitment.  
 
Besides, domestic legislations and judicial practice regarding to criminalization of individuals 
who recruit and use child soldiers in hostilities additionally demonstrate a willingness of the 
international community to condemn the use of child soldiers and to take criminal sanctions 
to stop this atrocity.  
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Chapter 4: The Constituent Elements of the Crime of Child 
Recruitment under the Rome Statute 
 
As is well known, the elements of a crime play an important role in determining what must 
be proved by the prosecutor to constitute a crime. They are therefore essential in building the 
ground rules of a trial.  In the case of the crime of child recruitment, only when all the 
elements of this crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused can be found 
guilty of the crime of child recruitment; otherwise he or she is entitled to acquittal.  
 
The first attempt to define the characteristics of the crime of child recruitment came with the 
adoption of the Elements of the Crimes (hereinafter “EoC”), which was adopted by Assembly 
of States Parties (hereinafter “ASP”) at its first session in 2002.  Article 9 of the Rome 
Statute defines the role of the EoC for the ICC as it “shall assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8”.558 This article clearly indicates that the 
EoC itself has no binding status upon the judges and must be consistent with the Rome 
Statute.559 
 
Since no other international instruments or documents has provided the constituent elements 
of the crime of child recruitment as clearly and comprehensively as the EoC does, the EoC 
were also taken by other international criminal tribunals, such as the SCSL, as a basic 
applicable reference for the culpability of an accused in their judicial practice. Five elements, 
according to the EoC, are essential with respect to the crime of child recruitment: 
 
“(i)  The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons 
into the national armed forces [or group] or used one or more 
persons to participate actively in hostilities; 
                                                          
558 Rome Statute, Article 9 (1). 
559 Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special 
Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
(2003):341, p. 350. On the contrary, the EoC is given priority in the application of law under Article 21, which 
states that “the Court shall apply […] in the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence; […]”. The discussion of the controverting languages between Article 9 and Article 21 
will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
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(ii)  Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years; 
(iii) The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or 
persons were under the age of 15 years; 
(iv) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with 
an international armed conflict; and 
(v) The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the existence of an armed conflict.”560 
 
Although there is no question about its grave nature, child recruitment is a relatively new 
crime, compared with most of the other international crimes provided in the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, a close examination of the elements of this crime will be helpful in clarifying 
this comparatively new legal definition.  
 
Essentially, a number of questions concerning the elements of this crime will be looked into, 
including the definition of “conscript” and “enlistment”; to what extent an “active” 
participation is to be regarded sufficient to constitute the crime of child recruitment; and 
whether the person must know with certainty that the child recruited was under the age of 15 
years at the exact time when the recruitment was conducted. In the following a detailed 
examination will be given to the definition of each of these elements. 
 
A. General Requirements for War Crimes 
I. Armed Conflicts and the Crime of Child Recruitment 
 
Since the crime of child recruitment is provided under war crimes, it shares the basic 
characteristics of war crimes, i.e., the conduct “took place in the context of and was 
associated with an international or internal armed conflict”.  That is to say two contextual 
elements are specified for this crime: a) there must have been an armed conflict, whether 
internal or international; b) there must have been a nexus between the armed conflict and the 
alleged offense. 
                                                          
560  Elements of the Crime of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B), adoption on 9 
September 2002, entry into force 9 September 2002.pp. 33, 53. 
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1. The Existence of an Armed Conflict  
 
According to the EoC, an armed conflict must be known to exist with respect to the alleged 
act of child recruitment. As far as armed conflicts are concerned, the general practice of 
international humanitarian law distinguishes between an international and non-international 
armed conflict, which though does not seem at first glance to hold any importance with 
regard to the crime of child recruitment, as the Rome Statute criminalizes the act both in the 
contexts of international and non-international armed conflicts. Yet this well-seasoned 
distinction cannot be neglected in our discussion, for by international practice, it is the first 
requirement in establishing the existence of an armed conflict. This section therefore contains 
a discussion about the conditions under which an armed conflict is internationalized and the 
characteristics marking an internal armed conflict as opposed to internal disturbances. 
 
a. The Existence of an International Armed Conflict 
 
Article 2 of the Geneva Convections (hereinafter “CA2”) and Article 1 (4) of the AP I are 
generally recognized as two main international instruments regulating the conducts in 
international armed conflicts.  Traditionally, these laws have sought to regulate the conducts 
between States.  It is from this respect that the existence of an international armed conflict is 
said to be based on the ground, i.e., the factual use of force by one State against another.      
   
It must be pointed out however that Article 1 (4) of the AP I gives a much broader 
application scope than that provided by CA2, as the definition of an international armed 
conflict provided in AP I is not limited its ambit to the traditional inter-state confrontations, 
but expends the scope of the term “national” to include cases of “fighting against colonial 
domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-
determination”.561 
                                                          
561  Additional Protocol I, Article 1 (4): "Armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
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The inclusion of these parties within the scope of AP I suggests that the dichotomy between 
international and non-internal armed conflicts is neither absolute nor is principled. As the 
current tendency goes, a pure case of either an international or internal armed conflict is 
becoming more and more a rare occurrence.562 Usually what happens is one or more State 
intervenes into an internal conflict in support of the non-state actor by joining military 
operations or providing arms and funds. 563 The term “internalized armed conflict” was 
therefore introduced to describe those conflicts whereby the non-state actor in an internal 
armed conflict is acting on behalf of another state. The definition of internationalized armed 
conflict has been further refined by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in its landmark judgment of 
the Tadic case, which gave rise to the following consideration: 
 
“It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes 
place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations". 
562 The most transparent internationalized armed conflicts in recent history are: NATO’s intervention in the 
armed conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 
1999, for more details, see S. Alexeyevich Egorov, The Kosovo Crisis and the Law of Armed Conflicts, 
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 2000, p. 183. For more details on the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between the Bosnian, Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina after 19 May 
1992. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, ZdravkoMucic, Hazim Delic & Esad Landzo, (Celebici),IT-
96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, Judgment, 20 February 2001, paras. 33,48,50; See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, paras. 156,162. The intervention of Rwanda, Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and others, in support of opposing sides in the DRC civil war since August 1998, for more 
details, see Human Rights Watch, Eastern Congo Ravaged: Killing Civilians and Silencing Protest, Vol. 12, No. 
3 (A), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/drc/Drcoo5-01.htm#P68_1748, (last accessed on 8 June 2010). See also 
ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351. ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua case, Judgment, supra note 433, p. 14. 
563 The factual circumstances of internationalization are numerous and may often be very complex. As Schindler 
has put it, he term “internationalized armed conflict” may include, but not be limited to, “a) two States militarily 
intervene in an internal armed conflict through its troops in support of opposing sides; b) war between two 
internal factions both of which are backed by different States, and c) war involving a foreign intervention in 
support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government.” See D. Schindler, International 
Humanitarian Law and Internationalized Internal Armed Conflicts, 22 International Review of the Red Cross 
(1982): 255, p. 255.  
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armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may 
become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be 
international in character alongside an internal armed conflict), if 
(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or 
alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
conflict act on behalf of that other State.”564 
 
It can be seen from the above addressed, where armed groups are acting as the proxies of a 
foreign state will essentially be considered to be international armed conflicts, and thus the 
body of law governing conducts of parties to an international armed conflict will apply.565 
The following paragraphs therefore will address the two ‘ifs’ stated in the Tadic judgment, 
which set out the two criteria in determining the existence of an international armed conflict.  
 
a) Foreign Military Intervention 
 
i. The ICTY’s Jurisprudence on “Foreign Military Intervention” 
 
The first criterion the Appeals Chamber established in the Tadic case for the determination of 
an international armed conflict is whether another State intervenes in an internal armed 
conflict through its troops.566Yet regrettably, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case failed to 
use the opportunity to quantify the requisite extent of a military intervention which would be 
sufficient to internationalize a prima facie internal armed conflict.  The same issue resurfaced 
in the Rajic case. The Trial Chamber eventually supplied a criterion by requiring that the 
intervention must be “significant and continuous” to internationalize an internal armed 
conflict.567 However, it is still unclear to what extent a foreign military intervention, which 
indirectly affects an internal conflict, is sufficient to render that conflict international. The 
                                                          
564 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal Judgment, supra note 562, para. 84.  
565 Mark Freeman, International Law and Internal Armed Conflicts: Clarifying the Interplay between Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Protections, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, available at 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/152 (last accessed on 15 March 2012).  
566 ICTY, Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 562, para. 84. 
567  ICTY, Prosecutor. v. Ivica Rajic, IT-95-12-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 13 
September 1996, para.12 in James G. Stewart, Towards A Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 IRRC (2003): 313,p. 329.  
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following ICTY Jurisprudence seems to offer some help in clarifying this issue, as is apparent 
from the Naletilic Judgment: 
 
“There is no requirement to prove that [Army of the Republic of 
Croatia] troops were present in every single area where crimes were 
allegedly committed. On the contrary, the conflict must be looked 
upon as a whole, […]”568 
 
The same principle was apparently assumed in the Blaskic case, where “the presence of an 
estimated 3,000 to 5,000 regular Croatian Army personnel who were mostly stationed outside 
the area of conflict between the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia Herzegovina 
Army” was considered to be sufficient to render an internal armed conflict international.   
 
However, it is highly questionable whether the presence of a “minor foreign military army”, 
as seen in the Blaskic Judgment, is sufficient to prove the existence of a foreign military 
intervention, as required to renders an internal armed conflict international.   
 
ii. The ICJ’s Jurisprudence on “Foreign Military Intervention” in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda case and the ICC’s Jurisprudence in the Lubanga 
Case 
 
It is a well-known fact that Uganda and Rwanda supported the insurgent group in the DRC’s 
civil war during the period of 2002 and 2003. The issue at stake, however, is whether the 
degree of these involvements reached the extent to be regarded as sufficient to 
internationalize a prima facie internal armed conflict. 
 
As far as Uganda was concerned, the ICJ’ judgment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Uganda case (hereinafter “armed activities case”) dealt with the issue whether Uganda had 
intervened in the internal armed conflict of the DRC through Uganda Peoples’ Defense 
Forces (hereinafter “UPDF”), the finding of which was subsequently adopted by the Pre-trial 
Chamber in the Lubanga case to determine the nature of the armed conflict in the DRC. 
                                                          
568 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic & Vinko Martinovic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 
2003, para. 194. 
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According to the ICJ, to reach a conclusion as to whether a State whose army are present on 
the territory of another State can be regarded as an occupying Power, it must  
 
“Satisfy itself that the foreign armed forces in the occupied territory 
were not only stationed in particular locations, but they had 
substituted their own authority for that of the Congolese 
government.”569 
 
Unlike the findings of Blaskic and the Naletilic case, the ICJ emphasized that the presence of 
armed forces in the territory of a state is not to be regarded as sufficient to constitute military 
intervention of a foreign State, unless there is an added condition that the armed forces had 
established and exercised their own authority in the occupied territory.   
 
In the ruling, the ICJ further found that Uganda actually established its authority in the Ituri 
area, based on a range of clear evidence:  
 
“General Kazini, commander of the Ugandan forces in the DRC, 
created the new “province of Kibali-Ituri” in June 1999 and 
appointed MsAdèle Lotsove as its Governor”570 
[…]  
“Uganda also established and exercised authority in Ituri by actively 
extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to 
irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC”571 
 
Based on the criteria applied by the ICJ in the armed activities case and the evidence 
submitted before the confirmation hearing,572 the Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case 
found that the intervention of Uganda in the Ituri region through the UPDF army had turned 
the armed conflict into a conflict with an international character, starting from the date of 
July 2002 to the date of 2 June 2003 when the Ugandan army was the effective withdrawal of 
from Congolese territory”.573 
                                                          
569 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 213. 
570  ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 
Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Report 2005, para. 175.  
571 Ibid.,para. 345. 
572 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, paras. 218-219. 
573Ibid.,paras. 220, 406. 
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As far as Rwanda’s involvement was concerned, the evidence submitted to the Pre-trial 
Chamber showed that Rwanda had provided arms, advice, support and soldiers to UPC, 
however it was insufficient to enable the Pre-trial Chamber to establish substantial grounds 
for a finding that Rwanda had directly intervening in the armed conflict through its army or 
had exercised its own authority in Ituri.  Therefore, from 3 June 2003 to 13 August 2003, the 
conflict in the Ituri region was pronounced to be a conflict of non-international character. 
 
Thus, insofar as the indictment against Lubanga was concerned, the charges were listed in 
two parts divided chronologically as a matter of the nature of the conflict, that is, conscription, 
enlistment and use of children under the age of 15 in an international armed conflict from 
July 2002 to 2 June 2003, and conscription, enlistment, and use of children under the age of 
15 in a non-international armed conflict from 2 June 2003 to December 2003. 
 
b) Agents of a Foreign State 
 
The second criterion the Appeals Chamber set forth in the Tadic case for determining the 
existence of an international armed conflict concerns whether “some of the participants in the 
internal armed conflict act on behalf of another State.”574 In accordance with the spirit of 
international humanitarian law, accountability should be imposed not only on those having 
formal positions of authority, but also on those who wield de facto power.575 For the armed 
units fighting within a State however “belonging to another State”, it is necessary for the 
respondent state to wield some “degree of authority or control” over those armed units.576The 
core issue for this criterion is therefore to what extent the degree of control is sufficient 
enough to regard an armed group or an individual, who does not possess the formal status as 
agent or organ of the foreign Power, as acting on behalf of a foreign Power.577 
 
There are two necessary standards for use in the determination of “the degree of control” of a 
foreign State. One belongs to the body of law on state responsibility, while the other, adopted 
                                                          
574 ICTY, Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 562, para. 84. 
575 Ibid., paras. 92-96. 
576 Ibid, paras. 97.  
577 ICTY, TadicTrial Judgment, supra note 577, paras. 90, 103. 
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in the Tadic case, is derived from international humanitarian law. It seems that the judicial 
inconsistency regarding the two standards makes it a quite intricate issue in the determination 
of the degree of control.578  
 
i.  The “Effective Control” Test adopted by the ICJ 
 
The “effective control” standard specifying the circumstances under which a group or 
individual can be regarded as acting as a de facto state official was adopted by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, when answering the question whether the United States should bear the 
responsibility for the actions of the contras who wreaked havoc within Nicaragua.579 
 
The evidence submitted failed to satisfy the Court that the control of the United States over 
the contras was sufficient to be “an effective control”, therefore, United States was not 
considered responsible for violations of humanitarian law perpetrated by the contras,580 as 
started follows,  
 
“All the forms of United States participation […], and even the 
general control by the respondent state over a force with a high 
degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean […] that 
the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the 
applicant State.”581 
 
A corollary of the statement would follow that a control over a group or individual not 
characterized as agent of a foreign Power would not be deemed as sufficient, unless the said 
Power was found either directly involved in giving specific instructions, 582 or having 
                                                          
578 James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A 
Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, supra note 567, pp. 325, 326-328 and footnote 65.  
579 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 433,paras. 109-116.  
580 Ibid.,para. 5. 
581 Ibid.,para. 115.All the forms of United States participation includes the financing, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of 
the whole of its operation. 
582 Ibid.,paras. 75-80. 
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participated in the planning, direction, support and execution of specific operations.583 
 
ii.  The “Overall Control” Test adopted by the ICTY 
 
There is however obvious discrepancy between the standard in the determination of the 
“degree of control” established in the Tadic case and the one set down in the Nicaragua case. 
When determining the nature of the armed conflict between the Bosnian Serbs and the central 
authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICTY Appeals Chamber established a less 
rigorous584 but equally cogent585 “overall control” test, which is stated as follows: 
 
“This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each 
individual operation. […] The control required by international law 
may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed 
conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organizing, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, 
in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group.”586 
 
Based on the “overall control” standard, the Appeals Chamber found that after 19 May 1992 
the armed forces of the Republika Sraska were acting on behalf of Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, thereby rendering the internal armed conflict international.”587 
 
iii. The “Effective Control” Test vs. the “Overall Control” Test 
 
                                                          
583 Ibid.,paras. 86.  
584 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March 2000, para. 
145. The Appeals Chamber stated that “the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Judgment arrived at this test against 
the background of the ‘effective control’ test …, the Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to say that the 
standard established by the ‘overall control’ test is not as rigorous as those tests. ” 
585 Ibid.,para. 137. The Appeals Chamber stated that “the Appeals Chamber will follow its decision in the Tadic 
Judgment, since, after careful analysis, it is unable to find any cogent reason to depart from it.” 
586 Ibid., para. 137. 
587 ICTY, Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 562para. 162.  
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It is obvious that the “overall control” test sets a lower standard than the “effective control”, 
since the “overall control”, unlike the “effective control”, does not require issuing of specific 
instructions or undertaking direct involvement in specific operations. The reason for adopting 
a lower degree of control within the ICTY Jurisdiction lies in the fact that the “overall 
control” standard was used in the context of answering the question of the nature of an armed 
conflict, which is different from the question of state responsibility. Only when the nature of 
an armed conflict is established, can the question of individual criminal responsibility be 
raised.  
 
The ICJ was, in contrast, dealing with the question of state responsibility, which required 
higher standard to prove the effective participation of a state. The rationale behind of the 
“effective control” can also be seen as follows:  
 
“[…]to prevent States from escaping international responsibility by 
having private individuals carry out tasks that may not or should not 
be performed by State officials, or by claiming that individuals 
actually participating in governmental authority are not classified as 
State organs under national legislation and therefore do not engage 
State responsibility. In other words, States are not allowed on the 
one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to 
disassociate themselves from such conduct when these individuals 
breach international law.”588 
 
At this point, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case contested that “no reliance could 
however be placed on the Nicaragua test, because the issue of state responsibility raised was 
different from the issue of whether an individual was criminally liable depending on the 
nature of the armed conflict in which he [or she] had been involved”. 589  From this 
perspective, the degree of control required to internationalize an armed conflict is a question 
of “overall control”, which is a test applicable in determining whether an individual or an 
armed group, be it highly organized or unorganized, is acting as a de facto State organ.  
 
2. The Existence of an Internal Armed Conflict 
                                                          
588 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Judgment, supra note 433,para.117. 
589 Antonio Cassese, 4 The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia, Eur J Int Law (2007):649, p.656. 
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There are far fewer international rules governing internal armed conflicts than those 
governing international armed conflicts.590 The relevant international rules relating to internal 
armed conflicts can be found in provisions contained in CA3, the AP II, and the Rome 
Statute. The three instruments however laid down quite distinct definitions of an internal 
armed conflict.591 
 
a. The Substantive Rules regarding an Internal Armed Conflict 
 
The CA3 and AP II were the first rules containing principles applicable to an internal armed 
conflict.592 According to CA3, internal armed conflict is referred to as an “armed conflict not 
of an international character”.593 This definition however was met with strong objections 
from the delegations that feared that acts of banditry or unorganized and short-lived 
insurrections would all be brought under the cover of this general and vague expression.594 
Although such doubt of the delegates brought a number of restrictions to be discussed during 
the Diplomatic Conference, which however were left out in the final version.595 One of the 
main reasons for doing so was based on the consideration to apply the CA3 “as widely as 
possible”. From this perspective, those discussed conditions seemed to be “not 
indispensable”.596 
 
                                                          
590 Eva La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2008, Introduction. 
591 See AP II, supra note75, Article 1; Rome Statute, supra note47, Article 8 (2) (f). Also see James G. Stewart, 
Towards a Single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized 
armed conflict, supra note 567, pp. 10-11.  
592 ICRC, Commentary to Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, (hereinafter “ICRC Commentary on the GC I”), ICRC Geneva, 1951, p. 39. 
593 See CA3.  
594 Commentary to GC I, supra note 592, pp. 47-48.Commentary to AP II, supra note 80, paras.4448, 4459. 
595 First Working Party, First and Second Draft, Annexes A and B to the 7th Report of the Joint Committee, Final 
Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, Vol. II-B, p. 121. 
596 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 592, pp. 49,50.  
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AP II, on the other hand, endeavored to give a more precise definition of an internal armed 
conflict.597 Contrary to CA3’s cover-all definition, AP II sets a significantly higher threshold 
for its own application, limiting its scope to: 
 
“all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(…) (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed 
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations 
and to implement this Protocol.”598 
 
Apparently, the violence is required to be sustained at certain intensity to qualify as an 
internal armed conflict.599 As to the criteria of the degree of violence, some restrictions on the 
insurgent parties were laid down: an armed group must be organized under a responsible 
command, must have control over part of the territory to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations, and must have the ability of implementing the Protocol.600 
 
In Paragraph 2, the AP II expressly excludes “situations of internal disturbances and tensions 
from its application.601 The term “internal tensions and disturbances” is referred to situations 
that involve the use of force and other repressive measures by a government to maintain or 
                                                          
597 AP II, supra note 75, Article 1, which states that “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, 
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol.” 
598 AP II, supra note 75, Article 1. See also James G. Stewart, Towards a Single definition of armed conflict in 
international humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict, supra note 567, p. 319. 
599 Commentary to AP II, supra note 80, paras.4449-4450, 4453.4457; O.R. VIII, p. 203, CDDH/I/SR. 22, para. 
11.  
600 ICRC Commentary to the AP II, supra note 80, paras. 4453- 4470.  
601 AP II, supra note 75, Article 1 (2).  
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restore public order or public safety. Its constitution is of no relevance “whether State 
repression is involved or not, whether the disturbances are lasting, or whether only a part or 
all of the national territory is affected”.602 Accordingly, these situations are fall short of an 
armed conflict. The AP II also illustrated in its paragraph 2 a list of examples of internal 
tensions and disturbances, which include “riots, such as demonstrations without a concerted 
plan from the outset; isolated and sporadic acts of violence, as opposed to military operations 
carried out by armed forces or armed groups; and other acts of a similar nature, including, in 
particular, large scale arrests of people for their activities or opinions”.603 
 
The Rome Statute subsequently adopted a definition to include all conflicts that  
 
“take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed 
conflict between governmental authorities and organised armed 
groups or between such groups”.604 
 
Similar to Article 1 of the AP II, the Rome Statute in its Article 8 (2) (d) and (f) emphasize 
that the Statute does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature”.605 Two essential 
characteristics of an internal armed conflict are identified: “the intensity of the armed conflict” 
and “the organisation of the parties”,606 which are similar to but more general than the criteria 
provided in Article 1 of the AP II. The following section will discuss the two essential 
standards provided in the Rome Statue.  
 
b. The Judicial Practice of Determining an Existence of an Internal Armed 
Conflict 
                                                          
602 ICRC, ICRC action in connection with internal disturbances, International Review of the Red Cross, No 294, 
1993, para. 2.  
603 ICRC Commentary on APII, supra note 80, para. 4474.  
604 Rome Statute, Article 2 (b) (f). 
605 Rome Statute, Article 8 (2) (f) which states that “Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an 
international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence, or other acts of a similar nature. It apples to armed conflicts that take 
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups.”  
606 ICTY, Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 414, para. 70.  
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The efforts by international tribunals to find appropriate criteria for the determination of the 
existence of an internal armed conflict have helped to establish the distinction between an 
internal armed conflict and internal disturbances.607 The two criteria provided in the Rome 
Statute, i.e., (a) the intensity of the conflict, and (b) the organization of the parties have 
become the criteria generally relied upon in determining an internal armed conflict.608 
 
a) The Intensity of the Conflict 
 
The Lubanga case started with the Pre-trial Chamber’s analysis on whether the situation in 
the DRC constituted a non-international armed conflict within the definition set forth in 
Article 8 (2) (d) of the Rome Statute. To answer this question, the Pre-Trial Chamber first 
examined whether a conflict of a certain degree of intensity existed. “The large number of 
armed attacks carried out during the period”,609 “the large numbers of victims involved”,610 
as well as “the involvement of the Security Council”,611 were all taken as factors indicative of 
a high degree of intensity.  
 
Other factors taken into account in the determination of the intensity of a conflict include “the 
increase in the number of the government forces”, “the distribution of weapons among both 
parties to the conflict”, 612  and “the extent of the displacement of people caused by the 
conflict”.613 
 
b) The Organization of the Parties 
 
                                                          
607 The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case has found that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State”. See ibid., para. 70.  
608 ICTY, Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 577, para. 562.  
609 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,para. 235 and fn. 303. 
610 Ibid.,para. 235 and fn. 304. 
611 Ibid.,,para. 235 and fn. 305. 
612 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic & EsadLandzo, (Celebici), IT-96-21-T, 
Trial Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 1998,para. 188.  
613 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 30 
November 2005, para. 90.  
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As far as the organizational degree is concerned, factors taken into account include the 
existence of headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the ability to procure, transport 
and distribute arms,614 which are all considered to be helpful in distinguishing an organized 
party from disorganized and short-lived ones. The evidence of the installation of own 
administrative officials, the establishment of an organized military structure, and the ability 
to carry out large-scale military operations for a prolonged period of time,615 gave the Pre-
trial Chamber in the Lubanga case enough ground to believe that the UPC/FPLC, PUSIC and 
FNI were organized to such a degree as to satisfy the criteria of being organized armed 
groups.616 
 
Another aspect of the organizational degree concerns the question of whether the parties have 
the ability to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. As stipulated in the AP II, 
this criterion should normally be taken into consideration when determining the existence of 
an internal armed conflict. The ICC in the Lubanga case however no longer required this 
criterion in determining whether a party to the conflict had control over part of the territory. 
A commentary on the Rome Statute supported the view reflected in the Lubagba case that,  
 
“Additional factors, such as the involvement of government forces on 
one side or the exercise of territorial control by the rebel forces, are 
not indispensable for the determination of an armed conflict”.617 
 
The analysis of the degree of organization obtained, gave sufficient evidence for the three 
armed groups, i.e., the National Integrationist Front (hereinafter “FNI”), Party for the 
Safeguarding of the Congo (hereinafter “PUSIC”) and the Union of Congolese Patriots/the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo (hereinafter “UPC/FPLC”) to qualify as 
organized armed groups within the meaning of article 8(2) (f) of the Rome Statute.618 
                                                          
614 Ibid., paras.80, 89. 
615 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,paras. 236-237.See 
also Koen Vlassenroot, Armed Group and Military in Eastern People’s Republic of Congo, Lectures Series on 
African Security, 2008, p.5. 
616 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,paras. 236-237. 
617 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sources and Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp, 386-387.  
618 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 237. 
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3. The Phrase “National Armed Force” vs. “Armed Force or Group” 
 
With regard to the crime of child recruitment, there is still another issue to be discussed. 
Comparing the language employed in Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) of the Rome Statute with that in 
Article 8 (2) (e) (vii), the wording “armed groups” can be seen clearly missing in Article 8(2) 
(b) (xxvi). Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi), governing the crime of child recruitment committed in the 
context of international armed conflict, is phrased thus:  
 
“conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
national armed forces”  
 
Whereas Article 8(2) (e) (vii), dealing with the crime of child recruitment in the context of 
non-international armed conflict, reads as follows:  
 
“conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into 
armed forces or groups”.  
 
The question therefore is whether the omission of the phrase “armed group” in Article 8 (2) 
(b) (xxvi) would leave a gap In the prosecution of persons, who are members of “armed 
groups”, and who have recruited children or used them to participate actively in an 
international armed conflict.  
 
This issue received careful examination in the Lubanga case. As stated above, the original 
internal armed conflict between the DRC government and dissident armed groups had 
changed into an international armed conflict between July 2002 and 2 June 2003, soon after 
direct involvement of the governmental armed forces of Uganda.  The whole armed conflict 
from July 2002 to 2 June 2003 falls within the scope of Article 8(2) (b) (xxvi), which 
however only criminalizes the recruitment of children into national armed forces. 
 
The Chamber subsequently found that the adjective “national” does not necessarily limit the 
scope of the application of this provision merely to governmental armed forces, but should be 
extended to cover armed groups substantially linked to a foreign State.619In reaching this 
                                                          
619 Ibid., paras.275, 282. 
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conclusion, the Pre-trial Chamber first referred to Article 43 of the AP I 620 and the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY in the Tadic case, both of which apply the term “national” to cases 
beyond the traditional term of “governmental”.621 
 
The Chamber also produced an argument that interpreting the term “national” as meaning 
“governmental” would contravene the very purpose of the Rome Statute, which is to make 
sure that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished”.622 
 
In consequence, the charge of Lubanga for conscripting, enlisting children into the FPLC, 
which was an armed group, between July 2002 and June 2003 in an international armed 
conflict was found to fall within the jurisdiction of ICC.  
 
II. The Nexus between the Armed Conflict and the Alleged Offense 
 
A link with an armed conflict is required by the EoC as a contextual element to the crime of 
child recruitment, as reflected in the provision that “the conduct took place in the context of 
and was associated with an armed conflict”.623 
 
The expressions “in the context of” and “was associated with” are normally used alternatively, 
not cumulatively.624 However in the provision the drafters used the phrase “in the context of” 
                                                          
620  The Commentary on Article 43 of API defines what constitutes the “armed forces of a Party” in an 
international armed conflict. According to the Commentary, armed forces under the API is not limited to 
governmental forces, however, liberation movements fighting against colonial domination, resistance 
movements, those fighting of “self-determination” or “national liberation” constitute armed forces, as long as 
they represents certain characteristics of a government. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, paras.272-273.  
621 When determining the scope of “protected person” under the Geneva Convention, the term “national” refers 
not only to nationality, but also to the nationals belonging to the opposing party in an armed conflict. ICC, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,paras. 277-280. 
622 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,paras. 281, 284. 
623 EOC, supra note 560, pp. 33, 53. 
624 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 234, p. 120.  
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to refer to “the existence of an armed conflict in the country or area, where the conduct was 
committed”, while the expression “was associated with” was used to stress “the necessary 
nexus between the armed conflict and the conduct of the perpetrator”.625 
 
In other words, this is to say that the said offence is not required to occur at the exact time 
and place where fighting was actually taking place, in case the alleged offence was either 
temporally or geographically removed from the actual fighting. According to the 
Jurisprudence of the ICTY, the “nexus” would be established if “the offences were closely 
related to the armed conflict as a whole”. 626It is sufficient to establish the nexus if the 
perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict.627 That is to say, 
it is possible for the armed conflict not to be causally linked to the alleged crimes. It would be 
sufficient, as long as it had played a substantial role in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the 
crimes, in his decision to commit them, in the manner in which they were committed or for 
the purpose for which they were committed.628 
 
In the Lubanga case for example, the Pre-trial Chamber found that there was a sufficiently 
clear nexus between Lubanga’s alleged criminal conduct of recruiting and using child 
soldiers and the armed conflict in Ituri, such that he was unquestionably implicated in the 
crime of child recruitment. 629 According to the Pre-trial Chamber, there was substantial 
evidence showing that children under the age of 15 were enlisted and conscripted to undergo 
a short term of military training where they were made to learn the use of weapons.630The 
corroborating evidence was contained in the video of Lubanga’s visit to the training camp for 
combat preparation.631The existence of the armed conflict in the DRC formed the background, 
                                                          
625 Eva La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, supra note 590, pp. 112-113. See also Roy S. Lee, 
The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 234, p. 
121.  
626ICTY, TadicTrial Judgment, supra note 517, para. 573.  
627Ibid. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Trial Judgment, July 31, 2003, para. 569. 
628ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 22 January 2004, 
para.735.ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vukovic, IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal 
Chamber, Judgment, 12June2002, para. 58. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment, 
29 November 2002, para. 25. ICTY, Stakic Trial Judgment, supra note 627, para. 569. 
629 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351,paras. 286-293. 
630 Ibid., para. 289. 
631 Ibid., para. 291. 
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or the requisite precondition, of Lubanga’s plan and commission of recruiting children into 
the armed group or using them to take active part in hostilities. 
 
B.  Specific Elements for the Crime of Child Recruitment 
 
As a general rule, there are two ingredients that must be established for a criminal charge to 
stand: the actus reus and mens rea. It is a well-known rule of criminal law not to seek to 
punish persons for their evil thoughts or intentions, if the accused has not caused or 
committed the actus reus.632 Hence, as one of the most significant elements to distinguish a 
crime from others, what constitutes the actus reus will be the first focus of our discussion in 
this chapter. 
 
I. The Actus Reus of the Crime of Child Recruitment 
 
The actus reus of the crime of child recruitment is provided in the EoC as “the perpetrator 
conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces [or group] or used 
one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities”.  
 
1. Two Categories of Actus Reus: Recruitment and Use 
 
Rather than using the single term “recruitment” with respect to the prohibition against child 
soldering,633 two new concepts “conscript” and “enlisting” came into being with the Rome 
Statue. By presenting the terms “conscript” and “enlist” as alternatives, the Rome Statute 
                                                          
632 R. v. Deller, 36 Crim. App. R. 184, 1952.Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, Volume III, New York, McClure, 
Phillips and Co., 1904, p.398. See also Peter W. Low, John Calvin Jeffries & Richard J. Bonnie, Criminal Law: 
Cases and Materials, Foundation Press, 1986, p. 363.  
633 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 244: “The term 
used in this article [article 8] – recruitment – differs from those used in the Rome Statute – enlisting and 
conscripting.” See also SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 191: “The Chamber notes that 
‘recruitment’ is the subject of the proscription under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional 
Protocols of 1977 rather than ‘enlistment’, ‘conscription’, or ‘use’ of child soldiers, the terms used in the 
Statute.”  
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clearly subscribes to two different forms of recruitment. 634Additionally, by adopting the 
disjunctive “or” to link the “conscript”, “enlist” and “use”, the Rome Statute endows 
“conscription”, “enlistment” and “use” with equal status in the constitution of the actus reus 
of this crime.635 
 
All three acts, that is, “conscription”, “enlistment” and “the use of children to participate 
actively in hostilities” have been criminalized,636 no matter  whether they are committed in 
the context of an international or a non-international armed conflict. Hence, if a person 
recruited children, regardless of whether by force or with consent, or used them to take active 
part in hostilities, the actus reus would be satisfied. The three facets stand independent but 
correlative. This has been confirmed in the jurisprudence of SCSL and ICC,637 where a three-
tiered list of charges, for example, in the Lubanga arrest warrant, was brought up by the 
prosecution: “a) conscripting children into armed groups; b) enlisting children into armed 
groups; and c) using children to participate actively in hostilities”.638 
 
2. Two Forms of Recruitment: “Conscription” and “Enlistment”  
 
a. The Definition of “Conscription” in the Context of Child Recruitment 
 
As discussed above, the act of “recruitment” can take either of the two forms defined in the 
Rome Statute and the SCSL Statute: “conscription” or “enlistment”. According to its literal 
definition, the term “conscription” refers to “the compulsory enrolment into military 
                                                          
634 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 244: “The 
Rome Statute prefers the terms ‘conscripting’ and ‘enlisting’ to ‘recruitment’.” 
635 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Vol. VI.  
636 The three forms of act correspond roughly to the headings of forcible recruitment, voluntary enlistment and 
use children to take active part in hostilities. 
637SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para.140. See also SCSL, Brima, Trial Judgment, supra note 
272, para. 738. 
638  ICC, Prosecution v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Thomas 
Lubanga. See also ICC, Prosecution v. Lubanga, Statement of Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda Press 
Briefing 8 November 2006, The Charges, Office of the Prosecutor, (hereinafter ‘Statement of Press Briefing’), p. 
4. 
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service”.639 So, in the context of child recruitment, it is safe to conclude that the notion of 
“conscription” is defined in terms of forcible recruitment or an exertion of force upon 
children in order to gain control over them for specific use within an armed force or group. 
The term “conscription” in the judgment in the Brima case by the Trial Chamber II of the 
SCSL is defined to imply “compulsion” and encompassing acts “through the force of law”,640 
which is “not necessarily restricted to direct acts of physical force and also include threats or 
intimidation”.641 This view was confirmed in both the Sesay case642 before the SCSL and the 
Lubanga case before the ICC.643 
 
Abduction is one of the means of conscription most often employed by both government 
armed forces and armed opposition groups.644 An act termed “press-ganging” was frequently 
undertaken by armed groups, which would abduct all the children in sight throughout a 
village.645 The entire conflict context in Sierra Leone was as a whole coercive.646 Children 
are abducted at gunpoint from buses, cars, refugee camps, churches, schools, streets, or even 
from their homes.647 Afterwards, boys are usually used in hostilities to commit atrocities, 
while girls are frequently forced to perform sexual tasks.648 
 
Abduction of children by an armed force or group for the purpose of using them to participate 
actively in hostilities is only one facet of conscription, forced military training may also 
                                                          
639 The Oxford English Dictionary, supra note116, vol. II, p.848. .  
640 SCSL, BrimaTrial Judgment,supra note 272, para. 734. 
641 Discussion Paper Proposed by the Co-coordinator, Suggested Comments Relating to the Crime of Genocide, 
UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.3.  
642 SCSL, Sesay Trail Judgment, supra note 297, para. 186. 
643 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 247.  
644 SCSL, BrimaTrial Judgment, supra note 272, para. 734. See also SCSL, Sesay Trail Judgment, supra note 
297,paras. 1697, 1700. 
645 Raymond J. Toney & Shazia N. Anwar, International Human Rights Law and Military Personnel: A Look 
behind the Barrack Walls, 14 AM.U.int’l.L REV.(1998):519, p. 522.  
646 Sonja C. Grover, Prosecuting International Crimes and Human Rights Abuses Committed Against Children: 
Leading International Court Cases, Springer, 2009, p. 74.   
647 Amy B. Abbott, Child Soldiers-The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 
(2000):499, p. 516.  
648 Stephanie H. Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of Sierra Leone find Justice for 
Its Children?, 18 AM.U.INT’L.L.REV (2002) :506, p. 540.  
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suffice for constitution of conscription of children in armed forces or groups, in case such 
forcible military training amounts to a conduct with the purpose of compelling a person to 
join an armed force or group.649 
 
b. The Definition of “Enlistment” in the Context of Child Recruitment 
 
If it is relatively uncontroversial that conscription is a concept of forcible recruitment, the 
definition of “enlistment” has in contrast remained open to different interpretations. The 
literary definition of the term “enlistment” refers to an “act of recording or registering”650and 
“accepting and enrolling volunteers”.651 This is what leads some to conclude that enlistment 
should be categorized as “a voluntary act”.652 However, this is not a conclusion that comes 
unchallenged. There are others who take the view that the notion comprises both the act of 
voluntary enrolment and the act of conscription.653 
 
This controversy regarding the definitions of “enlistment” is very much in evidence in the 
judicial practices before the international criminal courts. For example, Trial Chamber I of 
the SCLS in the Brima case upheld the distinction between “conscription” and “enlistment” 
with the observation that “as the forms of recruitment, conscription is forcible recruitment, 
whereas enlistment is voluntary recruitment”. 654 The same view was expressed by Trial 
Chamber III in the Sesay trial of the SCSL and by the Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC in the 
Lubanga case.655 However, Trail Chamber I of the SCSL in the Norman case seemed to be in 
favor of a broader interpretation.  
                                                          
649 SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, para. 1695. 
650 The Oxford English Dictionary, supra note116, Vol. III, p. 191. 
651 SCSL, BrimaTrial Judgment, supra note 272, para. 735. SCSL, SesayTrial Judgment,supra note 297, para. 
185. ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 247.  
652 SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272, para. 735.  
653 Knut Dörman, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources 
and Commentary, supra note 508, p. 377.  
654 SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272. 
655 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on Confirmation of the Charges, supra note351, para. 246-247. See 
also SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, paras. 185. The Pre-trial Chamber in Lubanga case made the 
same interpretation as that in Brima case, that enlistment was explained as the act of “accepting and enrolling 
individuals when they volunteer to join an armed force or group.” 
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What happened in the Norman case was that “conscription of child soldiers” was not among 
the charges brought up by the Prosecution, who mentioned only “initiation or enlistment [of] 
children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or group, and in addition, or in the 
alternative, use them to participate actively in hostilities”.656 Trial Chamber I in its judgment, 
however, maintained that the term “enlistment” was consistent with both the sense of 
voluntary enrollment and that of forcible recruitment such that: 
 
“the term “enlistment” could encompass both voluntary enlistment 
and forced enlistment into armed forces or group […]. For the 
purpose of the Indictment, where “enlistment” alone is alleged, the 
Accused is put on notice that both voluntary and forced enlistment 
are charged.”657 
 
With such a broad interpretation given to the term “enlistment”, a discussion is 
understandably required here. The partial judgment cited above probably raise more 
questions than answers. Apart from others, should the terms of “enlistment” be regarded as 
including both “voluntary and forcible recruitment”, particularly after the accused was 
informed of the charges brought against him or her? 
 
It should be pointed out that in the Norman case the failure of the Prosecutor to bring the 
charge of “conscription” in the first place was the reason why the Trial Chamber adopted the 
broad interpretation in the judgment. This, however, raises a concern as to whether such an 
interpretation broadened the meaning of the original charge and whether the accused should 
be judicially assumed to possess the understanding of the term “enlistment” in the way as the 
Chamber defined it. 
 
If the common understanding of the term “enlistment” takes it to be “voluntary act”, the 
explanation of the term “enlistment” by the Chamber would then amount to an amendment of 
the charge,658 thus giving rise to a doubt as to whether the accused had been given sufficient 
                                                          
656 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 29. 
657 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78 ,para. 192. 
658 In the Lubanga trial, the trial judges Elizabeth Odio Benito and Rene Blattman though agreed that new 
charges could be added but emphasized that “they could only be based on fresh evidence, not only on existing 
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notice and understanding of the alleged charge. There is, therefore, no legal ground to adhere 
to the definition given by Trial Chamber I in the Norman case to the term “enlistment” and 
disregard the interest of the defenses for a fair trial in the criminal trial procedure. 
 
As far as the provision of child recruitment under the Rome Statute is concerned, 
“enlistment” is never given an all-embracing reading. The Rome Statute employs the 
disjunctive “or” to link the two concepts: “conscription”, an uncontroversial concept of 
forcible recruitment, and the seemingly controversy-riddled “enlistment”. In this way, it 
signals its endorsement of a narrow definition for the term “enlistment”, or “voluntary 
recruitment” in the context of the crime of child recruitment. 
 
So it is proposed here that the term “enlistment” should be taken to mean “voluntary 
recruitment” in contrast corresponding to “forceful recruitment” as defined of its counterpart 
“conscription”, in the context of child recruitment. 
 
c. De Jure and De Facto Recruitment 
 
Next comes the issue to what extent an act of “recruitment of children into armed forces or 
groups” is deemed sufficient to constitute the crime of child recruitment.  
 
a) De Jure Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces or Groups 
 
A de Jure recruitment is easily recognizable by its formality, which as a rule involves the 
military administrative process for registration and enrolling children into an armed force or 
group, wherein such act in itself is sufficient to constitute the crime, no matter whether the 
child is eventually used to take part in hostilities after the recruitment or not. The rationale 
lies in the fact that once children are formally recruited into armies, no matter what their 
performances are, they lose their civilian status.659 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
facts”. The presiding judge Adrian Fulford stated that “Regulation 55 could not be used to add, substitute, or 
amend the charges, since the prosecutor must request those changes before the trial begins.”  
659 “Armed groups that are not part of the armed forces need to follow four conditions: Commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance. Article 44(3) of 
the AP I sets an exception to this rule when the nature of the hostilities prevents the combatant from 
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b) De Facto Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces or Groups 
 
However, in most of the times, the recruitment does not show a formal process of military 
registration, but consists of a single informal act, such as putting on uniforms, being under 
military discipline, bearing arms or wearing any of the traditional means of marking as a 
soldier.660 The recruitment may also take the form of a process involving several acts, such 
as, abducting a child and giving him or her a gun, or a protracted process spanning a long 
period consisting of providing children with religious initiation and afterwards sending them 
to military camps. These acts, lacking the formality of military registration, may not 
constitute the de jure recruitment, but can satisfy the requirement of a de facto recruitment.661 
 
What usually happens is that after the child was abducted, captured, or initiated, the child will 
be assigned to military training camps, or used to take part in hostilities without appropriate 
military registration. To all purpose and intent, children in these situations are actually 
serving members of armed forces or groups.662As noted by the Majority of the Appeals 
Chamber in the Norman case, recruitment “cannot narrowly be defined as a formal process”, 
and in a broad sense it includes “any conduct accepting the child as a part of the militia”.663 
 
3. The Use of Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinguishing himself or herself. There is an ongoing legal debate about the scope of a distinctive sign which 
combatants of non-regular armed forces need to wear; carrying arms openly; and conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war”. See ICRC, Distinction between Combatants and Civilians, 
available at http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=3920 (last accessed on 27 April 2010).  
660 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results, 
Springer, 1999,p.118. 
661 SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Honourable Justice Renate Winter, supra 
note 267, para.12. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Since the Appeals Chamber in the Norman stated that “enlistment” in the Norman case denotes to both 
conscription and enlistment, therefore, the term “enlistment” used by the CDF actually means recruitment, 
including both forcible recruitment and voluntary enrolment. SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, supra note 267, 
para. 144. 
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Besides the above mentioned conscription and enlistment, a discussion of the crime cannot 
go without mentioning another offence: the use of children to participate actively in 
hostilities.    
 
International instruments, however, seem to have gone different ways for the definition of the 
“use” of children in hostilities. Article 77 of the AP I and Article 38 of the CRC favor a 
narrow interpretation, explicitly restricting the use of children to take part in hostilities as 
“taking direct part in hostilities”.664 The Commentary on the AP I on the other hand, cited 
examples (of such direct participation) includes “in particular, gathering and transmission of 
military information, transportation of arms and munitions, provision of supplies etc”.665The 
Statute of the SCSL and the Rome Statute, adopted a closely related wording “active 
participation” in their provisions regarding child recruitment, in contrast to the term “direct 
participation” favored by the AP I and CRC.  
 
In the following, the difference between the words “active”, “direct” and “inactive” will be 
examined, with the aim of opening up a discussion: to what extent a “use” can be said to 
satisfy an “active” requirement as provided by the SCSL Statute and the Rome Statute for 
protection of children from being used in hostilities. 
 
a. The Term of “Active” vs. “Direct” 
 
It has sometimes been suggested that the adoption of the term “active” was the result of 
careful deliberation.666 Indeed, a decision was made during the drafting of the Rome Statute 
                                                          
664AP I, supra note 66, Article 77. CRC, supra note 92, Article 38.  
665ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocol I, supra note 69, para. 3187: “Examples would include, in 
particular, gathering and transmission of military information, transportation of arms and munitions, provision 
of supplies etc. The intention of the drafters of the article was clearly to keep children under fifteen outside 
armed conflict, and consequently they should not be required to perform such services; if it does happen that 
children under fifteen spontaneously or on request perform such acts, precautions should at least be taken; for 
example, in the case of capture by the enemy, they should not be considered as spies, saboteurs or illegal 
combatants and treated as such. In addition, appropriate instruction is again essential.” 
666 John T. Holmes, The Protection of Children’s Rights in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 
the book: Mauro Politi & GivsepeNesi, The Rome Statute of the ICC: A challenge to Impunity, Ashgate, 1998, 
p. 121.  
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to move away from the term “direct”, for the reason of the increased use of civilians in 
supporting roles in the military.667 The adoption of “active” was an attempt to avoid an 
interpretation in a very narrow sense, whereas the new term was believed possible to 
encompass a broader range of activities. “Active” thus came into circulation and was 
frequently adopted in the frame of the crime of child recruitment. 
 
Unfortunately this change in language failed to bring the desired effect. The two words are 
frequently assumed to be interchangeable in common usage, as obvious from the conclusion 
of the ICTR in the Akayesu case, that “the definition of the term ‘take active part in 
hostilities’ and the term ‘take direct part in hostilities’ are similar”.668 In the English texts of 
the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocols, the two words "active" and "direct" 
were used interchangeably for the notion of direct participation in hostilities. The consistent 
use of the phrase "participant directement" in the equally authentic French texts demonstrates 
that the terms "direct" and "active" refer to the same quality and degree of individual 
participation in hostilities.669 
 
Furthermore, though, it appears at first sight that the PrepCom had drawn a distinction 
between the terms “active” and “direct” in the context of the child recruitment, what actually 
transpired was that a distinction was drawn between “combat” and “military activities linked 
to combat”, not between “active” and “direct” participation. 670 This can be seen in the 
explanatory footnote of the PrepCom Draft Statute providing guidance for the interpretation 
the scope of “the use of children in hostilities”,671 which reads:  
 
“The words “using” and “participation” have been adopted in order 
to cover both direct participation in combat and also active 
participation in military activities linked to combat such as scouting, 
spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at 
                                                          
667 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 234, p. 206. 
668 ICTR, Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 420, para. 629.  
669  ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 872, 31 December 2008, p. 1035. 
670 Ibid, footnote 84. 
671 Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, supra note 660, p. 118.  
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military checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated 
to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of 
domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation. However, use 
of children in a direct support function such as acting as bearers to 
take supplies to the front line, or activities at the front line itself, 
would be included within the terminology.”672 
 
In this footnote, the phrase “participate actively in hostilities” follows closely in spirit what is 
offered in the AP I Commentary on the term of “take direct part in hostilities”, containing 
both direct participation in combat and also certain military activities linked to combat.  
 
b. The Definition of “Active” Participation vs. “Inactive” Participation 
 
As stated above, “active participation” is, according to the Rome Statute, not limited to 
fighting in the frontline, but also covers military activities linked to the combat, including 
activities such as conveying arms and equipment to regular troops, armed patrol, spying and 
sabotage. The Zutphen draft in its footnote took pains to illustrate with examples of what 
kinds of acts are satisfied as an “active” use.673 However the wide range of tasks and roles 
performed by children in armed conflicts means that exhaustive enumeration is out of the 
question. There thus remain many areas riddled with ambiguity and open to interpretations. 
Fortunately, there are two mutually complementary and supportive criteria which can be used 
to determine whether the participation is “active” or not. The first standard is found in the 
Tadic case with a clear definition of “take active part (active participation)”, as referring to 
                                                          
672 PrepCom Draft Statute, p. 21.  
673 "The words 'using' and 'participate' have been adopted in order to cover both direct participation in combat 
and also active participation in military activities linked to combat such as scouting, spying, sabotage and the 
use of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to 
the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an officer's married 
accommodation. However, use of children in a direct support function such as acting as porters to take supplies 
to the front line, or activities at the front line itself would be included within the terminology." See Report of the 
Inter-sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, article 20[E], at 23 n.12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 
(1998). 
 167 
 
“acts of war that by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or 
equipment of the enemy armed forces”.674 
 
According to the ICRC, “active participation” means a causal connection between the act of 
participation and its consequence on the enemy.675 Some factors in determining the “causal 
connection” are taken into consideration by the Trial Chamber in the Sesay case, which 
included, but are not limited to: i) conducting a direct support to the war efforts and to the 
military operation of the armed force or group, such as using children as spies; 676  ii) 
performing tasks that are military in nature or by the purpose are intended to cause damage or 
actual harm to the adversary party, such as using children to perpetrate crimes against 
civilians;677 iii) undertaking tasks that are related to or close to military objectives, such as 
armed patrol.678 
 
The second standard stated in the Lubanga case requires that the “military activities” should 
by nature involve high likelihood of exposing children to military danger and realistic fear. 
For example, children who play a role in guarding military objects or transporting arms and 
munitions to the frontline should be regarded as “taking active part in hostilities”, since they 
                                                          
674 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber, Judgments and 
Sentence, 6 December 1999, para.100. ICTY, Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra note 562, para. 616. ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 15 May 2003, paras. 
363-366. The Trial Chamber further takes note of the Commentaries, where it is stated that “to restrict the 
concept of participating directly in hostilities to combat and to active military operations would be too narrow, 
while extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad”. See also Prosecutor v. Alferd Musema, ICTR-
96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, Appeals Chamber, para. 279; ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I, 
supra note 69, paras.1944, 1679, 4788.The quoted sentence continues: “as in modern warfare the whole 
population participates in the war effort to some extent, albeit indirectly,” and that “active participation in 
hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at 
the time and the place where the activity takes place”. 
675  T. W. Beneet, Criminalising the Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Using Children in Armed Conflict: A 
Legitimate Africa Traditions?, supra note 73. 
676 SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297, para, 1729. 
677 Ibid., para. 1720. 
678 Ibid., para. 1718. 
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are exposed to bullets and shells or to capture by the enemy. 679An even lower level of 
involvement in hostilities, such as being bodyguard of a high-ranking military commander, 
will arguably expose children equally to potential attacks by the enemy. Factors related to 
this criteria should presumably include, but are not limited to, i) high risk of possible enemy 
attacks, such as guarding military objectives;680 ii) the proximity to a key military target of 
the warring factions, such as bodyguards to Commanders.681 
 
The Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, however, found it necessary to place a limit on 
the “combat-related activities” holding that any activity that is “clearly unrelated to 
hostilities” would not fall within the prohibition.682 
 
Doubtless, “combat-related activities” in the context of child recruitment denotes solely 
activities “manifestly with connection to the hostilities”.683 This interpretation would actually 
exclude a large number of children who were deemed unfit for combat but were used to 
provide logistical support to the armed forces or groups. These logistic tasks, therefore, 
would only be wrapped in the category of “inactive” participation, because they are by nature 
and purpose only contribution to a military operation, but not necessarily cause actual harm 
to the enemy, or provide directly support to the military operations”.684 
                                                          
679 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 
267. 
680 SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note 297,para. 1727. 
681 Ibid.,para. 1731. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
supra note 351, para. 263. 
682ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ibid.,para. 262.  
683 So far, the Trial Chamber in the Brima case gave a broader scope of “participation actively in hostilities”. In 
the Brima case, the Trial Chamber took the view that “the use of children to participate actively in hostilities is 
not limited to participation in combat. An armed force requires logistical support to maintain its operations. Any 
labor or support that gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active participation.” 
See SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272, para. 737.  
684 ICTY, Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 562, para. 199. [T]o be concerned in the commission of a criminal 
offence […] does not only mean that you are the person who in fact inflicted the fatal injury and directly caused 
death, be it by shooting or by any other violent means; it also means an indirect degree of participation […]. [I]n 
other words, he must be the cog in the wheel of events leading up to the result which in fact occurred. This 
position has been widely accepted by States. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, customary 
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Similarly, the use of children as domestic labor or sexual slavery,685are “manifestly without 
connection to the hostilities”, and therefore would not come within the scope of “use of 
children to take active part in hostilities” in the context of the crime of child recruitment 
either under the SCSL Statute or the Rome Statute.686 
 
4. The “Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces of Groups” vs. the “Use of 
Children to Participate Actively in Hostilities” 
 
To tackle this issue, the judgments in the Norman case on the issue relating to Kondewa’s 
guilty of the crime of child recruitment should first be examined. According to the 
Indictment, Kondewa was convicted by the SCSL of the initiation of Witness TF2-021 who 
was under the age of 15 years into the CDF.  
 
In the circumstances of the enlistment of TF2-021, the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that 
Kondewa’s initiation of Witness TF2-021 was “an act analogous to enlisting children for 
active military service”687, or was an essential condition for Witness TF2-021’s enrollment 
into the CDF. Based on this, the Trial Chamber ruled that Kondewa was guilty of enlisting 
Witness TF2-021 into the CDF688 and Kondewa therefore was sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment for his enlistment of Witness TF2-021. 
 
Kondewa appealed against his conviction regarding the enlistment of Witness TF2-021. 
According to the Appeal Judgment, the Majority acquitted Kondewa of liability under Article 
6(1) of the Statute for “committing” the crime of enlisting Witness TF2-021, based on the 
basis that there was connection between Kondewa’s act of initiation of Witness TF2-021 to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
international humanitarian law, Vol. 1: Rules, supra note 392, p. 22 or footnote 129-134. See also SCSL, Sesay 
Trial Judgment, supra note 297, paras. 1630, 1743. 
685 SCSL, Sesay Trial Judgment, supra note297,paras. 1620, 1730. See Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, 
Child soldier’s global report 2004, supra note1, p. 16. See Graça Machel, The Impact of War on Children: A 
Review of Progress since the 1996 United Nations’ Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, 
London: Hurst and Company, 2001, p. 7.  
686 SCSL, Brima Trial Judgment, supra note 272,para. 263. 
687 SCSL, Norman Trial Judgment, supra note 78,para. 970. 
688Ibid.,para. 970. See also SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, Partially dissenting opinion, Justice Winter, supra 
note 267, paras. 14-18.  
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join the CDF and the actual enrollment of TF2-021 into the CDF.689 The Appeals Chamber 
found that before Kondewa initiated Witness TF2-021, Witness TF2-021 had already enlisted 
in the CDF as a child soldier to “carry looted property”,690 and therefore his initiation by 
Kondewa into the CDF cannot be counted as enlistment.691 As Appeals Chamber rules,  
 
“It is apparent to the Appeals Chamber that there is a paucity of 
jurisprudence on the question of how direct an act must be to 
constitute “enlistment” under Article 4.c., as well as the possible 
modes of enlistment. The Appeals Chamber holds that for enlistment 
there must be a nexus between the act of the accused and the child 
joining the armed force or group.”692 
 
There was one dissenting voice though. Justice Winter pointed out that “the key test to 
determine whether an act in question constitutes enrolment is acceptance into an armed force 
or group”.693 The main thrust of her argument was that “carrying looted property” did not 
constitute “participating actively in hostilities”, because the act of “carrying looted property” 
was “done for private purposes”, and thus it is insufficient to establish that the Witness TF2-
021 had already been “enlisted into armed forces or groups”.694 
 
Basically, the case focuses on one specific act, the act of “carrying looted property” and its 
definition in relation to the current legislation. Thus two questions seem appropriate here: a) 
whether the act of “carrying looted property” is equivalent to an act of “active participation in 
hostilities,” of which the Appeals Chamber in the Norman case seemed to be convinced; and 
b) whether the act of “carrying looted property” is sufficient to constitute “recruitment of 
children into armed forces or groups”.  
                                                          
689 Ibid., para.146. 
690 Ibid.,paras. 141-145. 
691 Ibid.,para. 8: “It is clear that the enlistment of Witness TF2-021 had taken place before he was initiated by 
Knodewa. The evidence shows that the Witness had first been captured by the rebels in 1995 and was later 
captured by the CDF in 1997. Upon his capture by the CDF, Witness TF2-21 was forced to carry looted 
property by the CDF.” 
692 SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, supra note 267, para. 141.  
693  SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Honorable Justice Renate Winter, 
ibid.,paras. 11-12.  
694 Ibid.,para. 12. 
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As discussed above, carrying looted property can only be fallen into the scope of “indirect 
participation” in hostilities, as it does not by its nature is likely to cause any damage or actual 
harm to the adversary party. Since the first question was already discussed in the previous 
section relating to the definition of “active participation in hostilities”, the following section 
will focus on the second question. 
 
a. The “Indirectly Participate in Hostilities” as a de facto “Recruitment of Children 
in Armed Forces or Groups” 
 
The main issue here is whether the “use” of children in hostilities, no matter whether the 
participation is active or inactive, should all be deemed as a de facto recruitment into armed 
forces or groups. As far as “active participation” is concerned, there is general consensus that 
the use of children to participate “actively” in hostilities is actually a kind of de facto 
recruitment of children in armed forces or groups. Thus, the only question left is whether 
“indirect participation” of children in hostilities should also be regarded as de facto 
recruitment.    
A possible argument in this regard is that indirect participation in hostilities is essential in 
providing the basic support for the operation of an armed force or group. On this basis, it can 
be argued that children who serve for an armed force or group in an indirect role are de facto 
members of the armies, even though they do not take active part in hostilities. 
 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out there is no sharply marked distinction between children 
used as laborers in the armed forces or groups and those serving in military operations, 
particularly, because a) children taking indirect participation are also commanded by a person 
in the army; and b) children used as laborers also have a fixed distinctive emblem or carrying 
arms, while performing tasks, such as carrying looted properties or on food-finding missions. 
As the evidence in the Norman case showed us, the Witness TF2-021 was fully armed while 
carrying looted properties. And it must be again emphasized that military uniform and 
carrying arms have always been used as a means to distinguish combats from civilians.695 
 
                                                          
695 Amir Givol, NetaRotem & Sergeiy Sandler, Children Recruitment in Israel, supra note 149, p. 31.  
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Thus, with respect to comprehensive protection for children involved in military service, the 
inclusion of “indirect participation” into the frame of “recruitment of children in armed forces 
of groups” is believed by the author to be consistent with the purpose of Geneva 
Conventions, which holds that the vulnerable groups in the armed conflicts should be 
protected to the maximum extent possible.696 
 
b. The Arguments against the Inclusion of the “Use of Children to Participate 
Indirectly in Hostilities” into the Realm of the de facto “Recruitment of Children 
in Armed Forces of Groups” 
 
A possible argument against inclusion of “indirect use of child in hostilities” as de facto 
“recruitment”, could take the form that once these children are regarded as de facto members 
of an army, they would lose the protection of the Geneva Convention as civilians. This 
certainly creates a dilemma. On the one hand, Geneva Convention offers protection for 
children performing logistic tasks, as long as they are kept out of the category of de facto 
members of armed forces or groups and still keep their civilian status in armed conflicts. On 
the other hand, being included in the category of de facto members of armed forces, they 
would gain the protection from being recruited as child soldiers. The question thus boils 
down to alternative protect children maximally and ensure their best interests in armed 
conflicts.  
 
One possible argument in favor of taking ‘indirect participation’ as de facto recruitment is 
that children should be first and foremost protected from involvement in armed conflict, no 
matter directly or indirectly. No doubt, if there is no use of children to take indirect 
participation in hostilities, there is no need to discuss whether those children should be 
protected under civilian status or not. From this perspective, it is better to include children 
taking indirect participation in armed conflicts into the scope of de facto recruitment of 
children into armed forces or groups. 
 
c. The Rationale of Separating the “Use of Children to Participate Actively in 
Hostilities” from the “Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces or Groups”  
                                                          
696 ICTY, Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra note 562, paras. 167-168.  
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The discussion above seems to suggest that the distinction between “use” and “recruitment” 
is negligible, especially if the recruitment is in the de facto sense. But this is not to say that 
the current framework of legislation as laid down by both SCSL Statute and the Rome Statute 
should be disregarded. The importance of the current framework, i.e., listing recruitment 
(conscription and enlistment) and use as separate acts, has a more practical manipulation at 
the stage of sentencing. That is, the distinction of “active participation in hostilities” signals 
an aggravated form of the crime, for being an actual employment of children to serve in 
military operations in hostilities. The conviction of an accused on the use of children to 
“participate actively in hostilities” invites a heavier sentence than merely “recruitment (de 
jure and de facto) of children in armed force or groups”.  
 
And thus, if a use constituted both a de facto recruitment (including both the active and 
inactive use of children in hostilities) and the use of children to take active part in hostilities, 
the person can be sentenced on account of the latter charge for the active “use of children”, 
instead of the former - the de facto recruitment. That could be the reason, though active 
participation constitutes de facto recruitment, it should be still listed apart from the form of 
“recruitment of children into armed forces or groups”. 
 
d. The Arguments for Adding the “Use of Children to Participate Indirectly in 
Hostilities” into the Realm of the “Use of Children to Participate Actively in 
Hostilities” 
 
The current legislation on the crime of child recruitment has also sometimes been criticized 
for being formulated in such a way as to exclude “inactive participation” from the “use of 
children in armed conflicts”.697 For example, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck maintain that, 
permitting only a certain degree of participation undermines the principle at stake: for their 
own safety, children who are especially vulnerable should be excluded from hostilities, 
                                                          
697 T. W. Bennet, Criminalising the Recruitment of Child Soldiers: Using Children in Armed Conflict: A 
Legitimate Africa Traditions?, supra note 77.   
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whether participating directly or indirectly, children are placed in danger.698 The lack of 
prohibition of indirect participation was the reason of a concern of the UNICEF, too, which 
believes that it will actually encourage the parties to an armed conflict to increasingly use 
children in taking indirect part in hostilities.699 
 
Among the proposed amendments is one that suggests that a new phrase of “taking part in 
hostilities” (including both active participation and inactive participation) be adopted in the 
future legislation such as to provide a more comprehensive safeguard to protect children from 
the involvement in armed conflicts.700 
 
The question is whether sweeping them all under one category offers a feasible option. It 
should be noted that though it is indisputable that indirect participation in hostilities may in 
some circumstances place children under similar risks as active participation, the omission of 
“inactive participation” in the frame of “use of children in hostilities” does not however 
necessarily lead to a vague or incomplete protection for children, if, as argued in the previous 
section, the use of children to perform logistic tasks, such as cooking or doing laundry, is 
taken to be a form of de facto recruitment.701 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the inclusion of inactive participation into the form of “use” 
would contravene the very purpose of the legislation, which aims to impose heavier sentences 
in cases where children are used to take active part in hostilities, as opposed to mere “de facto 
recruitment of children in armed conflicts” to perform indirect role. From this perspective, 
                                                          
698 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 
392, p. 23. They also run the risk of being captured by the adversary party. If they fall into enemy hands, they 
are always faced with the certainty of being regarded as spies rather than combatants which confer a status on 
the persons affected such that they can enjoy the treatment of prisoners of war.  
699 A closer examination of the definition of “child soldier” proposed by the Cape Town Principles, which 
defines child soldier as “any person less than eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of regular or 
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porter, messengers, 
and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members”. UNICEF, The Symposium on the 
Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilisation and Social Reintegration 
of Child Soldiers in Africa, supra note 579, p. 8. 
700 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, supra note 660, p.118. 
701 See De Jury und De facto Recruitment, supra Chapter 4. 
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“inactive” participation should not be combined into the form of “use of children to take 
active part in hostilities”. 
 
5. The Minimum Recruitment Age of Children  
a. The Person must be under the Age of 15 years 
 
It should be noted that the substantive provisions for the crime of child recruitment as laid 
down in the Rome Statute and the SCSL Statute are restricted to the protection for children 
under the age of 15 years. For the constitution of the crime of child recruitment, the 
Prosecution must prove that the victim was a person under the age of 15 at the time the 
recruitment or the use was committed.702 If the children had attained the age of 15, the person 
who recruited or used them to take active part in hostilities will remain outside the scope of 
law. The reason for choosing 15 as the minimum recruitment age for the crime of child 
recruitment is that, at the time when the Rome Statute was drafted, there was no sufficient 
State practice criminalizing persons who recruited or used children between the age of 15 and 
18 in hostilities.703 
 
b. Efforts to Raise the Recruitment Age to 18 Years 
 
Once recruited into armed forces or groups or used to take active part in hostilities, children 
will lose civilian status and become legitimate military targets to the enemy fires. From this 
perspective, children between the age of 15 and 18 years should be given the same protection 
from recruitment.  
 
These days international sentiment is increasingly turning in favor of raising the age limit to 
18 for recruitment. This is clearly visible from the efforts of many international organizations 
and the NGOs. During the 26th and the 27thInternational Conferences of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, the ICRC expressed its support of the idea of setting 18 as the minimum 
                                                          
702 For the mens rea, see infra Mens Rea, Chapter 4.  
703 See Chapter 3. See also Mauro Politi &Giuseppe Nesi, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Ashgate, 2001, p. 120. The fact that this standard-setting [raising the age of recruitment to 18] exercise is still 
underway led many delegations in Rome to accept that the age of recruitment should be retained at fifteen years. 
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recruitment age.704 Human Rights Watch takes the same position that no children under the 
age of 18 should be recruited, either voluntarily or forcibly, or made to participate in 
hostilities.705 The UNICEF has also taken the position supporting 18 as the minimum age for 
participation in armed conflicts. In a statement to the UN Security Council on 12 February 
1999, the Executive Director of the UNICEF made a strong plea on account of the “straight-
18” standard.  
 
a) A Child’s Free Will as an Argument 
 
Despite the efforts by these humanitarian agencies for setting the minimum age of 
recruitment at 18 years, States are reluctant to accept this standard, especially setting 18 as 
the minimum age of voluntary recruitment. A major argument against raising the enlistment 
age to 18 is the allegedly the free will of the young person. 
 
The author thinks this argument can hardly to be said as an aspirational excuse. The dire 
circumstances as well as the environmental influences of an armed conflict706 leave children 
no option other than voluntary enlistment into military service.707Many factors can drive a 
                                                          
704  ICRC, Protection of the Civilian Population in Period of Armed Conflict, Resolutions of the 26th 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Resolution 2, 1 January 1996, C. with Regard to 
Children, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMRV#a3. See also ICRC, Protection 
of Victims of Armed Conflict through respect for International Humanitarian law, Report of the Plenary 
Commission, Theme I of the Plan of Action, 27th the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, Geneva, 31 October to 6 November 1999, Specific Humanitarian Problem, 4 November 1999, para. 2, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQ6D (last accessed on 26 June 2010). 
705 Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, 2002, p.176. 
706 ICRC, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child concerning Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, Position of the International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note103, para.45. Fernando 
Jiovani Arias Morales, the Psycho-social care of demobilized child soldiers in Colombia: Conceptual and 
Methodological aspects, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2005, available at                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.childsoldiers.org/psychosocial/Psychosocial_Care_of_Demobilized_Child_Soldiers_in_Colombia__
Conceptual_and_Methodological_Aspects_2005_by_Dr_Fernando_Jiovani_Arias_Morales.pdf, (last accessed 
on 8 June 2010), p.2.  
707 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, p. 5. See Vision, Reclaiming Their 
Youth, Fall 2008 Issue, available at http://www.vision.org/visionmedia/article.aspx?id=6686, (last accessed on 
10 June 2010).  
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child to join the military: to gain food and/or shelter for their offered services;708to search for 
role models, as the image of strong armed men in their eyes were heroes;709or to revenge for 
the violence done to their family. 710 The paucity of alternative options on top of the 
immaturity to fully understand the consequences of their choices are hardly factors that 
would boost the claim their decisions to join the army were made under their full 
autonomy.711 
 
In fact, the main reason that States are reluctant to set a higher age standard for recruitment, 
is exactly their youth and the attendant immaturity. The things such as manipulability, 
malleability, obedience, incomprehension of danger or death are all the qualities that make 
ideal soldier material. 
 
b) Current Development of Raising the Age Limit to 18 Years 
 
Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs in the current state practice that things are 
moving ahead. 109 states, or more than two thirds of the nations of the world, have adopted 
                                                          
708 This can be seen from the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. See Isobel McConnand & Sarah Uppard, Children 
- Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers and Children Associated with Fighting Forces, Save 
the Children, December 2001, p.17, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LGEL-
5D8D6Q?Open (Latest visiting is on 8 August 2008). Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers & UNICEF, 
Guide to the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, December 2003. p.7; see also 
Boothby & Knudsen, Waging a New kind of war: Children of the Gun, 282 Sci Am. (2000): 60-, p. 61; See also 
Daya Somasundaram, Child soldiers: Understanding the Context, 324 British Medical Journal (2002): 1268, p. 
1268. 
709 This is one of the main reasons that children decided to join the army during the protracted conflict in Sierra 
Leone. See ICRC, Commentary on Additional Protocol I, para. 3185. Ilene Cohn & Guys Goodwin-Gill, Child 
Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.11. 
710 In the Liberia conflict, lots of children joined the armed based on this reason. See J. Louise Despert, 
Preliminary Report on Children’s Reactions to the War, Unspecified Vendor, 1942, pp.417-418. Human Rights 
Watch, Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch, 1994.  
711 ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I, supra note 69, para. 3185. See also Matthew Happold, Child 
Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in: The Legal Regime of 
the International Criminal Court: Essays in Memory of Igor Blischenko (José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser & M. 
Cherif Bassiouni Eds.), Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, p. 580.  
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the “straight 18” standard by stipulating 18 as the minimum age for conscription,712 which is 
a most welcome development. Furthermore, some states, such as Columbia,713 Macedonia,714 
Thailand,715 though only a small fraction of the international community, have incorporated 
in their domestic laws the punishment of both conscription and enlistment of children under 
18 into armed forces or groups. As the issue of the minimum age for recruitment is 
continually brought up in debates and 18 constantly turns up in proposals as the appropriate 
age, it is hoped that in the foreseeable future a new provision will be drafted to prosecute the 
recruitment, either conscription or enlistment, or the use of child soldiers under the age of 18 
instead of 15 in hostilities. 
 
II. The Mens Rea of the Crime of Child Recruitment under the 
Rome Statute 
 
The concepts of actus reus and mens rea is one long established in criminal law. Basically it 
requires only when the prosecution succeeds in establishing the two basic elements at the 
same time, a conviction is possible,716as reflected in the legal maxim “actus non facitreum 
nisi mens sit rea”.717 However, neither the Charters of Nuremberg or Tokyo, nor the Statutes 
of the ICTY or the ICTR has laid down any general provision specific on the mental 
element.718 The only exception is the Rome Statute, “confirming the mens rea as a general 
requirement of culpability”.719  
 
                                                          
712Ilene Cohn & Guys. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, supranote709, 
Chapter 3, p.7-8, 53-75, Annex, Voting Age and Military Age by Country. 
713Colombia, Law 418 of 1997 for compulsory recruitment and Law 548 of 1999 for voluntary recruitment. 
714 Macedonia, Defence Law, at Ministry of Defence, Article 62.  
715Thailand, Constitution, at International Constitutional Law, Section 69and 49. 
716 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crime, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p. 151. 
717 It could be translated as “an act does not make a person guilty of a crime, unless the person’s mind is also 
guilty”. See Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons Ltd [1951] 2 KB 135.  
718 Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, 19 Criminal Law Forum (2008): 473, p. 473. 
719 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 JICJ (2005): 35, p. 36. 
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During the sessions of the PrepCom, there were proposals to insert the general principle 
concerning mens rea720 to include not only intent and knowledge but also special intent, 
recklessness and negligence in the Rome Statute.721 However, in the end only intent and 
knowledge made it into the final version of the Rome Statute.722This is thought as a result of 
the differences in national practices and theories as to the interpretation of recklessness and 
negligence.723 It is possible why Article 30 of the Rome Statute, on one hand, stipulates that 
“a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge”, while, on the 
side, it drops down a clause: “unless otherwise provided”. 724  This raises a question 
concerning whether the clause “unless otherwise provided” signifies that the EoC or other 
laws can add, reduce or even default the “intent and knowledge” coverage provided by 
Article 30. 
 
1. The Meaning of “Unless Otherwise Provided” in Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute 
 
a. “Unless Otherwise Provided” in respect of the Rome Statute 
 
To answer the question, one must first examine the reason why the Rome Statute only 
specified “intent and knowledge” in Article 30. According to Werle and Jessberge, 
 
                                                          
720 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, in: Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Otto Triffterer ed.), Beck/Hart, 2008, 
para. 1, p. 850. 
721 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 
52st Sess. Supp. No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996), Vol. II, pp. 92-93. 
722 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, supra note 720, para. 1, p. 850. See also 
John Tessitore & Susan Woolfs, A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 5th Assembly of the UN, UN Association 
of the United States of America and the Business Council for the UN, 2000, p.257.  
723 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note234, pp.24-25. 
724 Rome Statute, Article 30.  
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“article 30 does not only codify but seeks to standardize the mens 
rea requirement for […] all crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, which are in fact all crimes under international law.”725 
 
Piragoff and Robinson are more specific about the purpose of Article 30: 
 
“[w]ith respect to other mental elements, such as certain forms of 
“recklessness” and “dolus eventualis”, […] various forms of 
negligence or objective states of mental culpability should not be 
contained as a general rule in article 30.”726 
 
Badar stated his view in a more theoretical vein: 
 
“[t]he significance of this provision (i.e. Article 30) is that it assigns 
different levels of mental element to each of the material elements of 
the crime in question. This is a remarkable shift from an ‘offence 
analysis’ approach to an ‘element analysis’ approach.”727 
 
By applying an “element analysis” approach, the Rome Statute assigns a culpable state of 
mind to each objective element of a crime.728 
 
It was these considerations that allowed other mental elements to be incorporated in each 
individual article regarding specific crimes or modes of responsibility provided in the Rome 
Statute. 729  The “multiplicity of special rules”, as Werle and Jessbergestates, necessarily 
requires examining “the definitions on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the 
different wordings involve a departure from the standard laid down in Article 30 ICCSt.”730 
In short, the accepted view is that Article 30 does not seek to absolutely exclude all the other 
                                                          
725 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 37. 
726 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, in: Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, supra note 720, p. 850. 
727 Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, supra note 718, p. 475-476. 
728Ibid., p. 476, 516. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 44. 
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mental states, but allows for deviation from the “intent and knowledge” coverage in the 
Article 30, as is evident from the phrase “unless otherwise provided”. 
 
b. “Unless Otherwise Provided” in Respect of Article 21 
 
According to Article 21 (1) of the Rome Statute, the Court not only “shall apply in the first 
place, this Statute, Element of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, but also 
should consider applicable treaties, principles and rules of international law and customary 
international law in terms of legal resources.731 Accordingly, the Rome Statute cannot be the 
only legal sources meeting the standard of “otherwise provided”.  
 
However, some scholars, for example, Weigend, take a different stand, arguing that pursuant 
to the principle of legality, any modification of definitions or rules, including the mens rea set 
out in Article 30, would have to be found in the Statute itself and not from other sources.732 
 
This argument may have some plausibility, but is not convincing enough, especially when it 
comes to the case of customary international law. Actually, customary international law often 
plays an indispensable role in the interpretation of the Rome Statute, as pointed out by Werle 
and Jessberger, that there exists a strong argument that the interpretation and application of 
the Rome Statute should be as far as possible in conformity with customary international 
law.733 
 
In this regard, case laws, in particular, judgments by the international criminal tribunals 
should also be included in accessing the existence of a customary international law. Besides, 
case laws may also provide valuable interpretative insights on the clarification and 
                                                          
731 Rome Statute, Article 21 (1). 
732 T. Weigend, 'The Harmonization of General Principles of Criminal Law: The Statutes and Jurisprudence of 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC: An Overview', 19 Nouvelles etudes pénales (2004): 319, p.  327.  
733 There is a consistent opinion that customary international law could also be applied as an exception to the 
mental state coverage of Article 30. For more details, see Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless 
Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Elements of Crimes under International 
Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 46. As Werle and Jessberger stated, applying the customary international law 
is based on the need of “a uniform interpretation and application of the Rome Statute and customary 
international law”. 
 182 
 
supplementation of the provisions of Rome Statute. 734 As far as applicable treaties are 
concerned, Article 21 provides two types: “a particular treaty having direct bearing on a 
case”, and “a widely ratified treaty viewed as evidence of the ‘rules and principles of 
international law’”.735 Given this definition, there is hardly any reason why applicable treaties 
cannot be regarded as a derivation from the Rome Statute. 
 
In consequence, principles and rules of international law are arguably eligible as “other 
provisions” that provide supplement to the Rome Statute or standards different from the 
Rome Statute, in the sense that they are derived from the conscience of humanity or are 
applied by “a representative majority of states, including the world’s principal legal 
systems”.736 
 
c. “Unless Otherwise Provided” in Respect of the EoC 
 
However, can legal provisions embodied in other sources, such as the EoC,737offer a basis for 
an expansion or narrowing of the Article 30’s general standard? It will be shown below, there 
is still some question as to whether the EoC can also be applied as an exception to the mental 
state coverage of Article 30. There are some scholars,738 who take the view that Article 21 of 
the Rome Statute entitles the ICC to apply the EoC as the first legal sources of international 
                                                          
734 Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special 
Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, supra note 559, p. 353. 
735 Otto Triffterer(ed.), Commentary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, 
Article by Article, Beck/Hart ,1999, Article 21, para.  10. 
736 Ibid., Article 21, paras. 15, 18. 
737 Different standards of men srea specific to certain crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are provided in 
the EOC or found in customary international law. Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court, Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note234, pp. 28-30.Antonio Cassese, International Criminal 
Law, supra note  249, p. 176. 
738 Werle directly pointed out that “[T]aking Article 21 (1) ICCSt. into account, one thus would correctly come 
to the conclusion that the ‘unless-otherwise-provided’ clause allows modification of the subjective requirements 
laid out in Article 30 ICCSt. through both the Elements of Crimes and customary international law.” This can be 
found in Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and 
the Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 45.  
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criminal law among all the sources which might be applicable.739 On the other hand, it is 
arguable whether Article 9 with its phrase “shall assist” implies a subsidiary status of the EoC 
to the Rome Statute. An accompanying question inevitably raised in view of the contradiction 
between the wording of Article 9 and that of Article 21 is in that case what the status of the 
EoC is. Unfortunately, neither the Rome Statute nor the EoC has deemed it necessary to 
suggest any effective solution or clear interpretation to the conflict between these two 
documents. 
 
Before analyzing the answers to the questions, the author would like to point out the reasons 
why these issues should be discussed and how they are related to the issue of the mens rea of 
the crime of child recruitment. There is good reason why this issue should be discussed, 
because the question whether the elements in the EoC should belong to the “otherwise 
provided” is closely related to the issue of crime of child recruitment. The EoC allows for 
two dimensions regarding to the age of child: “knew” and “should have known”, as can be 
seen from the paragraph 3 of the EoC relating to Article 8(2) (b)(xxvi) and Article 
8(2)(e)(vii):  
 
“[t]he perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or 
persons were under the age of 15 years.”740 
 
This provision constitutes a deviation from the Rome Statute. “Should have known” as a 
constructive knowledge is insufficient to establish the mens rea threshold provided in Article 
30, which requires the crimes be committed in a mental state of either intent or knowledge.  
 
a) Arguments against the EoC as “Otherwise Provided” in the Rome Statute  
 
Those who are against the deviation of the EoC741 from Article 30 maintain that in Article 9, 
the EoC are provided as “a subsidiary to the Statute”.742The word “shall assist” implies a 
                                                          
739 Rome Statute, Article 21 (1): “The Court shall apply in the first place (i) its Statute, Elements of Crimes, and 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” 
740 EoC, Article 8(2) (b) (xxvi) and Article 8(2) (e) (vii), pp. 33,53.  
741 These arguments were raised during the negotiation of the EOC. For more details, see Donald K. Piragoff & 
Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, supra note 720, p. 850-856. 
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subsidiary or secondary status of the EoC to the Rome Statute. Accordingly, the EoC should 
be regarded as “unable to expand a defendant’s liability beyond what is foreseen by the 
Statutes itself.”743 
 
b) Arguments for the EoC as “Otherwise Provided” in the Rome Statute 
 
However, there is very strong objection to the subsidiary status of Article 9. Werle and 
Jessberger, for example, brush it aside, arguing that Article 9 requires the EoC “to be 
compatible with the Statute”, and therefore “differing provisions in the Elements of Crimes 
are to be treated just like differing provisions in the Statute itself”.744 This “compatible” 
relationship between the EoC and the Rome Statute is, to a large extent, concluded on the 
established agreement of the significant role of the EoC in the interpretation and the 
application of the Rome Statute.  
 
This view was finally approved and reaffirmed in the General Introduction to the EoC, which 
can also be read to render the EoC legally applicable as a source of law “otherwise provided”,  
 
“As Stated in article 30, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge. Where no reference is made 
in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any particular 
conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it is understood that 
the relevant metal element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in 
article 30 applies. Exceptions to the article 30 standard, based on 
the Statute, including applicable law under its relevant provisions, 
are indicated below.”745 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
742 Rome Statute, Article 9: The Elements of Crimes “shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application 
of article 6, 7 and 9”. 
743 Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, supra note 718, p. 503. 
744 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 46. 
745 EoC, General Introduction, para. 2.  
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In the Lubanga case, the Pre-trial Chamber is of the same opinion, affirming that the EoC can 
by themselves “provide otherwise”.746 Pursuant to this wording “unless otherwise provided”, 
the Pre-trial Chamber considered the “should have known” standard, though outside the 
“intent and knowledge” coverage, as one mental element of the crime of child recruitment 
regarding the age of the child.  
 
Bassiouni takes the view that the EoC are not merely explanatory to the Rome Statute, but are 
the mini-code which define, supplement and quasi-legislatively codify issues relating to 
crimes, principles and evidentiary questions. In other words, the EoC have a “more outcome-
determinative role in interpretation of the statutory provisions”.747 
 
c) The EoC Can be regarded as “Otherwise Provided” in the Rome Statute 
 
Attention has here been brought to the conflicting wordings of Article 21 and Article 9. In 
Article 21, the EoC stands at the top of the list of all relevant provisions, being listed as first 
among all the applicable sources of international criminal law. In Article 9, the word “shall 
assist” seems to suggest a subsidiary status to the EoC. However, an examination of the 
negotiation leading to the Rome Statute shows that the EoC should be understood to have 
only persuasive value rather than binding force.  
 
During the Rome Diplomatic Conference, some delegation proposed that the EoC should be 
endowed with binding force on the judges of the ICC.748However, the proposal of binding 
character was rejected by the majority of the delegations at the Rome Conference, in view of 
the concern that such binding force may undermine the judicial discretion of the judges.749 
                                                          
746 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-trial 
Chamber I, 29 January 2007, para. 356. 
747 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and 
Integrated Text (3 vols), Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 153-154. 
748 Otto Triffterer, (ed.), Commentary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' 
Notes, Article by Article, supra note 735, Article 9, para. 30. 
749 Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special 
Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2003): 
341, p. 350. See also Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers' Notes, Article by Article, supra note 735, Article 9, para. 30.  
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Nevertheless, the author believes that the subsidiary status of the EoC does not necessarily 
deny its derivation from the Rome Statute even when there are obvious contradictions 
between the EoC and the Rome Statute. Indeed, there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the EoC should be given priority in application.  
 
Firstly, the drafting of the EoC was undertaken subsequent to the Rome Statute for purpose 
of giving guidance on the application of the Rome Statute. As such, the EoC seek to provide 
details on issues relating to the statutory crimes, the principles of criminal law, and even 
some evidentiary questions, which the Statute failed to address. All the details covered by the 
EoC, including all the supplements, contradictions, or conflicts, were established by 
agreement of the participants regarding the interpretation of Article 30 (1), “so as to permit 
the mens rea of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC to be “otherwise provided” in the 
EoC”.750 Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the General Introduction to the EoC can also be read to 
endow the EoC with legality, to be applied as a source of law “otherwise provided”. 
 
Secondly, a close look at the negotiations leading to the EoC indicates that the draft of the 
EoC took on a wide range of comprehensive research, including proposals from delegations, 
detailed study of the ICRC, analyses of international law instruments and relevant case laws. 
From this perspective, the EoC to a very large extent is “drafted in accordance with existing 
international humanitarian law”.751 Accordingly, it can be concluded that any modification, 
supplementation and even contradiction showed in the EoC would have been given due 
examination. 
 
In spite of the contribution of the EoC in the clarification of the Rome Statute, the provisions 
of the EoC are far from perfect. On the contrary, there are still areas that clearly need 
improvement, areas which are ill-accorded with existing international humanitarian law. 
These problematic and contentious issues would need further judicial probing and reflection.  
The author argues in this regard, that it will be up to the judges to determine what is meant by 
“unless otherwise provided” and whether to apply the EoC when contradictions show up. 
                                                          
750 Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
supra note 711, p. 19.  
751 Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, with a Special 
Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, supra note 559, p. 402. 
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Before reaching a solution, the Court must make impartial assessment of the relevant 
international instruments, established principles of international law and customary 
international law to make sure that the application of law, whether the EoC or the Rome 
Statute, is in line with the established framework of the international humanitarian law. 
 
2.   Article 30 and the EoC: Mental Elements of the Crime of Child Recruitment  
 
As far as the crime of child recruitment is concerned, no provision in international instrument 
so far has figured out what will constitute the mens rea of this crime, except for Article 30 of 
the Rome Statute and the EoC.  
 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute, on the one hand, sets out a general definition of the subjective 
elements for all crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction: intent and knowledge. The EoC, for 
reasons stated above, can be taken as an additional specific provision to supplement the mens 
rea regarding the age of children.  
 
As discussed above, the “should have known” standard provided in the EoC is arguably a 
viable mental element applicable in the case of child recruitment. And thus, the EoC going 
beyond what is provided in the Rome Statute, allowed a constructive knowledge, “should 
have known”, to be a possible constituent of the mens rea of this crime, 
 
“the perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or 
persons were under the age of 15 years”.752 
 
The following sections are devoted to a discussion of these three mental elements as provided 
in Article 30 and the EoC.  
 
a. Intent as Mens Rea of the Crime of Child Recruitment Under Article 30 
 
Article 30 (2) captures two forms of intention, distinguishable by i) intention “in relation to 
conduct”, where the person “means to engage in the conduct”,753 whereas ii) “in relation to a 
                                                          
752 EoC, pp. 33&53. 
753 Rome Statute, Article 30 (2) (a): “In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct.” 
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consequence”, where the person “means to cause a consequence or is aware that it will occur 
in the ordinary course of events”.754 
 
a) Intent in relation to Conducts 
 
Essentially, a conduct must be “a voluntary action” of a defendant, accompanied by “the 
basic consciousness or volition” attributable to this action.  This was basically the accepted 
view, as is evident in the Lubanga case, where the Pre-trial Chamber I stated that, “[t]he 
cumulative reference to ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ requires the existence of a volitional 
element on the part of the suspect.”755 
 
b) Intent in relation to Consequences  
 
Article 30 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute further specifies two aspects of intention: i) “the person 
means to cause that consequence”, or, ii) the person “is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events”,756 which suggests two degrees of intent relating to consequences 
was provided, dolus directus of the first degree and dolus directus of the second degree. The 
Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case followed this principle and stated that the intent first 
and foremost requires dolus directus of the first degree: 
 
“the suspect (i) knows that his or her actions or omissions will bring 
about the objective elements of the crime, and (ii) undertakes such 
actions or omissions with the concrete intent to bring about the 
objective elements of the crime (also known as dolus directus of the 
first degree).”757 
 
                                                          
754 Rome Statute, Article 30 (2) (b): “In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 
755 ICC, Prosecutorv. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Pre-trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, para. 351.  
756Rome Statute, Article 30 (2) (b): “In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 
757 ICC, Prosecutorv. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Pre-trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, para. 351. 
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It is further stated that the intent provided in the Article 30 (2) (b) also encompasses dolus 
directus of the second degree, 
 
“in which the suspect, without having the concrete intent to bring 
about the objective elements of the crime, is aware that such 
elements will be the necessary outcome of his or her actions or 
omissions.”758 
 
In short, the fact is indisputable that a first and second degree intents are provided in Article 
30 (2) (b), however, the question whether recklessness is included as a part of “dolus directus 
of the second degree” in the Article 30 (2) (b) is not such a straightforward one. As shall be 
shown below, there is some dispute over this question. 
 
Two opinions on this issue have been offered. The minority view is that the language of 
Article 30 implies the inclusion of recklessness [dolus evetualis] in the concept of the indirect 
intent. The more accepted view is that recklessness cannot be included in the frame of Article 
30.759 
 
i. Arguments for the Inclusion of Recklessness into Article 30  
 
The advocates, who regard the recklessness as part of Article 30, focus on the problems that 
would be created by excluding recklessness from the scope of Article 30. It is argued that 
exclusion of the concept of “recklessness” from the coverage of Article 30 may lead to 
acquittals of defendants who, though without the intent, take a high and unjustifiable risk of a 
                                                          
758 Ibid., para. 352. 
759 David J. Bederman, International Decisions: international Criminal Law- Mens Rea - Intent and Guilty 
Knowledge, 104 The American Journal of International Law (2010):241, pp. 242-243. Albin Eser, Mental 
Elements—Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law, in: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (Antonio Cassese eds.), 2002, pp. 889, 915. In the book the author notes that liability based on 
mere awareness of the risk that one’s conduct may result in the prohibited consequence – dolus eventualis- 
“seems not to be the position of the Rome Statute”.  
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consequence.760 In his criticism of the Rome Statute for excluding recklessness as a basic 
capable mental state for war crimes, Cassese points out:  
 
“[O]n this score [excluding recklessness as a mental element of the 
ICC] the Rome Statute marks a step backwards with respect to 
lexlata […] and possibly creates a loophole: persons responsible for 
war crimes, when they acted recklessly, may be brought to trial and 
convicted before national courts, while they would be acquitted by 
the ICC.”761 
 
In other word, if an acquittal has been granted on this basis, it might be seen to be 
inconsistent with the national domestic application of crimes under international law, but it 
would not be considered to contravene the general judicial practice before the ICTY and the 
ICTR.762 
 
There are times when the ultimate object of the international law, i.e., “international crimes 
must be punished” is used as ground for clarification of the “imprecise” language of Article 
30. It is exactly this argument that is offered in an attempt to include recklessness (dolus 
eventualis) in the mens rea of child recruitment.763The problem with this argument is that one 
should not “substitute the concept of de lege lata [the law as it is] with the concept of de lege 
ferenda [the law as it ought to be] only for the sake of widening the scope of Article 30 of the 
Statute and capturing a broader range of perpetrators.”764 
 
                                                          
760 Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International 
Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2004): 57, pp. 64-65: “It is reasonable to accept that 
crimes committed without the highest degree of dolus ought as a general rule not to be prosecuted in the ICC.” 
761Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 154EJIL 10 
(1999):144, p. 154. 
762 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 42.  
763 Ferrando Mantovani, The General Principles of International Criminal Law: The Viewpoint of a National 
Criminal Lawyer, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003): 26, p. 32.  
764 ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 67(1)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-trial Chamber 
II, 15 June 2009, para. 369.  
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ii. Arguments against the Inclusion of Recklessness into Article 30  
 
Those against inclusion of recklessness into the mental elements of Article 30 build their 
argument around the phrase “will occur” in Article 30, insisting that it implies a strict 
standard, which, according to Werle and Jessberger, requires a possibility with a high 
probability of happening in the ordinary course of events, for “after all, it [article 30] does not 
say ‘may occur’”. 765 That the phrase “will occur” excludes recklessness is shared by 
Triffterer, who also holds the position that the defendant’s awareness of the possibility of a 
particular consequence under the mental state of recklessness is insufficient to prove a high 
probability of the consequence, as required by “will occur”. 766 Similarly, Roger, in his 
examination of the PrepCom sessions, finds nothing to support including recklessness in the 
frame of Article 30.767 
 
iii. Arguments of the Inclusion of Dolus Eventualis into Article 30 (2) (b) 
 
A third view is taken up by Trifferter, who in his Commentary on the Rome Statute, draws a 
distinction between the concept of “dolus eventualis” and the “recklessness”. It is argued that 
dolus eventualis meets the volition requirement provided in Article 30 (2) (b).768The likely 
meaning of the phrase “will occur in the ordinary course of events” embodied in most legal 
systems, as Piragoff and Robinson contend, is understood in such a way that “the occurrence 
of a consequence flowing from a particular conduct is highly probable”.769Dolus eventualis is 
such a mental state that requires “the knowledge or foresight of a substantial probability that 
the consequence will occur”.770 
 
                                                          
765 Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, supra note 719, p. 37.  
766  Otto Triffterer, The New International Criminal Law: It’s General Principles Establishing Individual 
Criminal Responsibility, in: The New International Criminal Law (Kalliopi Koufa ed.), 2003, p. 706. 
767 Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in ICC: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 
Elements of Offences, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001): 291, pp. 301-303.  
768 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, supra note 720, p. 860. 
769 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: Mental Element, supra note 720, p. 860. 
770 Ibid. 
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Boot in his book supports this interpretation, stating that though “it [Article 30] does not 
include a concept of recklessness, 771  it appears however that Article 30 includes dolus 
eventualis in view of the phrase ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events’ in 
paragraph(2)(b).”772 
 
Although the law does not provide for general principles of dolus eventualis, a decision by 
the Egyptian Court of Cassation however gives the following interpretation:  
 
“dolus eventualis substitutes intent, in the strict sense of the word, in 
establishing the element of intentionality. It can only be defined as a 
secondary uncertain intention on the part of the perpetrator who 
expects that his act may go beyond the purpose intended to realize 
another purpose that was not intended initially but nevertheless 
performs the act and thus appreciates the unintended purpose.”773 
 
However, this is not a view generally accepted. Most insist on a strict interpretation of the 
phrase “will occur”. For instance, Ambos argues that,  
 
“However, the perpetrator [in the mental state of dolus eventualis] is 
not, as required by Article 30 (2) (b), aware that a certain result or 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. He or she 
only thinks that the result is possible".774 
 
                                                          
771 Under this circumstance and the following circumstances, recklessness denotes a narrower concept, which 
excludes advertent recklessness, because advertent recklessness is roughly equivalent to the term dolus 
eventualis.  
772 Machteld Boot, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court: Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, Intersentia, 2002, p. 583.  
773  Judgment, Egyptian Court of Cassation, Case No. 1853/Judicial Year 47, Dec. 25, 1930 in Mohamed 
ElewaBadar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute without it?, 12 New Crim. L. R. (2009): 433, p. 444 with 
fn.82. 
774 Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999):1, pp. 
21-22.  
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In respect of the crime of child recruitment,775 the Defense in the Katanga case submitted 
their concern for including the concept of dolus eventualis in Article 30 (2) (b),776 however, 
the Pre-trial Chamber in the Katanga case seemed reluctant to give a definitive answer on the 
question. Only in the footnote of the Decision, the Chamber mentions that the majority’s 
opinion is that Article 30 encompasses dolus eventualis,777 however, in the same footnote it 
also cites the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Usacka that there is no need for the present 
Decision to discuss whether the concept of dolus eventualis has a place within the framework 
of Article 30 of the Statute, because the Chamber will not rely on this concept for the mental 
element in relation to the crimes charged.778 
 
The Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, on the other hand, was apparently in support of 
the view of Piragoff and Robinson that the concept of dolus eventualis is included in Article 
30, though not the notion of recklessness, as dolus eventualis requires a higher volition than 
recklessness, and such volition is based on the knowledge of the overwhelming probability of 
the occurrence of a result.779 
 
However, it went further by taking a rather expansive definition of dolus eventualis to include 
the circumstances where the probability of the occurrence of a consequence is low. 
According to the Pre-trial Chamber, dolus eventualis can be inferred from two different 
degrees of probability of the occurrence of a consequence:  
                                                          
775 The recruitment of children mentioned in this section is not related to mental element in respect of the age of 
the child itself. As to the mental state regarding the age of a child, it will be discussed in the following section.  
776 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-1/07, Defence Written Observations Addressing 
Matters That Were Discussed at the Confirmation Hearing, 28 July, 2008, paras. 31-32. 
777 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-1/07, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, Pre-trail Chamber, 30 September 2008, fn. 329. The author takes the view that this 
finding was made in such a reckless manner that the Chamber treated this opinion as valid without even 
engaging in an examination of their basis, or giving any explanation or approaches how this opinion is made.  
778 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Defence Written Observations Addressing 
Matters That Were Discussed at the Confirmation Hearing, supra note 776, para. 531. For more details about 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that in respect of counts 6, 7, 8, 
and 9, the suspects acted with dolus directus in the first or second degree, see ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga & 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-1/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Anita Usacka, in: Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 777, paras. 13-35.  
779ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, paras. 352 – 355. 
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“a) the risk of bringing about the objective element of the crime is 
substantial (that is, there is a likelihood that it ‘will occur in the 
ordinary course of events’)”; and 
“b)the risk if bringing about the objective element of the crime is 
low”.780 
 
In both cases the accused must have a certain degree of subjective attitudes toward the 
consequences, or a “clear acceptance of the consequences”.781 To the Chamber, this volition 
element is essential in the second case, where the probability of a consequence is low.782 
 
iv. Dolus Eventualis Can be Included into the Realm of Article 30 (2) (b) 
 
Based on the above discussion, the author agrees with Piragoff and Robinson, i.e., to interpret 
Article 30 (2) (b) in such a broad sense as to include circumstances where the accused has the 
knowledge of a substantial probability that the consequence will occur. And therefore the 
conclusion is that the notion of dolus eventualis can be explained as having a place within the 
framework of Article 30 (2) (b).  
 
Firstly, there are some good theoretical ground for taking dolus eventualis as a form of intent. 
According to the Romano-Germanic concept of intent, intent is constituted in two 
conjunctive components: the awareness (knowledge of a pertinent consequence) and the will 
(acceptance of the result).783From this perspective, dolus eventualis shares the same nature 
and essence with criminal intent. This idea is supported by some national criminal laws, 
which warrant treating intent and dolus eventualis in the same way. For example, the Italian 
                                                          
780 Ibid., paras.353–354. 
781 Ibid.,para. 438. 
782 Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute without it?, supra note 773, p. 437.  
783 Both the French and Italian criminal laws require “the foreseen and desire” elements. See Mohamed Elewa 
Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a 
Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, supra note 718, p. 492. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, paras. 351: “The cumulative reference to ‘intent’ and 
‘knowledge’ requires the existence of a volitional element on the part of the suspect.” See also Mohamed Elewa 
Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a 
Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, supra note 718, p. 492.  
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criminal law recognizes dolus eventualis as a form of constructive intention. 784  Dolus 
eventualis is, in South African criminal law, “a sufficient form of mens rea for all crimes 
based on intention”.785 In other countries, such as Germany, the “consent and approval theory” 
(i.e. “Wissen and Wollen”) is widely applied by the courts and accepted by the majority of 
German scholars.786 Likewise, the Austrian Criminal Code in Section 5 (1) defines ‘intent’ in 
exactly the same way, and therefore follows the German doctrine.787 
 
However, it must be contended that the opinion of the Pre-trail Chamber in the Lubanga case 
is unsatisfactory, where the analysis of dolus eventualis in the second situation appears to be 
subjective, hence, flawed.  
 
According to the Pre-trial Chamber decision, dolus evenutualis in the second situation is the 
circumstances where the risk of bringing about an objective element is low. In this case, 
knowing that the predictability of the event is near to improbable to be foreseeable, and thus 
it is highly questionable to impute the accused with the knowledge or foresight that the 
consequence “will occur”. In other words, if the consequence is not one predictable with a 
high probability, thus foreseeable to the accused, the prosecution would be hard put to prove 
a charge of “intentionally causing the consequence”. 
 
In fact, dolus eventualis should not be seen as specifying a low threshold element. The 
perpetrator is required actually to be able to perceive the occurrence of the consequence as 
probably but not remote. 788 Therefore, the Chamber should have given an explanation 
concerning the degree of “low” probability, in order not to confuse the borderlines between 
dolus eventualis and recklessness, or even criminal negligence in some cases. 
 
                                                          
784Article 43 of the Italian Penal Code. See also Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute 
without it?, supra note 773, pp. 443-444. 
785 Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute without it?, supra note 773, p. 444. 
786 The “consent and approval theory” requires the offender must not only foresee the consequences as possible 
(Wissen), but also accept the consequences (Wollen). See Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the 
Rome Statute without it?, supra note 773, p. 445. 
787 Kienapfel Diethelm & Höpfel Frank, Grundriss des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 13th Edition, Manz, 2009, 
pp. 94-95.  
788Mohamed Elewa Badar, Dolus Eventualis and the Rome Statute without it?, supra note 773, p. 446. 
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c) Proof of Intent  
It is a general practice that determination of the subjective elements is based on inference 
more or less entirely from the overt act.789Paragraph 3 of the general introduction to the EoC 
gives a general guidance on proof of intent, affirming that“[e]xistence of intent and 
knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances”.790 
 
In the case of conscription of children, the mens rea of using force may be derived from 
physical violence or overt expression of threats of abduction.791 Apart from the question of 
the age itself, which will be discussed later,792 there was no possibility that a defendant can 
accidentally or innocently abduct children, or forcibly send children to military camps. All of 
these acts necessarily underlay an intention of making the child a soldier. In the case of 
enlistment or use of children to take active part in hostilities, things are not much different. 
The fact that an individual gave a gun or uniform to a child, or put a child’s name on the 
recruitment list is in itself good enough evidence, for there could hardly be a plausible 
argument that he had no intention of recruiting the child for military purposes, even if the act 
was simply putting a uniform on a child. In this case, there is no question of the actor 
unknowingly and unintentionally causing the result.793 
 
The Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case gave special considerations to the overt acts of 
Lubanga in the determination of his awareness of the implementation of child recruitment, 
his willingness to accept the result by reconciling himself with it or by condoning it.794 The 
evidence given for the crime of child recruitment included, apart from others, Lubanga’s visit 
                                                          
789 Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.176. See also 
William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, supra note 716, p. 222, “The intent is a logical deduction 
that flows from evidence of the material acts”. See also the Akayesu case, where the intent is inferred from the 
physical acts, and specifically their massive and/or systematic nature or their atrocity. ICTR, AkayesuTrial 
Judgment, supra note 420, para. 477. 
790EoC, general introduction, para. 3.  
791 Edward Eldefonso & Alan R. Coffey, Criminal Law: History, Philosophy, Enforcement, Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1817. 
792 See infra Part: Should have known, Chapter 4.  
793One may argue here self-defense is a good defense. But what it is discussed here is not ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility, but the proving of the mens rea. 
794ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 404. 
 197 
 
to FPLC training camps when the recruitment of underage children were in progress, the 
transcript of the speech of Lubanga in front of the young FPLC recruits, his instructions 
encouraging the supply of young recruits to the FPLC, as well as the use of children as 
bodyguards for his home.795All this was delivered to the court to establish the intent of 
Lubanga to commit the crime of child recruitment as a co-perpetrator. 
 
d) Intent vs. Motive 
 
It should be pointed out that mens rea should not be confused with “motive”, though many a 
prosecutor have often enough cited motive as circumstantial evidence to prove that a 
defendant acted intentionally or knowingly.  
 
Essentially, motive refers to the underlying cause of a person’s actions. However, by nature, 
mens rea is different from motive. Mens rea, being a will to a conduct or a consequence, with 
stress on knowledge of the consequence, is therefore an essential element for the constitution 
of a crime, while motive does not necessarily involve knowledge of the consequence of the 
act.796 For, a bad motive will not necessarily make an act a crime, nor will a good motive 
prevent an act from being a crime.797 
 
For example, a child may be recruited to serve in a war, which could be fought for a motive 
“to defend the homeland, to safeguard the safety of the public, or to fight against aggressors”, 
for a “public” or “lofty” purpose in a so-called “just war”.798 In other words, the existence of 
such motives does not necessarily involve, thus would not prove, an intention to recruit 
children for military purposes. In short, motives do not necessarily contribute to the 
commission of a crime.799 
                                                          
795Ibid.,paras. 405. 
796 Edward Eldefonso & Alan R. Coffey, Criminal Law History, Philosophy, Enforcement, supra note 791, p.47. 
797Ibid. 
798SCSL, Norman Appeal Judgment, supra note 267. 
799 This view has been affirmed by the ICTY in trials concerning the crime of genocide. ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 694. ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Milorad Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 102. ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Goran Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 49. ICTY, Prosecutor v. 
Radoslav Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 696.  
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b. Knowledge as Mens Rea of the Crime of Child Recruitment under Article 30 
 
The notion of “knowledge”, as stipulated in Article 30 (3), refers to the “awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”800 There 
are therefore implicitly two forms of knowledge: a) knowledge of a circumstance, and b) 
knowledge of a consequence.801 Since the latter is an element shared by both the concept of 
intent and that of knowledge,802 the following section will focus on the first form: knowledge 
of a circumstance, as the second form has already undergone close examination early on. 
 
Firstly, it is clear that “knowledge of a circumstance” contains the notion of “actual 
knowledge”. Take for example, evidence may show that the defendant received certain 
records or had them in his or her possession. The law may in consequence assume that he or 
she read and understood them. But this is not the notion of actual “knowledge” under Article 
30 (3). The apparently logical assumption constitutes a form of “constructive knowledge”. 
 
In fact, no form of constructive knowledge, either in “should have known”, or in "has reason 
to know" would be compatible with the notion of “knowledge” under Article 30 (3). However, 
as mentioned earlier, with the clause of “unless otherwise provided”, the Roman Statute 
makes it clear that its provisions should be taken into consideration. As discussed in the 
previous section, the author takes the view that Article 30 should be interpreted as the default 
rule to be applied only if there are no specific rules on the mental element in either the other 
provisions of the Rome Statue, the EoC or other legal sources under Article 21. Considering 
that except for the Rome Statute and the EoC, there is neither case law nor relevant 
international instrument that had provided the mens rea for the crime of child recruitment 
before the Lubanga case, the “should have known” standard adopted as a subsequent 
complementation in the interpretation of the Rome Statute should be applied. This is what 
will be discussed in the following section, that is, what “should have known” standard 
regarding the age of a child must consist of.803 
                                                          
800 Rome Statute, Article 30.  
801 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note249, p.164. 
802 Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30, supra note 720, p. 860, para. 25. 
803 See infra C. Mens rea regarding the Age of a Child. 
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 In general, “knowledge” of a circumstance can be inferred from relevant facts and 
circumstances, 804  and in most cases the prosecution only needs to offer circumstantial 
evidence, such as a defendant's statements or other behaviors, to prove a defendant’s 
knowledge.805 
 
As far as the crime of child recruitment is concerned, the circumstantial evidence of the 
knowledge of the accused can be deduced from the context of the crime, which may include 
the following factors: i) the number of children being recruited; ii) the geographical scale of 
child recruitment committed; iii) the time during which the illegal acts occurred; iv) the fact 
of deliberately and systematically targeting young children as manpower for the armed force; 
v) the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; vi) the ranks of officers involved, and vii) 
particular circumstances of the specific area, etc. These factors will offer a basis for the Court 
to assess the knowledge of the accused with regard to the circumstance of children being 
recruited into the armies, or used to take active part in hostilities. 
 
c. The Mens Rea Regarding the Age of a Child  
 
In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the mental elements required by a specific 
crime,806 the default rule “unless otherwise provided” requires the reading of Article 30 in 
conjunction with the EoC. In connection with the crime of child recruitment, the EoC 
specifies two levels of knowledge regarding the age of a child: “knew” and “should have 
known”. As stated in Paragraph 3 of the EoC relating to Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and Article 
8(2)(e)(vii), “[t]he perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were 
under the age of 15 years.”807 
 
As a constructive knowledge, “should have known” is a lesser mental state than “actual 
knowledge”. Nonetheless it is however sufficient, in accordance with the EoC, to constitute 
the mental state regarding the age of the victim. That is to say if the prosecutor is able to 
                                                          
804 John Tessitore & Susan Woolfs, A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 5th Assembly of the UN, supra note722, 
p.257. ICTY, Tadic Trial Judgment, supra note 577, paras.657, 659. 
805 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, supra note716, p. 211. 
806 Ibid., p.30. 
807 EoC, paras.33, 53. 
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prove that the perpetrator was negligent to the existence of the circumstance that the child 
recruited was under the age of 15, the charge should be allowed to stand. In the following, the 
second mental state, i.e., the standard of “should have known” will be discussed. 
 
a) The Approaches of Interpreting “Should Have Known” Standard  
 
The “should have known” standard, as an additional mental element requirement in 
“determining the age of a child”808 is, in the first place, a lower mental state than “actual 
knowledge”, thus not necessarily requiring the person knew for certain that the victim was 
under the age of 15.809 Secondly, the “should have known” standard is not a form of strict 
liability, holding a defendant responsible solely because of his position of authority,810 but is 
a form of culpable failure, failure to be apprised of a particular circumstance, such as, the real 
age of the child being recruited. Nevertheless, what remains unclear is to what extent is the 
liability attached to a culpable failure.811 There are two approaches regarding this issue: the 
failure to obtain information, or the failure to acknowledge the information. 
 
i.  The “Failure to Obtain the Information” Approach 
 
The “failure to obtain the information” approach holds that a person should be held 
responsible for his or her failure to comply with his or her duty to act with due diligence to 
obtain information of a certain fact or circumstance. What is meant by this approach is that it 
is not necessary for the recruiter to have intent to ignore the age of a child at the time when 
                                                          
808 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 359. 
809Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 234, pp. 32, 207. 
810 The jurisprudence of the international tribunals, include the IMT, suggests that command responsibility is not 
a strict liability. See United States v. Wilhelm List and others (Hostages Trial), VIII Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, 1949, p. 34. See also German High Command Trial, XII Law Reports of Trial of WAR 
Criminals, 1951, p. 76. See also ICTR, AkayesuTrial Judgment, supra note 420, para. 489. See also ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic & Esad Landzo, (Celebici), Appeal Judgment, supra 
note 562, para. 239.  
811 Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blaskic and 
Beyond, 5 JICJ (2007): 638, pp. 652-653.  
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the recruitment is committed. But he or she should be held responsible for his or her 
negligence in not exhibiting a degree of due care for the safeguard of the age of the child. 
 
This is the idea first raised in the Hostages Trial before the IMT in a similar context of 
command responsibility, where the Tribunal stated that, a commander  
 
“is charged with notice of occurrences taking place within that 
territory. He may require adequate reports of all occurrences that 
come within the scope of his power and, if such reports are 
incomplete or otherwise inadequate, he is obliged to require 
supplementary reports to apprise him of all the pertinent facts. If he 
fails to require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of 
duty rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own 
dereliction as a defence.”812 
 
This approach was taken up by a majority of case law of the IMT and IMTFE, and later was 
confirmed in the Blaskic case of the ICTY. The Chamber in the Blaskic trial took the view 
that the existence of  
 
“a specific information giving rise to a suspicion is not required as a 
prerequisite to attract a criminal responsibility to a commander, as 
it is the commander’s duty to collect and investigate the conducts of 
the subordinates”.813 
 
In essence, this approach requires that it be a duty of the commander to obtain the 
information regarding the crimes of the subordinates.814 The imputation of liability is linked 
to the defendant’s omission to use all the available sources to be informed of a certain fact or 
circumstance. 
 
ii. The “Failure to Acknowledge the Information” Approach 
                                                          
812 See United States v. Wilhelm List and others, VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, at, 71. See also 
Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources 
and Commentary, supra note 508, p.375.  
813 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 322.  
814 Ibid.,para. 332. As can be seen from the judgment, the Chamber held that “General Blaskic did not perform 
his duties with the necessary reasonable diligence.” 
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It is sometimes suggested that, at least, serious negligence or recklessness is part of the 
requirement with regard to “should have known” standard, where the accused is criminally 
responsible if he or she did not care to know.815 Under this interpretation, it is sufficient for 
the prosecutor to demonstrate that an accused was aware of the risk that the child recruited 
was under the age of 15, but failed to take reasonable care to avoid the risk.816 Thus, this 
approach is comparable to the “had reason to know” standard. That is, if one takes a good 
look at the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR, it is not difficult to find817 that both 
tribunals have consistently rejected a “duty to obtain the information” formula in the context 
of command responsibility,818 which would hold a commander criminally responsible for the 
actions of his subordinates, that is, negligence to obtain information presumably within his 
reach.819 
 
On the contrary, the “had reason to know” standard sets out a “volitional element”, requiring 
a mental state of negligence serious enough to amount to acquiescence.820 If the “had reason 
to know” standard is to apply to cases of child recruitment, the prosecution would have to 
show that general information regarding the age of the child was available to the defendant, 
or at least put him or her on notice of the very high likelihood that the child had been 
recruited or is about to be recruited is under the age of 15 years. 
                                                          
815 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sources and Commentary, supra note 617, p.375. ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, supra note 351, para. 358. 
816 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sources and Commentary, ibid.,p. 381. 
817 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic Trial Judgment, supra note 813, para. 332. 
818 Although command responsibility is an omission mode of responsibility, and therefore might require a 
special and different mens rea from the individual responsibility, the interpretation and application of “should 
have known” standard and “has reason to know” standards can be a valuable reference to the present issue.  
819 To name a few of the cases: see ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, supra note 612, paras. 386-389. See also 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic & Esad Landzo, (Celebici), Appeal Judgment, 
supra note 562, para. 241. See also ICTY, Blaskic Appeal Judgment, supra note 799, paras. 257- 258. See also 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 3 July 2002, paras. 34-
35. See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic, IT-01-48-T, Trail Chamber, Judgment, 16 November 2005, 
para. 71.  
820 ICTR, AkayesuTrial Judgment, supra note 420, para. 489. 
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The Celebici case, 821 in a note of clarification, found that the “had reason to know” is 
consistent with Article 86 of the AP I,822 which requires that  
 
“a superior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific 
information was in fact available to him which would provide notice 
of offences committed by his subordinates. Such information need 
not provide conclusive proof of the crimes, but must be enough so 
that it ‘indicated the need for additional investigation’”.823 
 
This finding actually overturned the interpretation of “should have known” standard made in 
the Blaskic case. The introduction of a “had reason to know” standard substituted the formula 
of “dereliction of duty to obtain information” for the requirement of “failure to acknowledge 
available information”. This is pointed out by Arnold, under the “had reason to know” 
standard, 
 
“a supervisor is only liable for having failed to take notice of 
information that may have indicated the occurrence of crimes, but 
not for the failure of obtaining that information.”824 
 
b) The Interpretation of the “Should Have Known” Standard in the 
Lubanga Case  
 
                                                          
821 ICTY, Delalic et al, Trial Judgment, supra note 612.  
822 Article 86(2), API states that “[t]he fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed 
by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if 
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, 
that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures 
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.” 
823 ICTY, Delalic et al, Trial Judgment, supra note 612, para. 393.  
824Roberta Arnold, Article 28:Responsibility of Commanders and other Superiors, in: Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Otto Triffterer), supra note 720, 
p. 829. 
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Despite the wide and nearly consistent practice in the application of the “had reason to know” 
standard by the two ad hoc tribunals, the interpretation of the “should have known” standard 
is placed at the discretion of the ICC on a case to case basis.  
 
This is obviously the case with the Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case. Though it 
acknowledged the jurisprudence of the ICTY in the application of the “had reason to know” 
standard, the Chamber of the Lubanga case, nevertheless, adopted the “failure to obtain the 
information” formula in its interpretation of the “should have known” requirement. Take the 
conditions stipulated by the Pre-trial Chamber for the application of the “should have known” 
standard that when the suspect, 
 
“i. did not know that the victims were under the age of fifteen years 
at the time they were enlisted, conscripted, or used to participate 
actively in hostilities; and  
ii. lacked such knowledge because he or she did not act with due 
diligence in the relevant circumstances (one can only say that the 
suspect ‘should have known’ if his or her lack of knowledge results 
from his or her failure to comply with his or her duty to act with due 
diligence).” 825 
 
An example of such diligence is the care that should be exercised even if the physical 
appearance of a child suggests that he or she is over 15 years, as emphasized in the following 
by Dörman: 
 
“The mens rea requirement [should have known] would […] be met 
if the accused does not provide for safeguards and inquire the age of 
the child even though the child’s age appears close to the protected 
minimum age.”826 
 
                                                          
825ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 351, para. 358. 
826Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources 
and Commentary, supra note 617, p.375. See also Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, supra note 735, p. 262. See generally Johan 
D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal 
Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2004): 57, p.65. 
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What would count as “due diligence”, according to Happold, include “asking the age of 
recruits, seeking to verify their answers from parents, or looking at birth certificates or other 
identity documents”.827 
 
c) Rationalizing the “Had Reason to Know” Standard Regarding the Age of 
a Child 
 
The Lubanga trial followed the IMT’s practice in the interpretation of the standard of “should 
have known” as a culpable liability of failure to obtain relevant information relating to a 
circumstance. However, in regard to the crime of child recruitment, it is the belief of the 
author that the “has reason to know” standard is more appropriate for the “should have 
known” standard, as a higher threshold of the mens rea is believed to be fairer. 
 
This belief stems essentially from the fact that it is not often the case that recruiters have all 
the resources available to access information as to whether a child is under the age of 15, or 
has attained the generally accepted legal age for military service. In countries, such as the 
DRC, or in the areas such as southern Sudan, there is no efficient system or mechanism for 
documenting births. Even in countries with developed administrative systems, children are 
unlikely to be carrying such documentations in times of war or civil upheaval.828 While the 
appearance and the maturity could be a strong indication that a child is over 15 years, it is 
however not an indicator which is, in and of itself, sufficient to establish the real age of the 
child.829 
 
From this perspective, applying the “failure to obtain the information” approach to the crime 
of child recruitment would arguably be unfair. Basically, the accused should not take 
responsibility for something unlikely to be foreseeable, due to shortage of information. 
Accordingly, the “had reason to known” standard applied by the ICTY and the ICTR is 
                                                          
827 Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
supra note 711, p. 99.  
828Eva La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, supra note 590, pp.113-114.  
829In certain area, children matured earlier. A child of 15 years old may look like a grow-up. An individual in 
charge of recruitment might conscript him among a great number of grown-ups by negligence. 
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believed to offer a better guidance for the definition of the mental state required in regard to a 
child’s age. 
 
C.    CONCLUSION 
 
Although the Rome Statute marked a new era in which child recruitment is criminalized as a 
war crime under international law, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and Article 8 (2) (e) (vii) of the 
Rome Statute have raised a number of questions about the contours of the crime of child 
recruitment. This chapter focused on some of the ambiguities contained in the languages of 
Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi), Article 8 (2) (e) (vii) and Article 30, in an attempt to clarify such 
ambiguities by making a balance between the best interests of the child and the protection of 
the rights of the accused. 
 
Firstly, it was pointed out that the actus reus of the crime of child recruitment consists of two 
forms: the “recruitment of children in armed forces or groups” and the “use of children to 
participate actively in hostilities”. It is argued that the “use of children to participate actively 
in hostilities” should only refer to activities related to military operations, and not be 
extended to indirect participation of children as laborers for logistic tasks. However, it must 
be noted that such interpretation of the form of “use”, does not necessarily exclude the 
“indirect participation” from the crime of child recruitment. For those children, as de facto 
members of the armed forces or groups, would naturally fall under the category of victims of 
de facto “recruitment”. The separation of the “use of children to participate actively in 
hostilities” from de facto recruitment, is thought to provide more flexibility for the Judges in 
criminal sentencing.  
 
As to the mens rea of the crime of child recruitment, Article 30 of the Rome Statute, through 
the phrase “unless otherwise provided”, leaves the door open for application of rules not 
stipulated in the Roman Statute, which were however provided in the EoC and other 
international instruments. The ambiguous and imprecise wording of Article 30 (2) has raised 
a number of questions about whether dolus eventualis can be explained as part of intent under 
the framework of Article 30 (2). What is argued in this chapter is that the practice, at national 
level of treating intent and dolus eventualis in exactly the same way, suggests that there are 
theoretical grounds to include dolus eventualis as a form of intent. However, the more 
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expansive approach adopted by the Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case seemed to have 
muddied the water more and brought more questions on this issue.  
As to the mens rea of the age of a child, the argument raised in the chapter is that the “should 
have known” Standard should be given a narrow explanation to set the liability to “failure to 
acknowledge the information” but not to “failure to obtain the information” of the age of a 
child. Such explanation is in conformity with the reality in the warring zones where the 
availability of information is rather difficult and sometimes impossible. 
 
The decision of the Pre-trial Chamber in the Lubanga case on the nature of the armed conflict 
regarding the alleged crimes committed by Lubanga is put under close scrutiny in this 
chapter. Discussion is made to understand the approach adopted by the Pre-trial Chamber in 
its analysis of the issue of the extent to which a foreign military intervention would be 
deemed sufficient to internationalize an internal armed conflict. The analysis of the different 
approaches of the ICTY and the ICJ in the determination of the issue of whether an agent is 
acting on behalf of a foreign state, has demonstrated different levels of requirements in the 
establishment of state responsibility in international law and the individual criminal 
responsibility in criminal law.  
 
Finally, although the Rome Statute only criminalized the act of recruitment or use of children 
under the age of 15 in hostilities, there are certain signs that sentiment is turning in favor of 
raising the age limit to 18 years. It is to be hoped that the age issue will be given full 
consideration in the future draft on the issue of child recruitment. 
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PART III – FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
Children, as the most vulnerable group in armed conflicts, deserve special attention and full 
protection by the international community. It is the duty of every State to prohibit the use of 
child soldiers and to establish relevant judicial systems, including municipal legislations, to 
make possible prosecution and punishment of perpetrators who commit the crime of child 
recruitment.  
 
The achievement of the international judicial community is undeniable in the development of 
international standards concerning the prohibition and punishment of child recruitment. 
Progress is clearly visible from GC IV to OPCRC, where the former only prohibited forcible 
recruitment of children under the age 15 and the latter not only bans both the forcible 
recruitment and recruitment of volunteers, but also raises the recruitment age to 18 years. The 
adoption of the Rome Statute, which for the first time expressly criminalized the act of child 
recruitment as a crime, is generally regarded as a big step forward.  
 
However, these developments in legislation have so far failed to produce a drastic reduction 
in the use of child soldiers. The inhumane and widespread practice of child recruitment in 
various war areas and the miserable life of child soldiers during protracted conflicts continue 
calling for vigilance and commitment from the international community.  
 
To achieve the real progress of eliminating child soldering, it is not simply a comprehensive 
legal standard-setting. Besides that, norms must be fully enforced, and prosecution must 
always be brought to perpetrators who committed the crime of child recruitment. The 
widespread and prevalent use of child solders may result from three main reasons. Firstly, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, every international instrument relating to child recruitment has their 
own flaws, resulting either from compromises in some of the key issues, or from vague and 
broad language.  
 
Secondly, the applicability of international humanitarian law depends largely upon the 
adoption of appropriate national legislation, and the end of child soldering cannot be 
achieved without the respect of each state. Accordingly governments of States Parties should 
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fulfill entirely their obligation to adopt or supplement the relevant national legislation. What 
seems truly delightful is that the rapid development in the regulatory mechanism to stop the 
use of child soldiers on the international level has witnessed sufficient rise in state practice 
and opinio juris of the criminalization of child recruitment. As discussed in Chapter 3,since 
the adoption of the Rome Statute, child recruitment has crystallized as a crime under 
customary international law.  
 
The last reason, which also will be the next step in the process of eliminating child soldering, 
is the effective prosecution of perpetrators. The analysis of case law regarding the crime of 
child recruitment in Chapter 2 showed that so far there are only nine trials involving 13 
accused before both the SCSL and the ICC. The number of perpetrators punished or being 
prosecuted is rather limited. Clearly more judicial practice is urgently needed to enrich the 
authority of the law on the crime of child recruitment. 
 
Additionally, trials of the crime of child recruitment can not only bring deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and healing effects, but also provide a good opportunity to clarify some 
misconceptions and vague language used in the provisions. In Chapter 4, the provisions 
regarding the crime of child recruitment in the Rome Statute and the EoC have been analyzed 
with the aim of identifying the key factors in the constituency of the crime of child 
recruitment before the international criminal tribunals. The reasoning and findings in the 
relevant cases, especially in the Lubanga case before the ICC, have been subjected to close 
examination, which at the same time has helped with the development of the theories 
proposed here.  
 
Firstly, the actus reus of the crime of child recruitment contains two offences: recruiting 
(conscripting or enlisting) children under the age of 15 into armed forces or groups; and the 
use of them to take active part in hostilities. As far as “recruitment” is concerned, it refers to 
both de jure and de facto recruitment. The term “use of children to participate actively in 
hostilities” only refers to military activities linked to combat. Any indirect participation, to a 
large extent, can be regarded as part of de facto recruitment. The separation of the “use of 
children” taking active part in hostilities from “recruitment of children” is thought to provide 
more flexibility for the Judges in criminal sentencing.   
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Secondly, even though Article 30 of the Rome Statute sets down a narrow definition, it has 
not blocked the possibility to extend the definition to include mental elements elsewhere 
provided, such as in the EoC. It is evident from the language of “unless otherwise provided”. 
Accordingly, besides intent and knowledge, the criteria of “should have known” should also 
be applied as mens rea in the case of child recruitment. A narrow explanation of the “should 
have known” standard has been argued to be applied to set the liability of the accused for his 
“failure to acknowledge the information” concerning the age of a child.  
 
Recent trends in the development of the norms of child recruitment should also not be 
underestimated. Although it is widely recognized that the minimum age of recruitment of 
children is 15 years for this crime, it has been argued that on the basis of the principle of 
maximal protection of civilians (including children) in armed conflicts and the principle of 
the best interest of children in international human rights law, it is however necessary to raise 
the minimum recruitment age from 15 years to 18 years. As more states accept to raise the 
age of recruitment to 18 years, it is also hoped that recruitment or the use of children under 
the age of 18 may become a crime under customary international law one day.  
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ANNEX I: ZUSAMMENFASSUNG(DUETSCH) 
 
Trotz der Dynamik, die sich in der letzten Dekade in der Entwicklung des internationalen 
Rechts zur Verhinderung und Bestrafung des Kindersoldatentums gezeigt hat, ist das 
Phänomen der Kindersoldaten bis heute ein weit verbreitetes Problem. Die vorliegende 
Dissertation versucht, mit einer Analyse der Verbrechen der Rekrutierung von Kindern 
effektive Mittel zum Schutz der Kinder vor Rekrutierung in bewaffneten Konflikten zu 
finden. Das Ausmaß der Probleme wird dabei derart dargestellt, dass die unterschiedlichen 
Rahmenbedingungen der Normen der Rekrutierung von Kindern verglichen, die praktischen 
und rechtlichen Ansätzen, die ergriffen wurden, um auf das Kindersoldatentum zu reagieren, 
diskutiert und die Trends für die zukünftige Entwicklung hervorgehoben werden.  
 
Teil I untersucht den Rahmen des Völkerrechts in Bezug auf das Verbot von 
Kindersoldatentum. Zu diesem Zweck bewertet und vergleicht Kapitel 1 historische 
Entwicklungen innerhalb des humanitären Völkerrechts, der internationalen Menschenrechte 
und des internationalen Strafrechts in Bezug auf Bestimmungen über die Rekrutierung von 
Kindern. Kapitel 2 untersucht die gerichtliche Praxis der internationalen Gerichtshöfe für die 
Verfolgung der Täter, die das Verbrechen der Rekrutierung von Kindern begangen haben, im 
Detail.  
 
Teil II, der dem Hauptteil dieser Studie entspricht, konzentriert sich auf die Analyse des 
Verbrechens der Rekrutierung von Kindern im Regime des Völker-Strafrechts. Kapitel 3 
führt eine detaillierte Diskussion über die völkergewohnheitsrechtliche Natur des 
Verbrechens der Rekrutierung von Kindern, dabei wird die Rechtmäßigkeit der gerichtlichen 
SCSL-Entscheidung der Berufungskammer im Norman Case,  Personen, die Kinder vor 1996 
rekrutiert oder in Feindseligkeiten verwendet haben, hinterfragt. Im Anschluss daran werden 
die staatliche Praxis und die opiniojuris der Kriminalisierung des Kindersoldatentums unter 
die Lupe genommen. Verschiedene Äußerungen, die von der Berufungskammer in der 
genannten Entscheidung vorgebracht wurden, werden in diesem Kapitel dargelegt und 
kritisiert. In Kapitel 4 werden einige grundsätzliche Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf die 
Tatbestandsmerkmale dieser Verbrechen, die das Römische Statut und der EOC zur 
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Verfügung stellen, erörtert. Zu diesem Zweck bezieht sich die Autorin auf 
Rechtsprechunginternationaler Strafgerichte sowie auf theoretische Perspektiven, die in 
einschlägigen Studien diskutiert worden sind. 
 
In Summe lässt sich feststellen, dass ein unabdingbares und absolutes Verbot des 
Kindersoldatentums auf internationaler Ebene etabliert wurde. Darüber hinaus wird 
angenommen, dass die Kriminalisierung des Kindersoldatentums seit der Verabschiedung des 
Römischen Statuts in der Staatenpraxis eine ausreichende Dichte erlangt hat. Obwohl eine 
juristische Praxis auf nationales Ebene in Bezug auf das Verbrechen der Rekrutierung von 
Kindern noch aussteht, haben sich die Strafverfolgung und Bestrafung der Täter auf der 
internationalen Ebene gut entwickelt. Die gerichtliche Praxis auf internationaler Ebene wird 
als fähig erachtet, für Staaten einen wertvollen Rahmen zur Anwendung und Auslegung der 
Normen bezüglich des Kindersoldatentums in deren nationalen Rechtssystemen zu bieten. 
 
Stichworter:    Kindersoldaten,   bewaffneter Konflikt, Einsatz, Zwangsverpflichtung,  
Wehrpflicht, Mindestalter der Rekrutierung, Völkergewohnheitsrecht 
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ANNEX II: ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) 
 
The phenomenon of child soldiering remains today a widespread problem, despite the 
dynamism shown in the development in international law in the past decade in prohibition 
and punishment of child soldiering. This dissertation attempts to find effective ways of 
protecting children from recruitment in armed conflicts with an analysis of the crime of child 
recruitment by outlining the scale of the problems such that the different frameworks of 
norms of child recruitment are compared, the practical and legal approaches that have been 
taken to respond to child soldiering are discussed, and the trends for future development are 
highlighted.  
 
Part I examines the frame of international law relating to the prohibition of child soldering. 
For this purpose, chapter 1 reviews and compares historical developments within 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law 
in regard to provisions relating to child recruitment. Chapter 2 further examines in detail the 
judicial practice of the international criminal tribunals on the prosecution of the perpetrators 
who committed the crime of child recruitment. 
 
Part II, being the main part of this study, focuses on the analysis of the crime of child 
recruitment in the regime of international criminal law. Chapter 3 carries out a detailed 
discussion of the customary nature of the crime of child recruitment, in which the judicial 
decision of the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Norman Case is questioned for its legality in 
terms of prosecuting persons who recruited or used children in hostilities before 1996. 
Following that, the state practice and opinio juris of criminalizing child soldiering are closely 
examined. Various pronouncements the SCSL Appeals Chamber raised in its decision are set 
out, and criticized, in this chapter. In Chapter 4, some conceptual problems relating to the 
constituent elements of this crime provided in the Rome Statute and the EoC are discussed. 
For this purpose, the author refers to case law of international criminal tribunals as well as to 
theoretical perspectives of scholars employed in relevant studies.  
 
In sum, the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of child soldiering is found to have been 
undeniably established on the international level. In addition, criminalization of child 
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soldiering is believed to have received sufficient density of State practice since the adoption 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It is understood that though judicial practice at the national 
level concerning the crime of child recruitment is still to be hoped for, prosecution and 
punishment on the international level of perpetrators are however well in progress. The 
judicial practice on the international level is believed capable of providing valuable 
framework for states to apply and interpret the norms of child soldiering in their national 
judicial systems.  
 
 
Key Words:  child soldiers, armed conflicts, recruitment, use, conscription,  
enlistment, minimum age of recruitment, customary international law  
 
 
 
  
 215 
 
ANNEX III: BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Books 
1. Graça Machel, The Impact of War on Children: A Review of Progress, London: Hurst & 
Co, 2001.  
2. Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Beck/Hart, 2nd edition, 2008. 
3. Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2003 
4. Roy Lee (ed.),The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, 
Negotiations, Results, Kluwer Law International, 1999 
5. Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, ICRC Geneva, 1951 
6. G. Goodwin-Gill and I. Cohen, Child Soldiers, Oxford University Press, 1994 
7. UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children 2006: Excluded and Invisible, New York, 
2005 
8. The Save the Children Fund, Forgotten Casualties of War: Girls in Armed Conflict, 
London, 2005 
9. Kienapfel Diethelm & Höpfel Frank, Grundriss des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 13th 
Edition, Manz, 2009 
10. Suzanne Miers, Slavery in the Twenties Century: The Evaluation of a Global Problem, 
Rowman Altamira, 2003 
11. H. G. Frank, The Barbaric Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty, the Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2003 
12. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, 2005 
13. Richard Shelley Hartigan, the Forgotten Victim: A History of the Civilian, Precedent 
Publisher, 1982 
14. Social Studies School Service, Ancient Greece, Social Studies Publisher, 2003 
15. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Penguin, 1968 
16. A. Clean Mower Jr., The UN Convention of on the Rights of the Child: International Law 
Support for Children, Greenwood 
17. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal law, 2nd (ed.), 
Kluwer Law International, 1999, 
 216 
 
18. Yves Sandoz & B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1997 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Geneva 1987 
19. Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law, Juris Publishing, Manchester 
University Press, 2005 
20. Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, Blood, Power and Bedlam: Violations of 
International Criminal Law in Post-Colonial Africa, Peter Lang, 2008 
21. F. Jenny Kuper, International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict, Oxford 
University Press, 1997 
22. Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Transnational, 2001 
23. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers, 1996 
24. Kenneth S. Gallant, Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law, 
Cambridge University press, 2008 
25. Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, Oxford University 
Press, 2005 
26. Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005 
27. Eva La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2008 
28. Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2003 
29. William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crime, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000 
30. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: 
Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text (3 vols), Martinus Nijhoff, 2005 
31. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays, Oxford University Press, 1999 
32.  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th (ed.), Oxford University Press, 
2003 
 
B. Articles  
33. M. Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law: the Legal Regulation of Children’s 
Participation in Hostilities, 47 Northern Ireland Law Reports (2000): 27  
34. Alison Smith, Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Law (2004): 1141 
 217 
 
35. Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber 
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 Pepperdine Law Review (2001): 167 
36. Daniela Kravetz, The protection of Civilian In War, The ICTY’s Galic Case, 17 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2004): 524 
37. Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Law?, 93 AM.J.INT’L L. (1999):452 
38. Jordan A. Gilbertson, Little Girls Lost: Can the International Community Protect Girl 
Soldiers?, 29 University of La Verne Law Review (2008): 219   
39. Dominique Marshall, The Construction of Children As An Object of International 
Relations: The Declaration of Children’s Rights and the Child Welfare Committee of League 
of Nations, 1900-1924, 7 International Journal of Children’s Rights (1999):2 
40. Susan Tieferbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 Fordham 
Int´L.J. (2008): 415 
41. Claire Breen, The Role of NGOs in The Formulation of and Compliance with the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, 25 Human Rights Quarterly (2003): 453 
42. Thomas Humphrey, Child Soldiers: Rescuing the Lost Children, 13 Australian Journal of 
Human Rights (2007) 1 
43. Timothy Webster, Babes with Arms: International Law and Child Soldiers, 39 Geo. 
Wash. Int’L. Rev. (2007): 227 
44. Bhavani Fonseka, The Protection of Child Soldiers in International Law, 2 Asia-Pacific 
Journal on Human Rights and the Law (2001):2 
45. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal (Spring 2002):184 
46. Pilar Villanueva Sainz-Pardo, Is Child Recruitment as a War Crime Part of Customary 
International Law?, 12 International Journal of Human Rights (2008): 555 
47. Knut Dörmann, War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes, 7 Max Planck Yearbook 
of United Nations Law (2003):341 
 218 
 
48. James G. Stewart, Towards A Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 IRRC (2003): 313 
49. Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment 
on Genocide in Bosnia, Eur J Int Law (2007) 18 (4): 649 
50. Amy B. Abbott, Child Soldiers-The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev. (2000):499 
51. Mohamed ElewaBadar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective, 19 Criminal 
Law Forum (2008): 473 
52. Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the 
ICC Statute and the Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law, 3 JICJ 
(2005): 35 
53. Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea 
in International Criminal Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2004): 57 
53. Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in ICC: The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001): 291 
54. Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 Criminal Law 
Forum (1999):1 
55. Ivan Jovanović, Immunity of Heads of State for International Crimes: Deflating 
Dictator’s Lifebelt?, 3 Belgrade Law Review (2009):206 
 
C. Cases  
a. ICJ (Permanent Court of International Justice) 
56. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark/Netherlands, Judgment, 20 February 1969 
57. Asylum Case, Colombia v. Peru, Judgment, 20 November 1950 
58. Fisheries Case, United States v. Norway, Judgment, 18 December 1951 
 219 
 
59. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua 
v. United States of America, Judgment, 27 June 1986 
60. Lotus Case, France v. Turkey, Judgment, Judgment, Serial A, No. 107, September 1927 
61. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Reports 1996, 
62. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo, Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Report 2005 
 
b. SCSL 
63. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72 (E), Decision on 
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004. 
64. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Decision on the 
Defence Motion on the Denial of Right to Appeal, Sam Hinga Norman (SCSL-2003-08-PT) 
and Morris Kallon (SCSL-2003-07-PT), Trial Chamber, 7 November 2003. 
65. Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Judgment, 2 
August 2007 
66. Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, No.SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 
May 2008 
67. Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Karama and Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Judgment, 20 June 2007 
68. Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-
2004-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 February 2008 
69. Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T, 
Trial Judgment, 2 March 2009 
70. Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, SCSL-04-15-A, 
Appeals Judgment, 26 October 2009 
71. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended 
Indictment, 29 May 2007, p. 6. 
72. Prosecutor v. Foday Sankoh, SCSL-03-02-I-001, Indictment, 7 March 2003 
73. Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma, SCSL-03-03-I, Indictment, 7 March 2003 
 
c. ICTY & ICTR 
 
 220 
 
74. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial 
Judgment, 6 December 1999 
75. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Judgment, 7 June 2001  
76. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000 
77. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, 22 January 2004 
78. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 
1998 
79. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-1-94-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2 October, 1995 
80. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Trial Judgment, November 30, 2005  
81. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Trial judgment, December 5, 2003 
82. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, 
17 December 2004 
83. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003 
84. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdjanin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment, 1 September 2004   
85. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Yejnil Delalic, Zdravko Muaic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, No. IT-
96-21-T, Trial Judgment, 16 November 1998  
86. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, IT-98-29-1/A, Appeal Judgment, 12 November 
2009 
87. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Auto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, Trial Chamber, 10 
December 1998 
88. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, ZdravkoMucic, Hazim Delic & Esad Landzo, IT-96-
21-A, Appeals Judgment20 February 2001 
89. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999 
90. ICTY, Prosecutor. v. Ivica Rajic, IT-95-12-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to 
Rule 61, 13 September 1996 
91. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic, IT-98-34-T, Trial Judgment, 
31 March 2003 
92. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, IT-03-66-T, Trial 
Judgment, 30 November 2005 
93. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac & Zoran Vukovic, IT-96-23/1-
A, Appeal Judgment, 12 June2002 
94. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment, 29 November 2002 
 221 
 
95. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, 29 July 2004 
96. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, 17 September 
2003 
97. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment, 5 July 2001 
 
d. ICC 
98. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Order for submissions on the 
Detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, 22 October 2008 
99. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public 
Redacted Version with Annex I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007 
100. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/07, Warrant 
of Arrest for Mathieur Ngudjolo Chui, 6 July 2007 
101. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant 
of Arrest for Germain Katanga, 2 July 2007 
102. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Public 
Redacted Version, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008 
103. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest for Bosco Ntaganda. 
12 January 2006 
 
D. Reports 
a. UN Reports  
104. Report of Graça Machel, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, 11 November, 
1996, UN Doc. A/51/306 (1996) 
105. Report of the Secretary-General, Child and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2000/712, 19 
July 2000 
106. Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. 
S/2002/1299, 26 November 2002 
107. Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
S/2000/915, 4 October 2000 
108. Security Council, S/RES/1261, on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts, 25 
August 1999. 
109. Security Council, S/RES/1314, on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts, 11 
August 2000 
 222 
 
110. Security Council, S/RES/1460, on Children in Armed Conflict, 30 January 2003 
111. Security Council, S/RES/1539, on Children in Armed Conflict, 22 April 2004 
112. Security Council, S/RES/1612, on children in Armed Conflict, 25 July 2005 
113. Security Council, S/RES/1379, on Children in Armed Conflict, 20 November 2001 
114. Security Council, S/RES/1299, on Children in Armed Conflict, 26 November 2002 
115.  Security Council, S/RES/1882, on Children in Armed Conflict, 4 August 2009 
116. General Assembly, A/51/77, 20 February 1997 
117. General Assembly, A/54/263, 16 March 2001 
118. General Assembly, A/57/190, 19 February 2003 
119. General Assembly, A/59/261, 24 February 2005 
120. General Assembly, A/42/141, 22 February 2008 
121. General Assembly, A/64/146, 3 March 2010 
122. UNGA Resolution S-27/2, A world Fit for Children, 10 May 2002  
 
b. Other Bodies 
123. Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed 
Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, 
Symposium of the NGO working Group on the Convention of the Child and UNICEF, 30 
April 1997 
124. International Red Cross, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
concerning involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, Position of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 322 IRRC 107 (1998) 
125. No Peace Without Justice & UNICEF, International Criminal Justice and Children 
(2002) 
126. Child Convention on the Rights of the Child, Campaign for U.S Ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
127. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Use 2003: A briefing for the 
4th Security Council open debate on Children and Armed Conflict 
128. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 
129. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2005 
130. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers and UNICEF, Guide to the Optional Protocol 
on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2007 
 223 
 
131. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Reluctant Recruits: Children 
and Adults forcibly recruited for the military service in North Kivu, Volume 13, No. 13, May 
2001 
132. UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Report, New York, 2005 
133. ECOSOC Resolution 2005/20, adopted by the plenary meeting on 22 July 2005 
134. ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) 
International Law, Statement of Principles Application to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty- Ninth Conference, London, 2000 
 
E. Conventions 
135. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.3 
136. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International armed Conflicts, June 8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 
137. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of victims of Non - International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
138. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, at 8, 9, 17, 37 I.L.M. 999  
139. International Labor Organization Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 182, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 106-S (1999), 38 I.L.M. 1207 
140. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict, Doc. A/54/L. 84 (2000) 
141. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990) 
142. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31  
143. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85  
144. Geneva Convention Relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135  
145. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287  
146. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/3 (1948) 
 224 
 
147. The Supplement Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 and done at 
Geneva on 7 September 1956 
148. Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) 
of 14 August 2000 
149. Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), The Elements of 
Crimes are reproduced from the Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, September 2002 
150. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976 
151. The European Convention on Human Rights was signed by the Council of Europe at 
Rome on 4 November 1950. Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, entered into force May 18, 1954 
152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered 
into force on 27 January 1980 
 
  
 225 
 
ANNEX IV: CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE AUTHOR 
 
EDUCATION 
 
• 03.2008-06. 2012: Vienna University, Doctoral Degree of Law, Vienna, Austria 
• 03.2007-02.2008: VWU, German Language Certificate for Preliminary University 
Study, Vienna, Austria 
• 09.2004-06.2006:Renmin University of China, Master of Law, Beijing, China 
• 09.1999-06.2003:Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Bachelor of Law, 
Wuhan, China 
• 09.2001-06.2003: Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Bachelor of 
Administration (Minor), Wuhan, China 
 
WORKING EXPERIENCE 
 
• 01.02.2011-31.12.2011: Project Assistant, UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies 
Centre, University of California, Berkeley, USA 
• 01.10.2010-30.01.2011: Intern, Corruption and Economic Crime Branch, UNODC, 
Vienna, Austria 
• 01.03.2009-02.04.2010: Visiting Scholar, UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies Centre, 
University of California, Berkeley, USA 
• 01.07.2006-28.02.2007: Consultant, Shandong Yangguang Engineering Design 
Institute, Jinan, Shandong Province, China 
• 01.09.2005-28.02.2006: Intern, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Hague, Netherlands     
• 10.09.2004-31.08.2005: Research Assistant, College for Criminal Law Science of 
Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China 
• 04.09.2003-03.09.2004: Paralegal, Shandong Excellent Law Firm, Jinan, Shandong 
Province, China 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
• The Application of Customary International Law before International Criminal 
Courts, accepted by the Journal: China International Criminal Law Review, to be 
published in July 2012 
• The Crime of Child Recruitment under International Law, 8 International Law 
Review of Wuhan University (2008), pp. 92-121 
 226 
 
• The Property Law: Estate Law, (co-author), China Legal Publishing House, 2007, 
350p. 
• The Property Law: Property Law in Rural Area, (co-author), China Legal Publishing 
House, 2007, 210p. 
• Translation of the article: Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military 
Relationship: Complementarities or Incompatibility into Chinese, in the book: Zhu 
wenqi (ed.), International Review of the Red Cross - International Humanitarian Law 
Literary Collection, Law Press China, 2006, pp. 161-186 
• Translation of the article: International Criminal Court: Impartial and Efficient 
International Criminal Justice for Asia and the World into Chinese, 1 China Review 
of International Criminal Law (2006), pp. 269-278 
• Views on the Rule of Law, 5 Shandong Judicial Review (2001), pp. 64-65 
• The Impact of Entering WTO on China’s Accounting System, 5 Journal of Plan and 
Market (2001), pp. 34-36 
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
• Participant, Summer Institute in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
“The Rights of Women and Children”, Singapore and Cambodia (4-16.07. 2011) 
• Conference Team, Global Standards-Local Action, 15 Years Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria (08.2008) 
• Conference Team, the Ethics Regional Workshop for Asia on International Criminal 
Law, Beijing, China (09.2006) 
• Conference Team, the Seminar on ICC and its Development in International 
Criminal Law, Shanghai, China (06.2005) 
• Member of Delegation of Renmin University of China, 3rd Red Cross International 
Humanitarian Law Moot Court, Hong Kong, China (03.2005) 
 
COMPUTER SKILLS 
 
• Operating System: Microsoft Windows, Windows NT, Windows Vista 
• General: MS Words, MS Excel, PowerPoint, Databases, Internet 
• Programming Language: C 
 
LANGUAGE 
 
 Chinese: Native Fluency 
 English: Good Fluency 
 German: Intermediate 
